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THE OHIO LANDLORD AND TENANT
REFORM ACT OF 1974
The Ohio legislature has passed comprehensive legislation to deal
with the changing nature of the residential tenancy. The new Ohio
landlord-tenant act contains several departures from the common
law. Repair responsibilities are divided between landlord and tenant.
Lease-drafting and retaliatory practices are subjected to close scrutiny.
A wide range of remedies is provided for the redress of grievances.
The author analyzes the statutory scheme, noting the interplay among
the provisions of the law. He concludes that the new statute lays
the foundation for a new attitude of cooperation between landlord
and tenant.
I. INTRODUCTION
JN THE closing hours of its final session, the 110th Ohio General
Assembly enacted a major reform of the laws governing the resi-
dential landlord-tenant relationship.' The legislation mandates a com-
prehensive restructuring of Ohio's legislative treatment of the resi-
dential tenancy and deliberately lays to rest much of the state's
common law in this area. In so doing, the statute draws heavily from
the substance and philosophy of the recently drafted Uniform Resi-
dential Landlord and Tenant Act.2
A fundamental innovation of the new law is the abandonment
of traditional reliance upon legal constructs, such as reversionary
interests, for the dictation of duties, in favor of statutory division of
1. Amended Substitute Senate Bill 103 was passed on July 23, 1974 and
became effective on November 4, 1974. The new law consists of a revision of
the existing chapter of the Ohio Revised Code treating forcible entry and de-
taminer, OHIo REv. CODE ANN. ch. 1923 (Page Supp. 1974), and an entirely
new chapter of the Code, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. ch. 5321 (Page Supp. 1974).
See Appendix for complete text.
2. Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Special Committee on the
Uniform Landlord-Tenant Relationship Act, Approved Draft (1974) [herein-
after cited as URLTA]. This draft was initially rejected at the midyear meet-
ing of the American Bar Association held in Cleveland, Ohio, in February
1973. Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-Tenant Act of the Committee on
Leases, Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 8 REAL PROP.
PROBATE & TkusT J. 104 & n.4 (1973); reprinted in full in R. POWELL, 2 LAW
OF REAL PROPERTY T 260.1 (Rohan ed. 1973). It was subsequently approved
by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association at the midyear
meeting held February 1974 in Houston, Texas. Note, Landlord-Tenant Re-
form: Arizona's Version of the Uniform Act, 16 ARiz. L. REV. 79 & n.4
(1974). See Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, supra
at 125-43, for the text of the final draft of the act, which is identical to the
approved act.
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responsibilities between landlord and tenant.3 This new scheme
assigns duties on the basis of the relative abilities of the parties to
fulfill obligations, 4 rather than upon the strict legal theories of
property law, which often led to inequitable allocations of responsi-
bilities. 5
To secure the performance of both landlord and tenant, the Act
sets forth formidable remedies, some wholly new to Ohio, others
merely refining common law remedies. 6 The tenant is the primary
beneficiary of the new statute, a necessary result in view of the statu-
tory goal of placing with the tenant the task of initiating action to
assure a habitable living space.
The remainder of the new law is designed to protect the alloca-
tion of responsibilities and the network of remedies from frustration
by private parties. Perhaps the most important of these provisions
is the prohibition of landlord retaliatory activity against the tenant
in response to his lawful exercise of statutory rights.7 In addition,
the statute rigidly controls the use of certain provisions in the indi-
vidual lease agreement in order to prevent contractural avoidance of
statutory objectives.8 Finally, in order to bar the summary disposi-
tion of complex issues and ensure the existence of a forum to hear
all disputes that may arise, the statute expands both the scope of the
hearing and the powers of the court in forcible entry and detainer
proceedings. 9
As with any new law of such broad influence, the legal commun-
ity will require a period to adjust to the creation of what is, in fact,
an entirely different legal environment. In this instance, the prob-
lems of adjustment may be particularly acute for several reasons.
First, the statute relies heavily on Ohio common law to clarify critical
3. Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.04, .05 (Page Supp. 1974).
4. See note 24 infra.
5. See, e.g., Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1279
(1960); Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evalua-
tion of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225
(1969); Schier, Protecting the Interests of the Indigent Tenant: Two Ap-
proaches, 54 CAu. L. REV. 670 (1966); Schoshinski, Remedies for the
Indigent Tenant-Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. LJ. 59 (1966); Skillern, War-
ranties in Leases: The Need for Change, 44 DENVER L.J. 387 (1967); Cf.
Bennett, The Modern Lease-An Estate in Land or a Contract?, 16 Tax. L.
REv. 47 (1937).
6. OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.04(B), .05(C), .07(B), .09(D), .11-
.12, 1923.02(H)-(I) (Page Supp. 1974).
7. Id. §§ 5321.02, .03.
"8. Id. §§ 5321.13, .14.
9. Id. §§ 1923.061, .081, .15.
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terms and to supplement the new law where collateral aspects of the
landlord-tenant relationship are not thoroughly covered. Such inter-
play demands that the statute fit precisely into the existing common
law context. Secondly, some of the provisions of the new law are
triggered by vague standards of reasonableness or materiality. The
objective factors relevant to defining these standards can be ascer-
tained only through extensive review of the legal commentary and
case law. Finally, the subtlety and complexity of the statute may
make it difficult to apply. Intricate connections exist between many
of its provisions. Unless these are carefully considered, much of
their significance and much of the force of the statute as a whole
will be lost. Obviously, none of these interpretive problems are in-
surmountable, but discovery of solutions is time-consuming. This
Note is offered as a step toward accelerating the process. 10
II. THE DivisIoN OF RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE
CONDITION OF THE PREMISES
At common law the residential tenancy was viewed as a convey-
ance of an interest in land." The landlord's responsibilities, in the
absence of express agreements to the contrary, were limited to
delivering possession at the beginning of the term' 2 and thereafter
refraining from disturbing the tenant's quiet enjoyment of the leased
10. To date, four articles dealing with the new law have been published.
They have differed greatly in scope, circulation and emphasis. One is a brief
outline, with little discussion of the major provisions. Klein, Highlights of Re-
cent Changes in Landlord-Tenant Law, 46 LAw & FACr 5 (Cuyahoga County
Bar Ass'n Nov. 1974). An overview with checklists and sample notice forms
designed for the practitioner is found in Marshall & Gittes, Tenants and Land-
lords: A New Set of Rules for an Old Relationship, 43 OHio BAR 37 (Jan.
13, 1975). These same authors, both of whom were involved in the drafting
of the new law, have provided a far more extensive discussion in a publication
of the Law Student Services Association of the Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity School of Law. Of particular interest in this article is the treatment
of the procedural innovations under the new law and the discussion of possible
legal strategies that could be employed by a tenant's lawyer in pursuing reme-
dies under the law. Gittes & Marshall, A Guide to Ohio's New Tenant-Land-
lord Law, 3 LAw & HousiNG NEWSLETrBR 2 (Jan. 1975). One student note,
dealing with the law primarily from the perspective of the nationwide move-
ment toward reform in this area, has also been published. Note, Covenant
of Habitability and the Ohio Landlord-Tenant Legislation, 23 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 539 (1974).
11. Brenner v. Spiegel, 116 Ohio St. 631, 157 N.E. 491 (1927); 1 AMEMI-
CAN LAw oF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY].
12. Mullins v. Brown, 87 Ohio App. 427, 94 N.E.2d 574 (1950); Miller
v. Innis, 3 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 50 (Ct. App. 1905), aff'g 3 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 54
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premises for the duration of the term.1 3 The landlord was under
no duty to repair the premises.' 4 No implied warranty that the
premises were safe or fit for habitation existed.' 5
The tenant's responsibilities for the condition of the premises
were also minimal. His primary duty was to return the premises at
the expiration of his term in the same condition as when he received
them, normal wear and tear excepted.' 6 Thus, the tenant was
responsible in voluntary waste' 7 for excessive damage caused by his
own willful acts.' On the basis of this duty to refrain from harmful
actions, the courts imposed a further obligation to make such limited
repairs as were necessary to assure the preservation of the leased
premises in a reasonable state of maintenance. 9 Upon the expira-
tion of the term,2 0 the tenant was liable to the landlord for damages
resulting from breach of this duty.
21
The nature of the tenant's duties emphasizes the basis of the com-
(C.P. Franklin County 1905), af'd mem. 74 Ohio St. 476, 78 N.E. 1132
(1906).
13. See Wetzel v. Richcreek, 53 Ohio St. 62, 69-70, 40 N.E. 1004, 1006
(1895); 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.47.
14. Goddall v. Deters, 121 Ohio St. 432, 169 N.E. 443 (1929); 1 AMEmR-
CAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.78.
15. Branham v. Fordyce, 103 Ohio App. 379, 145 N.E.2d 471 (1957).
16. Cinciinati Oakland Motor Co. v. Meyer, 37 Ohio App. 90, 174 N.E.
154 (1930).
17. See, e.g., Chalmers v. Smith, 152 Mass. 561, 26 N.E. 95 (1891) (over-
loading a storage area in barn rafters causing the building to collapse);
Kilfoyle v. Hull, 4 Ohio Dec. Rep. 552, 553-54 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1879)
(action brought by landlord for injury to his reversionary interest caused by
the painting of a sign on the side of a barn). See generally H. TnFPANY, 2
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 630 (3d ed. 1939).
18. Rammell v. Bulen, 51 Ohio L. Abs. 125, 128, 80 N.E.2d 167, 168 (Ct.
App. 1948); 1 AMEmiCAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.39.
19. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 139 (1936). Although this section of
the Restatement relates to the obligations of life tenants, the principles are
fundamentally the same as those applicable to estates for years and other land-
lord-tenant relationships. 5 AMERICAN IAW OF PROPERTY § 20.12, at 101 n.9.
See also Comment, Periodic Tenant's Repair Obligation in Absence of Cove-
nant, 41 MAXQ. L. REv. 58, 59-61 (1957). The duty to keep the premises in
a reasonable state of repair has also been described as the duty to make minor
repairs. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.78.
20. The landlord had to prove both a duty to repair and negligent breach
of that duty. Mansfield Motors v. Freer, 42 Ohio App. 214, 182 N.E. 51
(1932). Whether a duty to repair existed in a given case was determined by
such factors as community custom, the availability of the landlord, the neces-
sity of immediate repair, and the cost of repair relative to the rent and the
duration of the tenancy. Comment, Periodic Tenant's Repair Obligation in
Absence of Covenant, supra note 19, at 70, 74-75.
21. 5 AMERCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 20.12.
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mon law's concern with the residential tenancy. These duties were
not continuing ones as such. Although the duties theoretically pos-
sessed the force of law throughout the term, the tenant's liability did
not mature until the end of the term. The law did not focus on the
habitability of the dwelling during the tenancy; its interest lay in pre-
serving the reversionary interest of the landlord. If the tenant
wished to have a habitable dwelling, he was left -to his own devices
to secure it; if, on the other hand, he wished to avoid liability in
voluntary waste, he had to return the premises to the landlord in a
state as good as they were in when he received the possessory rights.
In a society based on agriculture, the elevation of the underlying
land interests to preeminence was appropriate. However, in a more
modern setting such an emphasis has proved to be "archaic and com-
pletely out of harmony with the facts."'22  The judicial response to
the changes in society has been the development of a new common
law doctrine-the implied warranty of habitability.23  Though the
exact content of this doctrine varies from one jurisdiction to another,
the principal policy underlying this reform is that the duty to repair
a residential dwelling should be placed with the party who has the
greatest stake in the continued maintenance of the dwelling and the
greatest capacity to fulfill the duty.24
In response to the implied warranty and various other judicial
22. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.78.
23. The implied warranty of habitability has its origin in two different
bodies of law-the various local building and housing codes in effect nation-
wide and the UNiFORm COMmERCIAL CODE [hereinafter cited as UCC]. Al-
though both have been used to support the development of an implied warranty
of habitability, see, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), some jurisdictions have ad-
hered more closely to one than the other, so that different formulations of the
warranty have resulted. In some jurisdictions the landlord is deemed to war-
rant only that the premises are and will remain in compliance with state and
local building, housing, health, and sanitary codes. See, e.g., Javins, supra;
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). The other formu-
lation results from an analogy to the warranties of merchantability and fitness
for a particular purpose found in UCC §§ 2-314, -315, and in Onro REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 1302.27, .28 (Page 1962). Under this view the landlord is deemed
to warrant that the premises are habitable and fit for residential occupancy.
See, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Boston Housing Au-
thority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973). While the housing code
approach offers a relatively clear and fixed standard by which to measure per-
formance, it lacks the flexibility and adaptability of the less well-defined stand-
ards of fitness and suitability adopted by the UCC approach. Comment,
Tenant Remedies-The Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability, 16 VILL.
L. REv. 710 (1971).
24. The common law principle requiring the tenant to maintain and repair
[Vol.. 25:876
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and legislative developments, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act.25 The Uniform Act synthesizes the various
the premises is itself founded on this policy. In the feudal agrarian society
that produced the rule, the tenant's primary interest was in the land since he
could use it to produce income through cultivation. Because his livelihood was
derived from the land, he was likely to remain a tenant for many years. The
dwelling that came with the land was only of secondary importance. Since
it was small and simply constructed, the model farmer-tenant of the common
law was likely to possess the skills necessary to keep it in repair. The imposi-
tion of repair duties on a tenant with a long-term business interest in the
premises and with skills sufficient to fulfill the duty was therefore quite reason-
able. The continuing vitality of these considerations is reflected in the new
Ohio law, which excludes from its coverage residential premises rented in con-
junction with two or more acres of farmland that is to be worked by the tenant.
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(c) (6) (Page Supp. 1974).
Prior to the development of the warranty of habitability, several exceptions
limited the common law rule of caveat emptor for the lessee of residential
premises. These exceptions placed duties of repair and disclosure on the land-
lord where it was evident that the tenant was unable to protect himself by in-
spection or unable to make repairs because of his short-term interest. The first
exception was articulated in the case of Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31
N.E. 286 (1892), in which the court held that the landlord had a duty to make
repairs where the rental arrangement involved a short-term lease of a furnished
dwelling. This principle has been further extended to require disclosure of
latent defects that the tenant could not reasonably be expected to discover by
diligent inspection. See, e.g., Steefel v. Rothschild, 179 N.Y. 273, 72 N.E. 112
(1904); Shinlde, Wilson & Kreis Co. v. Bimey, 68 Ohio St. 328, 67 N.E. 715
(1903). A third exception implied a warranty of fitness in the lease of prem-
ises which are under construction. See, e.g., J.D. Young Corp. v. McClintic,
26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). Thus, the common law recognized that
duties and responsibilities should be borne by those most capable of performing
them. See generally, Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077-
78 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Note, Landlord v.
Tenant: An Appraisal of the Habitability and Repair Problem, 22 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 739, 741-42 (1971).
In spite of these potentially broad exceptions to the common law caveat
emptor principle, the social structure of today justifies an even broader rejec-
tion of the doctrine. The circumstances of the typical modem tenant are quite
dissimilar from those of his agrarian forebears. His primary interest is in ob-
taining premises suitable for occupancy. Increased mobility and the absence
of any vocational interest in the premises result in relatively short periods of
tenancy for the average tenant. The structure of the dwelling is typically com-
plex, while the tenant's employment skills are seldom related to repair or main-
tenance. Under these circumstances the tenant has little incentive to make re-
pairs, often lacks the necessary skills, and frequently is not in a financial posi-
tion to have them made. In contrast, the landlord's long-term business interest
and ability to obtain financing to have repairs made, if not to develop the skills
to do the work himself, place him in a much better position to fulfill the repair
duty. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., supra; 1 AMmuCAN LAW OF
PRoPERTY § 3.78; URLTA § 2-104, Comment.
25. See note 2 supra.
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formulations of the implied warranty of habitability in the provision
dealing with the duties of the landlord.26 A companion section de-
fines the complementary duties of the residential tenant.2 7 The influ-
ence of the Uniform Act upon the measure adopted by the Ohio leg-
islature is clear, particularly with respect to the two sections that the
legislature adopted, with minor changes, as the vehicle for allocating
duties between the landlord and the tenant.28
A. The Landlord's Obligations
The structure of the landlord's duties29 under the Ohio Act is
complex. There are three distinct, yet potentially overlapping, levels,
or tiers of obligations which the residential landlord must be prepared
to meet. The first tier consists of a specified set of minimum duties
that all landlords throughout the state must meet. The second tier
26. URLTA § 2.104(a). The Comment to this section notes that it
follows the warranty of habitability doctrine now recognized in Javins v.
First Nat'l Realty Corp., 438 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972);
Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Springs Inc. v.
Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App.
458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248
(1971); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969);
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). In describing the
impact of § 2.104(a) the Comment states, "Generally duties of repair and
maintenance of the dwelling unit and the premises are imposed upon the land-
lord by this Section. Major repairs, even access, to essential systems outside
the dwelling unit are beyond the capacity of the tenant. Conversely, duties
of cleanliness and proper use within the dwelling unit are appropriately fixed
upon the tenant." URLTA § 2.104, Comment.
27. URLTA § 3.101.
28. These differences will be noted where they might affect the construc-
tion of a provision. Several bills were considered before the drafting and pas-
sage of the new law. One of the bills, Ohio H.B. 169, 110th Gen. Assembly,
Regular Sess. (1973-74) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 169], was the full URLTA.
Ohio H.B. 796, 110th Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. (1973-74) [hereinafter
cited as H.B. 796], sponsored by various tenant groups, used the provisions
of URLTA that impose the landlord and tenant duties. The two bills that did
not adopt the URLTA provisions in this respect were Ohio H.B. 277, 110th
Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. (1973-74) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 277],
sponsored by the Ohio Board of Realtors, and S.B. 103, 110th Gen. Assembly,
Regular Sess. (1973-74) [hereinafter cited as S. 103], drafted by the Governor's
Advisory Commission on Housing and Urban Development. Copies of the
various bills submitted and the legislative history were supplied by Jonathan
Marshall of Columbus, Ohio, formerly with Ohio State Legal Services, and
Fred Gittes, former director of the Ohio and the Columbus Tenants' Unions.
See also Gittes & Marshall, A Guide to Ohio's New Tenant-Landlord Law, 3
LAW & HoUsING NEwSLETrER 2, 3 (Jan. 1975).
29. Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (Page Supp. 1974).
[Vol. 25:876
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imposes obligations that may vary with the geographical area in
which the premises are located. The third tier of obligations consists
of those set by the individual landlord and tenant as determined both
by the terms of the rental agreement and by the reasonable expec-
tations of the parties. The landlord is afforded a limited right of
entry to perform the duties imposed by the statute.
1. The First Tier: Statewide Minimum Duties
The first tier of obligations consists of those duties common to
all residential landlords in Ohio. In the absence of stricter duties
imposed by local laws, 30 this tier establishes the full extent of the
landlord's minimum duties. For the most part, the provisions that
comprise this tier have a distinct common feature: they are strictly
legislative creations with no common law background. For this
reason, and also because they are directed at the so-called modern
conveniences, these provisions leave little room for creative judicial
interpretation. 'Under the first-tier obligations, the landlord is
obliged to supply running water.31 He must supply reasonable
amounts of heat and hot water unless (1) these utilities are gener-
ated "by an installation within the exclusive control of the tenant and
supplied by a direct public utility connect," or (2) the dwelling unit
is not required by law to be equipped with these facilities. 32 The
landlord must maintain in good and safe working order all elevators
and "all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, and air
conditioning fixtures and appliances" that are supplied by him.33
Finally, where a structure contains more than three dwelling units,
the landlord must supply containers for waste and arrange for them
to be emptied.3 4
The only duty at this level that does have a common law counter-
30. See notes 43-64 infra and accompanying text.
31. Oino REv. CoDn ANN. § 5321.04(A) (6) (Page Supp. 1974).
32. Id. Other bills required the landlord to supply heat only during the
period between October 2 and May 1. H.B. 169, § 5315.19(A) (6); H.B. 796,
§ 5315.19(A) (6).
33. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A) (4) (Page Supp. 1974). Instead
of restricting this provision only to the listed types of appliances, other bills
were more inclusive, reading "all ... air conditioning and other facilities and
appliances." H.B. 169, § 5315.19(A)(4); H.B. 796, § 5315.19(A)(4). It
should be noted that this maintenance duty with respect to ranges, dishwashers,
refrigerators, washers, and dryers is the only repair obligation that may be
transferred to the tenant-and then only by the terms of a written rental agree-
ment. OnIo RFv. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(A) (7) (Page Supp. 1974).
34. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A) (5) (Page Supp. 1974). Two
19751
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part is the requirement that the landlord "keep all common areas
of the premises in a safe and sanitary condition. ' 35 This duty differs
from its common law counterpart, however, with respect to the at-
tributes of the area that trigger the duty and the extent of the
activities required to fulfill it.
Under Ohio's common law the landlord had a duty to repair those
areas of the premises over which he possessed a right of control. In
premises occupied by two or more tenants, the law implied that this
control extended over those portions used in common by the ten-
ants. 3 6  The duty required the landlord to exercise ordinary or
reasonable care to repair those areas and to keep them safe.3 7  The
courts, however, limited this potentially broad duty in two critical
ways. First, the landlord could reduce the extent of his duty by an
express abandonment of the right of control.38 Secondly, narrow
judicial definitions of "repair" prevented the duty from extending to
such activities as keeping stairwells lighted 9 or removing ice and
snow.
40
The new Ohio law reformulates and expands the duties of the
landlord regarding common areas in order to avoid such restrictive
interpretations. First, by defining the places over which the duty
extends as "common areas," the law ties the duty to the element of
common use by the tenants rather than to the right of control exer-
cised by the landlord. The introduction of this element into the
statutory scheme frustrates any attempt to avoid the duty by
abandoning a right of control.
other bills did not limit this provision to structures containing more than three
units, H.B. 169, § 5315.19(A)(5); H.B. 796, § 5315.19(A)(5).
35. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A)(3) (Page Supp. 1974). In the
other two bills, this duty is described as one to keep the area "clean and safe."
H.B. 169, § 5315.19(A) (3); H.B. 796, § 5315.19(A)(3).
36. Rice v. Ziegler, 128 Ohio St. 239, 190 N.E. 560 (1934).
37. Harmony Realty Co. v. Underwood, 11'8 Ohio St. 576, 579, 161 N.E.
924, 925 (1928).
38. Dee v. Emery, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 92 (Super. Ct. Cincinnati), aff'd
without opinion, 27 WEEKLY L. BULL. 160 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1884). See gen-
erally, Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 468 (1952) for problems that may result from fo-
cusing a rule of law on such an elusive concept as the right of control.
39. McKinley v. Niderst, 118 Ohio St. 334, 160 N.E. 850 (1928), affg
27 Ohio App. 38, 160 N.E. 724 (1927).
40. Jeswald v. Hutt, 15 Ohio St. 2d 224, 239 N.E.2d 37 (1968); Turoff
v. Richman, 76 Ohio App. 83, 61 N.E.2d 486 (1944). But cf. Oswald v. Jeraj,
146 Ohio St. 676, 67 N.E.2d 779 (1946), which held a landlord to be guilty
of negligence in failing to remove ice and snow after he had made it a practice
to do so over a long period of time. See generally Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 387
(1973).
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Secondly, by keying the landlord's duty to a condition to be
achieved-safe and sanitary-rather than a description of required
activities-repairs-the law effectively precludes the narrowing of
the duty on the ground that the particular activity is not in the nature
of a repair. Under the common law, for example, it might be suc-
cessfully argued that there is no duty to remove ice from a sidewalk
because the act of removing ice is not a repair. 41  This argument
defeats the primary intent of establishing a duty. The concern was
the removal of dangerous conditions, not the literal definition of the
activities that restored the premises. 42 Clearly, not all of the activi-
ties necessary to maintain a safe and sanitary condition fall under
the typical definition of repairs. The new statute focuses on this fact
and widens the scope of the landlord's duty to embrace all activities
necessary to achieve a safe and sanitary condition in the common
areas.
2. The Second Tier: The Community-Imposed Obligations
The second tier of the landlord's responsibilities requires that he
"comply with the requirements of all applicable building, housing,
health, and safety codes which materially affect health and safety."'43
To the extent that codes promulgated by the state4 4 are applicable,
there may be said to be a state-wide minimum standard imposed sim-
ilar to those in the first tier. The new law does not, however, restrict
the required compliance to only those codes.4 5 Minimum standards
41. Cf. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.R. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 31 Ohio St.
2d 81, 285 N.E.2d 371 (1972) (holding that although vermin and rodent in-
festation and excessive dust violated health code requirements to keep an area
"safe and sanitary," a party was not required to remedy the condition under
his covenant to repair).
42. Cf. Oswald v. Jeraj, 146 Ohio St. 676, 67 N.E.2d 779 (1946) (refusing
to allow the source of the unsafe condition, i.e., natural causes, to overcome
the fact that there was an unsafe condition present).
43. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1974).
44. Such codes are authorized or set forth in chs. 3701, 3707, 3709, 3737,
and 3781 of the Ohio Revised Code.
45. Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1974). H.B.
277, § 5315.19(A) required the landlord to comply with "either the applicable
local building and housing codes or Chapter BB-53 of the Ohio Building Code
... ." Under this formulation, not only would the landlord have had fewer
code provisions with which to comply, but he would have been able to choose
the less stringent set of regulations. H.B. 169, § 5315.19(A) (1) required com-
pliance with only the building and housing codes. H.B. 796, § 5315.19(A)(1)
limited the obligation to building and housing codes but did not limit the ap-
plicable provisions of those codes to those materially affecting health and
safety. The new law expands the types of codes with which the landlord must
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may also be fixed by the community through the enactment of local
codes. Compliance with these codes, then, becomes a duty owed by
the landlord directly to the tenant. The tenant may enforce this duty
through private legal action.4 6
A major problem in code enforcement, whether public or private,
is that the quality of housing covered by any single set of codes can
vary greatly. In large cities many dwellings do not meet the code
standards. Of these structures many are simply slums, in a state of
neglect. Many other buildings, however, were constructed long
before building or housing codes were enacted. Thus, even if they
were in the same condition as when built, they would fail a modem
housing inspection. If an intensive enforcement effort were under-
taken, the owners of many of these older buildings would find the
cost of repair prohibitive. They would have no choice but to close
or abandon their buildings, which, in turn, would decrease the
amount of housing available. 47 In order to reconcile the need to pro-
comply for the purposes of this statute, but limits the applicable provisions of
those codes to those materially affecting health and safety. See notes 47-56
infra and accompanying text.
46. The development of local building and housing codes began near the
end of the 19th century as a response to the squalid living conditions of work-
ers in urban industrial areas. It was hoped that governmental enforcement
backed by a system of fines for violators would improve the quality and arrest
the deterioration of rental housing. Unfortunately, the codes failed to achieve
these goals. The fines proved to be too small to have any deterrence value,
the enforcement agencies were inadequately staffed and financed, and the
standards of compliance were too subjective. See, Landman, Flexible Housing
Code-The Mystique of the Single Standard: A Critical Analysis and Com-
parison of Model and Selected Housing Codes Leading to the Development of
a Proposed Model Flexible Housing Code, 18 How. L.J. 251 (1974); Gribetz
& Gad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLum. L.
REv. 1254 (1966); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HAIv.
L. REv. 801 (1965).
It has been suggested that giving tenants a private right of action for a
landlord's noncompliance with the codes would make enforcement of code
standards more effective and thereby move society closer to the goal of a min-
imum standard of safety in rental housing. Note, Housing Code Enforcement
by Private Attorneys General: A Better Way?, 1973 URBAN L. ANN. 299.
Several jurisdictions have adopted the implied warranty of habitability doctrine
for this purpose. See Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 279 A.2d 248 (1971);
Note, Housing Code Enforcement by Private Attorneys General: A Better
Way?, 1973 URBAN L. ANN. 297. See also Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 570,
111 N.W.2d 409 (1961); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes,
supra at 843-48.
47. Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, supra note 46, at
849-50. Two approaches have been suggested to decrease the risk inherent in
strict code enforcement. The first is selective enforcement, which designates
for close supervision areas of a city where strict enforcement would be most
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tect the health and safety of the tenants with the often conflicting
need to protect, if not expand, the housing supply, the new law re-
stricts private enforcement to those provisions of local codes which
"materially affect health and safety."'48
The effect of the statute is to construct another housing code,
embodying a standard less stringent than that of the entire local code,
one composed of only those code provisions that are essential
to the protection of health and safety. The task of selecting the ap-
plicable local provisions is left to the courts. In each case it will
be necessary to decide whether the code provision allegedly violated
materially affects health and safety. In making this determination
the courts must strike a balance between the need to protect the
health and safety of tenants and the need to minimize the financial
burden imposed on landlords. In each case the court must decide
whether the provision at issue is so closely related to the health and
safety of all tenants that it should be enforced even at the risk of
adversely affecting the housing supply. Stated in another way, the
question is whether a code provision should be part of the absolute
minimum standards for safety and health that are enforceable by pri-
vate action. 49
This inquiry focuses on the condition of the premises that is regu-
lated by the local provision. The extent to which this condition
affects the health and safety of an occupant then determines whether
the provision should be enforceable by private action. 50 This analy-
likely to result in reduced deterioration. Comment, Housing Codes and the
Prevention of Urban Blight-Administrative and Enforcement Problems and
Proposals, 17 VML. L. REV. 490 (1972). A second approach would abandon
the use of a single set of codes for that of several sets, each one of which
would be keyed to and used in a particular section of a city. In this way,
the standards applicable to buildings constructed in 1970 would not be ap-
plicable to buildings constructed in 1890. This approach would key the codes
to the practical realities of slums while not allowing inadequate practices to
continue in newer and better preserved areas. Landman, Flexible Housing
Code, supra note 46.
48. Omo Rv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A) (1) (Page Supp. 1974).
49. Violations of code provisions that are not included in this standard
would perhaps be actionable, however, as breaches of the landlord's duty to
keep the premises fit and habitable. Omo RPv. CoDE ANN. § 5321.04(A) (2)
(Page Supp. 1974). Such code provisions need not, therefore, be thought of
as precluded from serving as grounds for tenant action. See notes 65-81 infra
and accompanying text.
50. That the focus should be placed on the condition to be regulated is
indicated by § 5321.07(A) of the new law, which defines tenant remedies. In
describing the types of violations for which remedies are available, this sec-
tion refers to noncompliance with "codes which apply to any condition of the
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sis apparently excludes from the field of private enforcement pro-
cedural regulations embodied in licensing, filing, and certification
requirements, which bring conditions to the attention of code enforce-
ment agencies, but do not in themselves regulate conditions of the
premises,
Once a local provision has been found to regulate the conditions
of the premises, a determination regarding the materiality of the im-
pact of the condition on health and safety is in order. This analy-
sis requires a consideration of both the severity of the injury that
could be caused by the condition and the probability that the injury
would actually occur. At this point, more local provisions may be
eliminated from consideration. There may be provisions regulating
conditions which themselves are so tangentially related to health and
safety that they may be summarily excluded. For example, a hous-
ing code might require that exterior walls be painted regularly. 51
The immediate consequences of following the provision are purely
aesthetic. The long-term impact may be more significant: deterior-
ation of the wood may be prevented. But there is little chance that
the present tenant will be so directly affected by the condition during
his tenancy as to justify giving him a private right of action to enforce
the provision.
Other provisions may be found that regulate conditions having
direct influence on the tenant's life conditions, but may be dismissed
from consideration because the impact of the conditions does not
reach the required level of severity. For example, a provision might
require a minimum percentage of window space in relation to floor
area.52 While -the tenant may prefer a certain minimum amount of
residential premises that could materially affect the health and safety of an
occupant." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(A) (Page Supp. 1974). This
language was also used in defining the landlord's duty to comply with building
and housing codes in S.B. 103, §§ 1923.17(A)-(B). It is of interest that the
word "occupant" rather than "tenant" is used. "Occupant" may imply a
broader class than "tenant." "Tenant" is defined by the statute as "a person
entitled under a rental agreement to the use and occupancy of residential prem-
ises to the exclusion of others." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(A) (Page
Supp. 1974). It would appear that "tenant" could be restricted to a person in
contractual privity with the landlord. If this were so, then "occupant" could
be used to cover those who might live with a tenant, such as his family, but
who might not be in privity with the landlord.
51. E.g., CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINcs § 6.0515(A) (1969).
52. Id. § 6.0503: "Every habitable room shall be provided with natural
light by one or more windows or approved equivalent facing upon an adequate
open space. The aggregate glass area of such required windows shall not be
less than ten (10) percent of the habitable floor area of the room served by
them."
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light for his dwelling, the probability that injury would result from
a violation of this provision is remote. Moreover, it is difficult to
hypothesize a serious injury flowing from a violation. A code section
requiring the entrance of natural light assuredly contributes to the
overall quality of life, but it is hardly a sine qua non of health and
safety. It might be more readily classified as an amenity than a bare
necessity.53 Therefore, such a provision would not be enforceable
by the tenant through private action; its violation is not a breach of
the statutory duty to comply with the housing codes.
Remaining after the elimination of the procedural and the non-
material local housing code provisions are those local laws that most
Ohio landlords must meet if they are to fulfill their second-tier obli-
gations. These provisions regulate substantive conditions of a dwell-
ing that clearly relate to the health and safety of the tenant in a ma-
terial way. Their potential impact on health is substantial; the sever-
ity of the injury caused by a violation could be great. An example of
such a provision would be one prohibiting the use of lead-based paint
by the landlord when decorating or repairing. It has been estab-
lished that human consumption of such paint may cause severe physi-
cal and mental injuries; 54 likewise it has been established that the
53. In Green v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. 3d 619, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704 (1974), the warranty of habitability was defined as being "in most
cases substantial compliance with those applicable building and housing code
standards which materially affect health and safety." Id. at 637, 517 P.2d at
1183, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 719. The court, citing to Academy Spires, Inc. v.
Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (Dist. Ct. 1970), stated that refer-
ence should be made to what constitutes "bare living requirements" as opposed
to "amenities," in determining the content of the warranty.
The Academy Spires court held: ". . . In a modem society one
cannot be expected to live in a multi-storied apartment building
without heat, hot water, garbage disposal or elevator service. Failure
to supply such things is a breach of the implied covenant of habit-
ability. Malfunction of venetian blinds, water leaks, wall cracks,
lack of painting . . . go to what may be called 'amenities.' Living
with lack of painting, water leaks and defective venetian blinds
may be unpleasant, aesthetically unsatisfying, but does not come
within the category of unhabitability. . . ." (268 A.2d at p. 559).
110 Cal. 3d at 637 n.22, 517 P.2d at 1182, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
Both of these cases call for ad hoc determinations of a rather visceral na-
ture. It may be that guidance phrased in terms of "bare living requirements"
versus "amenities" is sufficient. These tests still seem to beg the question of
what is a "bare living requirement." The balancing used in the Ohio law
seems to articulate the reasoning process in a much clearer fashion.
54. Estimates of the number of children across the Nation who may
be lead sick run as high as 400,000 per year. About 200 children
die from lead each year. . . . While annually 12,000 to 16,000 chil-
dren are actually treated for lead poisoning and survive, half of these
19751
890 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
incidence of consumption by children and the resulting injuries occur
with alarming frequency, particularly in slum areas.55 It is this kind
of provision that the statute seeks to regulate through the second-
tier obligations of the landlord.
It appears that this line of analysis may end at the point of the
finding of materiality. As a practical matter, however, the courts
must consider another variable before deciding whether a particular
local code provision is embraced by the second tier of the landlord's
obligations. The courts must balance the factors of probability and
severity of injury against the cost of bringing buildings into compli-
ance and the prospect of forcing landlords out of the housing market.
The burden placed on the court making such an inquiry is heavy.
The court is faced with the necessity of weighing the possible extent
of injury, the likelihood of occurrence, and the costs of avoidance,
together with vague notions of general social utility. The judiciary,
however, is not unaccustomed to such a chore. In fact, the elements
to be considered in determining whether a provision falls into the
so-called second tier closely parallel those that must be considered
in the typical negligent tort case. 56
The necessity of determining the impact of numerous local code
provisions poses serious problems for the judiciary and the landlords'
sector of the economy. Conceivably, every provision of every local
housing code might have to be considered. This may result in a sub-
stantial increase in litigation in the already overburdened courts.
Furthermore, until specific local code sections are held to be material
to second-tier liabilities, a landlord will be forced either to comply
with substantial portions of the applicable local code or to rely upon
his own judgment that a certain provision is, or is not, material to
children are left mentally retarded. This type of brain damage can-
not be reversed by treatment.
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, REPORT FOR LEAD-BASED
PArr POISONING PREVENrION Acr, S. REP. No. 91-1432, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess.
2 (1970).
55. Moscovitz, A New Threat-Lead Poisoning of Slum Children, 3
CLEARINGHOUSE L. REv. 92 (1969).
56. Writing for the court in Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir.
1941), Judge Learned Hand said:
The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the re-
sultant Of three factors; the likelihood that his conduct will injure
others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and bal-
anced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.
... A solution always involves some preference, or choice between
incommensurables ....
Id. at 612. See also W. PROSsER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (4th
ed. 1971).
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health or safety. Unnecessary compliance will result in increased
operating costs and thus increased rental fees. The costs of the
initial uncertainties in the second-tier obligations will be high.
These high costs, of course, will not be permanent. Over time,
a body of case law will develop in a community holding some code
provisions to be enforceable through the new law and others not
enforceable. The various courts in the state will probably apply the
case law already developed with respect to analogous provisions in
other localities. It is reasonable to expect that the content of the
landlord's second-tier obligations will become relatively clear and
fixed. Gradually, the need for interpretive litigation will disappear
and be replaced by the day-to-day analysis of the landlord's attorney.
The development of firmly established precedent regarding the
precise nature of the landlord's second-tier obligations will not
end the responsibilities of the judiciary in this area of the law.
If nothing else, the court must serve as factfinder to determine
whether there has been compliance with a material code provision.
Inherent in this inquiry is another significant issue of law: whether
strict or merely substantial compliance with second-tier obligations
will shield the landlord from liability.
There is some case law under the doctrine of implied warranty
of habitability to the effect that, where housing codes define the land-
lord's duty, only substantial compliance is required. 57 The duty
imposed, however, requires compliance with all of the provisions of
the pertinent code. The reason for adopting the rule of substantial
compliance in these cases has been that it was necessary to introduce
a degree of flexibility not found in a unitary code in order to protect
the housing supply.58 Substantial compliance provides this flexibility
by permitting reference to such factors as the age and suitability of
-the structure in relation to the area in which it is located in
determining liability.
The new Ohio law has provided the needed flexibility in its code
compliance requirement in a manner markedly different from the
57. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.62 & 63
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 35.1, 356, 280 N.E.2d
208, 217 (1972); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831
(Mass. 1973). See also Green v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. 3d 619, 5.17 P.2d
1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 76 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1973); 25 CAsp W. Rus. L. REv. 371, 376-81 (1975).
58. See notes 47 supra for discussion of suggested means of affording this
protection through different approaches to code enforcement and development.
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common law doctrine. The legislature has rejected the substantial
compliance approach59 in favor of severely limiting -the number of
building, housing, health, and safety code provisions that can be en-
forced through the mechanisms of the new law.60 The balancing
of cost of compliance and effect on the housing supply against the
threat posed to the tenant's health and safety takes place in the initial
determination of whether a given code provision is enforceable
through tenant action rather than in the determination of whether
a given violation is actionable.61 Once a code provision is found
to be so intimately connected with health and safety as to be en-
forceable by tenants, the act gives no indication that any further con-
cessions to flexibility are required. By providing for flexibility only
in the selection of the provisions and not in the extent of compliance
required, the legislature has made possible the articulation of a clear
standard by gradual definition of the landlord's duties as the case
law develops. This preserves the hope that the second tier will
eventually develop a code-like integrity of its own, accompanied by
all the advantages of a code: uniformity of application, certainty
of expectation, and predictability of result. 62
The need for strict compliance is made even more compelling
by a consideration of the implications of using a substantial compli-
ance test where the number of enforceable provisions has been so
limited. After holding that a given provision is so intimately con-
nected with health and safety as to be part of the bare minimum
standard, a court requiring only substantial compliance would then
be in the incongruous situation of having to make further inquires
into such factors as the condition of other dwellings in the neighbor-
hood, the age of the building, and the amount of rent, in order to
determine if a given tenant were entitled to even this minimum
standard. In effect, the factors used to gauge substantial compliance
would make the bare minimum standard to which a tenant should
be entitled dependent upon the tenant's socioeconomic status. 3 Al-
though such inquiries are quite proper when determining the third
59. See H.B. 277, § 5315.19(A) which explicitly required substantial com-
pliance.
60. See notes 47-56 supra and accompanying text.
61 See text accompanying note 49 supra.
62. Comment, The Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability, supra
note 23, at 727.
63. Daniels, Judicial and Legislative Remedies for Substandard Housing:
Landlord-Tenant Law Reform in the District of Columbia, 59 GEo. LJ. 909,
927-28 (1971).
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tier of duties, which grow out of the circumstances surrounding each
individual tenancy,6 4 it is highly doubtful that such socioeconomic
determinants should be found to bear on matters fundamental to
basic standards of health and safety.
The combination of a materiality requirement with substantial
compliance would constitute legislative overkill. A double conces-
sion to flexibility would destroy any hope for certainty in the litiga-
tion process while placing undue emphasis on the social and eco-
nomic position of the tenant. It appears the legislature believed it-
self confronted with an either-or situation and traded substantial
compliance for the materiality requirement, believing it to be the
wiser alternative for achieving a balance between flexibility and
certainty.
3. The Third Tier: The Expectations of the Parties
The third tier of the landlord's obligations represents a marked
departure from the other two tiers. Whereas the first two tiers are
keyed to minimum standards established by law, the duties of the
third tier arise from the reasonable expectations of the parties to each
rental arrangement. The duties imposed by this tier will therefore
vary greatly; depending upon the circumstances of the rental ar-
rangement, they may greatly exceed those demanded by state or
local law.65 In essence, the only limitation on these third-tier duties
64. See notes 65-81 infra and accompanying text.
65. H.B. 277, § 5315.19(A) sponsored by the Ohio Board of Realtors, im-
posed much less stringent standards for the landlord than the other bills.
Blumberg, The Ohio Struggle With the Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE RaV. 265-66 (1973). The standard of habita-
bility was set by that bill as only substantial compliance with building, health,
and safety codes. The far more stringent tenant union bill contained a provi-
sion imposing a requirement virtually identical to the fitness and habitability
provision of the new law in addition to a code compliance requirement. See
H.B. 796, § 5315.19(A)(1). The only difference between the "habitability"
provision in this bill, URLTA, and the Ohio law is that the last uses the phrase
"reasonably necessary" while the others use only "necessary." See Strum, The
Landlord-Tenant Relationship: 1980 and Beyond, 9 REAL PROP. PROBATE &
TRusr J. 17, 23 (Spring 1974), which takes the view that the same provision
in URLTA imposes a higher standard than mere compliance with code provi-
sions materially affecting health and safety. Contra, Lonnquist & Healey, A
Prospectus on the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act in Nebraska
8 CREIaHTON L. Rlv. 336, 353-54 (1975), which views a similar provision as
imposing minimum duties, with a code compliance provision similar to that in
-the Ohio law as imposing the maximum duties.
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is that they may be established at a level no lower than the minimum
set by the first two tiers.66
The wording chosen by the Ohio legislature to establish this tier
is significant. The statute commands that the landlord "make all
repairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary to put and keep the
premises in fit and habitable condition." 67 Thus, it is clear that the
landlord's duty is a continuing one. Not only must he "put" the
premises in proper condition for delivery to the tenant, but he must
"keep" them in that condition as well. Furthermore, there is no
limitation, other than reasonableness, placed upon the nature of the
activities in which he must engage to meet the standard. 68 Specific-
ally included is the obligation to "make all repairs." 69
Of equal significance are the common law origins of the statutory
language. The "fit and habitable condition" standard imposed by the
Act is the same formula used by a number of courts in defining the
landlord's duty under the developing common law warranty of habit-
ability. 70 Under the facts that the courts considered in the warranty
of habitability cases, the question before them was whether the land-
lord had breached some rudimentary duty to his tenants. The facts
of many of these cases disclosed severe defects in the leased prem-
ises, and the issues could have been resolved by the establishment
of some minimum duty on the part of the landlord. 71 Such cases,
on their facts, are not a suitable reference point for the establishment
of a new third tier of obligations; minimum obligations are already
operative by virtue of the first and second tiers. 72
The tendency of courts to go beyond the narrow situations pre-
sented in these cases to frame the duties embodied in the warranty
66. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.13(A) (Page Supp. 1974).
67. Id. § 5321.04(A) (2).
68. The responsibilities specifically imposed on the tenant by OHno REv.
CODE ANN. § 5321.05(A) (Page Supp. 1974) set a limit on the activities in
which the landlord must engage, much as the explicit placement of the repair
obligation on the landlord limits the activities in which the tenant must engage.
See notes 97-98 infra and accompanying text.
69. Omio Rnv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A) (2) (Page Supp. 1974).
70. See, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Marini v. Ire-
land, 56 NJ. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25,
289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972).
71. See, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972) (housing and
building code violations, falling bathroom ceiling); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio
Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972) (faulty furnace, defective
wiring). See also Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831,
852 (Mass. 1973) (dissent).
72. See notes 43-49 supra and accompanying text.
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of habitability does, however, make these cases relevant to the estab-
lishment of third-tier obligations. Although the courts addressed
themselves to the standards that the law would protect, the language
of the opinions often reflected a sensitivity to the need for the law
to be responsive to the particularized expectations of the parties to
the rental agreement.7 3 Necessarily, such expectations would exceed
minimal standards in many cases. Of course, such remarks may be
dismissed by sucessor courts as dicta. However, such proclamations
serve as valuable input for legislators considering landlord-tenant
reform. The third tier of obligations adopts -these expansive defini-
tions of the implied warranty of habitability and extends express legal
protection to the expectations of the parties.7 4
Protection of the expectations of the parties introduces highly
subjective elements into the analysis of the third-tier obligations of
the landlord. The minimum limits of these obligations are estab-
lished by the first- and second-tier duties. The upper limits, on the
other hand, are undefined. Presumably, they would be based upon
some notion of reasonableness.
Although the standard seems indefinite, it may not be so im-
precise as it appears. There are, in fact, certain visible, quantifiable
features of a dwelling that would indicate the type of dwelling the
tenant expects to inhabit. Perhaps the most obvious feature the ten-
ant would consider is the condition of the premises at the beginning
of his term. Since the tenant's rent obligation remains constant
throughout his term, he is entitled to expect that the condition that
existed at his entry would likewise prevail for the duration of his
term. 75
There are, of course, several other objective indications of the
tenant's expectations.76 They include:
1. the age of the structure;
2. the amount of rent;
3. the area in which the premises are located; and
73. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See also 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
371, 377 n.37 (1975).
74. See note 23 supra.
75. Javins v. First Nat'1 Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); see Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment
Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
76. See Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Lati-
mer, 214 Kans, 329, 338, 521 P.2d 304, 311 (1974) (concurring opinion).
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4. the promises or representations made by the landlord,
whether in the rental agreement or otherwise. 77
These objective elements are addressed to an evaluation of
building maintenance in a very general sense. They do, however,
give rise to certain other expectations regarding the specific manner
in which the landlord will respond to defects that may arise. These
further expectations are ,also based on objective factors regarding re-
pair needs including:
1. the nature of the claimed defect or condition;
2. the effect of the defect or condition on health and
safety;
3. the length of time the defect or condition has existed;
and
4. whether the defect or condition would be a violation
of any building, housing, or sanitary codes. 78
The third tier of landlord duties thus broadens the base of tenant
protections. By emphasizing reasonable expectations, the third tier
extends the remedies available under the new law to those tenants
whose problems may not be so severe as to violate state or local mini-
mum standards, but which are of sufficient magnitude to deprive
these tenants of the full value of their bargains. 79 The flexibility
inherent in the formula permits the law to impose different standards
on a landlord operating low rent housing units from one operating
a high rise luxury apartment. In the former situation, where the
building might be old and located in a deteriorating neighborhood,
the tenant may not be entitled to much more than compliance with
the various code provisions materially affecting health and safety;
his rent, in all likelihood, reflects this fact. In the latter situation,
a failure to repair a closed-circuit television security system could
77. The obligations imposed by chapter 5321 cannot be waived or modified
by agreement between the landlord and tenant, tro REv. CODE ANN. §
5321.13 (A) (Page Supp. 1974), except that "[tihe landlord may agree to as-
sume responsibility for fulfilling any duty or obligation imposed on a tenant
by section 5321.05 of the Revised Code." Id. § 5321.-13(F). Therefore, the
rental agreement cannot be used to define the scope of this duty or the extent
of the activities required to fulfill it. The rental agreement may, however, con-
tain provisions that may aid in determining the content of the tenant's bargain,
as, for example, when the document includes a list of rules or services that
may be supplied. If other factors support the conclusion, a court might well
find that the landlord's failure to enforce the rules or to supply the services
is a breach, not only of contractual obligations, but of statutory duties as well.
78. See Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Steele v.
Latimer, 214 Kans. 329, 338, 521 P.2d 304, 311 (1974) (concurring opinion).
79. See Comment, The Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability,
supra note 23, at 727.
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be a violation of the duty owed to an affluent tenant whose high
rental payments were in part induced by such features.80
It is this aspect that permits the new legislation to be responsive
to the middle or upper income tenant, who for a long period has
been ignored by the developments in landlord-tenant law.8 '
4. Performing the Statutory Duties: The Landlord's Right of Entry
To enable the landlord to perform his new obligations under the
Act, he is afforded a statutory right of entry.82 The right is limited
to certain specific purposes: to inspect for defects -and make repairs,
to deliver large packages, to perform agreed-upon services, and to
show the premises to prospective purchasers or renters.83 In addi-
tion -the landlord must give the tenant reasonable notice whenever
feasible and make entry only at reasonable times.8 4
Although this provision is phrased as a grant to the landlord, its
thrust is to protect the tenant by restricting the breadth of the right
of entry available at common law. Under the common law, a lease
clause could provide for as extensive a right of entry as the landlord
could induce the tenant to accept in the rental agreement. Because
of the poor bargaining position of most tenants, the landlord could
provide for the tenant to agree to a virtually unlimited right. The
new law does not, however, permit the modification of this provision
by rental agreement,85 except when the modification removes duties
from the tenant.80 Consequently, the landlord is locked into the
limited right of entry provided in the statute.87
B. The Tenant's Obligations
The extent of a tenant's interest in a rented dwelling is that it
80. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
81. See Comment, Tenant's Rights in Pennsylvania: Has the Middle Class
Been Forgotten?, 12 DUQUESNE L. RaV. 48 (1973).
82. Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(B) (Page Supp. 1974).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 5321.04(A) (8) provides, "Except in cases of emergency or if it
is impractical to do so, [the landlord must] give the tenant reasonable notice
of his intent to enter and enter only at reasonable times. Twenty-four hours
is presumed to be a reasonable notice in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary."
85. Id. § 5321.13(A).
86. Id. § 5321.13(F).
87. The consequences of this limitation can be serious. For example, a
landlord may incur certain liabilities if the local police, having obtained the
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be suitable for occupation during the lease term.88 Although his legal
interest is a limited one, he has a very definite role to play in the
scheme of allocation of responsibility under the Ohio law.
The first and most self-evident duty of the tenant to the landlord
is to refrain "from intentionally or negligently destroying, defacing,
damaging or removing any fixture, appliance, or other part of the
premises. '89 This obligation appears to be a clear codification of
the common law doctrine of voluntary waste. 90
Like the landlord, the tenant does have certain specifically de-
tailed duties to perform. He is required to dispose of all rubbish
and garbage in a safe and sanitary manner.91 He must keep all
plumbing fixtures he uses clean. 92 The tenant is required to use all
electrical and plumbing facilities properly.93 Under the terms of a
written rental agreement he may also be required to maintain certain
specified appliances.94
Moreover, the tenant has an open-ended duty similar to that im-
posed on the landlord: he is obligated to "keep that part of the
premises which he occupies and uses safe and sanitary." 95  This
proper search and arrest warrants, demand that he admit them to a tenant's
apartment. If he fails to do so, he may be liable for obstruction of justice.
If he admits them, he may be liable to the tenant for abusing the right of ac-
cess since the law does not include this as a reason for entry.
88. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir.
1970); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.78; see also note 26 supra.
89. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(A)(6) (Page Supp. 1974); cf. RE-
STATEMrNT OF PROPERTY §§ 138, 139, 146 (1936).
90. See note 17 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted that the
new Ohio law may differ from the common law in two ways. First, the Act
prohibits damaging or defacing, which may leave the tenant free to make im-
provements without concern for ameliorative waste. Secondly, the new law af-
firmatively includes liability for acts of persons on the premises with the
tenant's permission instead of excluding from liability the acts of strangers, or
public enemies.
Because permission is used to trigger liabilty, it has been suggested that
a tenant could be liable under the comparable provision of URLTA for damage
done by the landlord or his agents or workmen, although such liability was
probably not contemplated by the drafters. Subcommittee on the Model Land-
lord-Tenant Act of the Committee on Leases, Proposed Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act, 8 REAL PROP. PROBATE & TRusT J. 104, 113 (1973).
91. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(A) (2) (Page Supp. 1974).
92. Id. § 5321.05(A) (3). This duty exists even if the tenant shares the
use of the fixtures with other tenants. This provision, therefore, could relieve
the landlord of a duty since shared facilities are otherwise the landlord's re-
sponsibility. See text accompanying notes 35-40 supra.
93. Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(A) (4) (Page Supp. 1974).
94. Id. § 53Z1.05(A)(7).
95. Id. § 5321.05(A)(1). The other bills described this duty, arguably
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wording corresponds so closely to -the definition of the analogous
duties of the landlord96 ,that it creates a possible overlap of statutory
responsibilities, both in the common areas and the tenant's own
dwelling unit. This overlap with respect to the common areas can
be resolved by a close reading of the statute. The tenant's duties
are keyed to simultaneous use and occupation of the areas affected
by his duties;97 a tenant may not occupy a common area. Thus,
the maintenance of common areas is the exclusive province of the
landlord.
The problem of overlap with respect to the tenant's own dwelling
unit cannot be so summarily resolved. The tenant does in fact
simultaneously use and occupy his apartment.
Closer examination of the relative duties of the landlord and ten-
ant, however, may resolve the potential overlap. First, it stands to
reason that the drafters could not possibly have intended to shift the
burden of repair to the tenant after having devised such a compre-
hensive scheme -to place repair duties on the shoulders of the land-
lord.98 A limit is inherently placed upon the activities required of
the tenant to fulfill his duty to keep the premises safe and sanitary.99
more restrictively, as an obligation to keep the premises "as clean and safe as
the condition of the premises permits." S.B. 103, § 1923.18(A) (1); H.B. 169,
§ 5315.21 (A) (2); H.B. 277, § 5315.21(B); H.B. 796, § 5315.21(A) (2).
96. See notes 35-42 supra and accompanying text.
97. Since the conjunctive "and" is used, the preferred construction would
dictate that, in order for the provision to apply, a tenant would have to occupy
as well as use a part of the premises. See IA J. SuTHERLAND, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTON § 21.14 (4th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as SUTH-
ERLAND]. In order to "occupy," a tenant must possess or keep that part for
use as well as actually use it. See BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 1231 (4th ed.
rev. 1968). Normally only a tenant's dwelling unit would satisfy both the oc-
cupation and use elements, although basement storage bins or garages might
also qualify.
98. Onlo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A) (2) (Page Supp. 1974). See also
notes 26 and 67-69 supra and accompanying text. The definition of premises
includes the tenant's dwelling unit as well as common areas, grounds, and facil-
ities. Id. § 5321.01(C).
99. The only provision of the law using the word "repair" is that defining
the landlord's obligations. He not only is required "to make all repairs," Omo
Rav. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1974), but also is afforded a
right of entry to make "ordinary" as well as "necessary" repairs. Id. §
5321.07(B)(2). The Act does not use the word "repair" to describe any of
the tenant's obligations.
An examination of the other bills considered by the General Assembly also
reveals grounds for the conclusion that the repair obligation is placed solely
on the landlord. Each of the four bills initially before the legislature contained
a provision permitting the landlord to transfer to the tenant by written agree-
ment some repair obligations. S.B. 103, § 1923.22(F); H.B. 169, §§ 5315.19
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A second argument against a broad tenant repair duty is that
the placing of such a burdensome duty on the tenant would frustrate
the entire statutory scheme of the legislation. The allocation-of-
responsibilities approach which pervades the statute is, like the com-
mon law warranty of habitability, built on a foundation of assigning
obligations consistent with the obligor's capabilities and interest in
the endeavor. °00 The tenant's capabilities and interests cannot sup-
port a full-scale repair duty.
Finally, it is useful to refer to the specific duties that have been
imposed since the general duties are typically construed as being of
the same nature as the specific ones. The landlord's specific duties
are addressed to the systemic, large-scale maintenance functions. In
contrast, the tenant's specific duties are addressed to simple custodial
acts.'
0
'
The most logical construction of the general upkeep obligation
of the tenant extends it merely to the proper use of the premises
(C), (D); H.B. 277, § 5315.19(C); H.B. 796, §§ 5315.19(C), (D). The re-
pair obligation was to be placed on the landlord subject to transfer by agree-
ment. This provision does not appear in the new law, although the provision
that allows the landlord to impose on the tenant a maintenance obligation for
certain appliances bears a resemblance to it. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.05
(A) (7) (Page Supp. 1974). The idea that the landlord has the obligation to
repair subject to a limited right to transfer some portion of this obligation to
the tenant seems to have remained throughout the legislative considerations.
This was the position taken by State Representative Harry J. Lehmann of
Shaker Heights, one of the two drafters of the bill finally enacted into law,
in an interview in October 1974.
100. See note 24 supra.
101. An application of the principle of construction of ejusdem generis leads
to the conclusion that the tenant's duties are restricted to those not requiring
repair. This doctrine states, "Where general words follow specific words in an
enumeration describing the legal subject, the general words are construed to
embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the pre-
ceding specific words." 2A SuTHERLAND § 47.17 (footnotes omitted). In
order for ejusdem generis to apply, five conditions must be met:
(1) the statute contains an enumeration by specific words; (2) the
members of the enumeration constitute a class; (3) the class is not
exhausted by the enumeration; (4) a general reference supplementing
the enumeration . . . (5) there is not clearly manifest an intent that
the general term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine re-
quires.
Id. § 47.18 (footnotes omitted).
The tenant's duties are enumerated in Omo Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.05
(A) (1)-(8) (Page Supp. 1974). Of these duties, six specify the parts of the
premises affected and the activities required. Id. § 5321.05(A)(3)-(8). See
notes 89-94 supra and accompanying text; notes 107-15 infra and accompany-
text. Five of these six limit the tenant's duties to proper use, operation, or
clearing of certain areas of the premises. Id. § 5321.05(A)(3)-(6), (8).
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and the performance of limited housekeeping tasks,102 activities that
are not properly repairs and include such labor as cleaning, changing
lightbulbs, or preventing the development of fire hazards. Condi-
tions that require this sort of activity have immediate effect on the
tenant's living environment and are readily noticed and easily cor-
rected by the tenant because he occupies the specific dwelling unit.
The issue of statutory overlap also appears with regard to com-
pliance with various local codes. According to the Act, the tenant
is required to comply with "the requirements imposed on tenants by
all applicable state and local housing, health and safety codes.' 03
A number of cases have held that a lease covenant to comply with
such codes or with "the laws" imposes a duty to make repairs.' 0 4
However, since these cases involved leases that also contained coven-
ants to make repairs, they provide little guidance in determining
what requirements may be deemed to be "imposed on tenants" who
have no contractual duty to repair. However, this issue can be
quickly resolved by means of the reasoning set forth with regard to
Only one can be read as imposing a duty to make repair, i.e., to "main-
tain" certain applicances, but even this limited repair duty can only exist when
imposed by a written rental agreement. Id. § 5321.05(A) (7). Therefore, to
the extent that no duty to repair is unconditionally imposed in these specific
provisions, they may be thought of as a class, imposing duties short of repair
regarding certain specific areas or objects.
The enumeration is not complete in that it does not cover all parts of a
residential dwelling unit for which certain basic maintenance duties should be
imposed, e.g., floors or cabinets. The enumeration does, however, contain the
general requirement to keep the premises safe and sanitary. Id. § 5321.05(A)
(1). The fact that this provision is first rather than last does not affect the
application of the ejusdem generis doctrine. 2A Su ,ER)N § 47.17. Since
the specific provisions of the enumeration do not completely cover the dwelling
unit or premises, such a general provision should, under the doctrine, be con-
strued to embrace things "similar in nature to those . . .enumerated by the
...specific words," id., provided there is no clear indication that a broader
meaning has been intended. As discussed earlier, the provision imposing the
duty of repair on the landlord, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A) (2) (Page
Supp. 1974), implies that no broader meaning is intended. See text accom-
panying notes 67-69 supra. Therefore, this provision may be limited to impos-
ing only those basic maintenance duties which cannot be characterized as re-
pairs.
102. The term "housekeeping" is borrowed from a discussion of Arizona's
landlord-tenant statute. The provision of the Arizona law that sets forth the
tenant's duties is also modeled after URLTA and seems best suited, in denota-
tion and connotation, to convey the thrust of the tenant's duties under the Ohio,
Arizona, and URLTA provisions. See Note, Landlord-Tenant Reform: Ari-
zonas Version of the Uniform Act, 16 Aurz L. REv. 79, 121 (1974).
103. Omo REv. CDE ANN. § 5321.05(A) (5) (Page Supp. 1974).
104. See Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 521, 540-43 (1968).
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the duty to keep the premises "safe and sanitary."'10 5 .In view
of the absence of a repair duty as well as the policy of tying
responsibilities to capabilities, the code provisions that would be ap-
plicable to tenants would be those that regulate the aspects of the
premises over which the tenant has control and that do not involve
repair responsibilities. These would, in most instances, be those that
regulate -the manner of use of the premises. 10 6
According to the statute, the tenant owes duties not only to the
landlord, but also to the other tenants who occupy units in a multi-
unit dwelling. 107 Specifically, the tenant and those on the premises
with his permission are required to conduct themselves "in a manner
that will not disturb his neighbors' peaceful enjoyment of -the prem-
ises.1'0 8 Whereas the obligation to refrain from damaging the prem-
ises protects the landlord's interests in the premises, this obligation
protects the interests of the other tenants in the premises. This duty
is not an innovation of the Ohio legislature. The common law has
long recognized the right of a person to enjoy the occupation of his
property "without serious annoyance from the acts of others."'109 If
one person used "his property to damage another or disturb his quiet
enjoyment of it," then that person would be liable for creating a nuis-
ance." 0 The thrust of the protection afforded by the new law is
to enable the landlord to stand in the shoes of the aggrieved tenant
to take legal action to stop the nuisance.
Since a landlord's action for breach of this provision would be
based on injuries to other tenants, whether conduct amounts to a
breach of the duty imposed by the law should be determined in the
same manner as if the affected tenants were suing. The factfinder
reaches his decision by applying all the elements of the tort of nui-
sance."' Thus, under Ohio law, for the plaintiff to succeed, he must
105. See notes 95-102 supra and accompanying text.
106. See 1 AMmECAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.80.
107. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(A) (8) (Page Supp. 1974).
108. Id.
109. 2 AmsucAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 81.
110. Village of Cardington v. Fredericks, 46 Ohio St. 442, 446, 21 N.E.
766, 767 (1899); Newcomb v. Dredge, 105 Ohio App. 417, 152 N.E.2d 801
(1957).
111. New York gives a landlord the power to evict a tenant if he can "by
competent evidence establish to the satisfaction of the court that the tenant
is objectionable." REAL PROP. AcTIONs § 711 (McKinney 1963). The factors
that must be established are very similar to those required to show a nuisance.
The misconduct must be continuous and persistent and there must appear to
be "a lack of desire or of ability on the part of the tenant to prevent or control
the objectionable conduct." Kaufman v. Hammer, 49 Misc. 2d 773, 775, 268
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demonstrate that, by virtue of the conduct of the tenant or his guests,
he suffered material, substantial, and tangible injury.112 Even then,
the inquiry would be reduced to the weighing of circumstances 13-
whether the conduct was a "reasonable exercise of dominion [over
the defendants dwelling unit] having regard to all interests affected,
his own and that of his neighbors, and having in view also public
policy." 114 The nature of the dwelling itself may also be a critical
consideration. For example, loud music and late parties in a
"singles" apartment building would less likely be a nuisance than the
same activity in a building occupied by retired persons.11 5
The question, in essence, may be whether the landlord would
have been liable for the conduct complained of had he, and not the
tenant, been the wrongdoer. Since, in all likelihood, the landlord
and not the wrongdoer will be the primary target of the complaints
of the aggrieved tenant, this provision actually serves as a means of
indemnifying the landlord.11 6
Ill. REMEDIES FOR BREACH OP OBLIGATION
A. Remedies Available to the Landlord
1. Eviction
Because eviction is the most drastic remedy available to the land-
lord, it has always been a carefully limited right. Prior to the en-
actment of the new law, eviction was available to the landlord in
an action for forcible entry and detainer against holdover tenants,
tenants in possession under an oral tenancy though in default of rent,
N.Y.S.2d 80, 92 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1966). Conduct that is merely dis-
agreeable or distasteful, or displeasing or shocking to an "over-sensitive or fas-
tidious nature, no matter how irritating or unpleasant" is insufficient. Valley
Courts, Inc. v. Newton, 47 Misc. 2d 1028, 1030, 263 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865 (Sy-
racuse City Ct. 1965).
112. Eller v. Koehler, 68 Ohio St. 51, 56, 67 N.E. 89, 91 (1903). Another
way of stating the proposition is that the conduct must result in an injury
which is greater than "a trifling annoyance, inconvenience or discomfort."
Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 476, 78 N.E.2d 752, 759 (1947).
113. 68 Ohio St. at 55, 67 N.E. at 90.
114. Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 477, 78 N.E.2d 752, 759
(1947).
115. Cf. Louisiana Leasing Co. v. Sokolow, 48 Misc. 2d 1014, 266 N.Y.S.2d
447 (N.Y. City Ct. 1966) (noise made by small children behaving normally
is not a sufficient nuisance to make tenant objectionable).
116. Omio REv. CoDn ANN. § 5321.05(C) (Page Supp. 1974) would allow
a landlord to recover damages where the tenant's acts resulted in a condition
which amounted to a breach of the landlord's duties to another tenant.
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and tenants occupying lands without color of title."" Without abro-
gating these grounds, the new legislation adds two new grounds for
an action in forcible entry and detainer.
The first of the new grounds for eviction is intended to implement
the entire statutory scheme; it allows use of the sanction for the
breach of a statutory obligation imposed on the tenant by the new
law.' 8 Before eviction can be obtained on this ground, however,
certain conditions must be met. First, in order to justify the for-
feiture, the alleged violation must be substantial; that is, it must
materially affect health and safety.1 9 Secondly, the landlord must
strictly follow a prescribed procedure. He must send the tenant
a written notice "specifying the act and omission that constitutes non-
compliance"' 20 and the date on which the rental agreement is to
terminate. The law further requires that this date of termination
be set at "not less than thirty days after receipt of the notice."' 21
Finally, there must be a showing that the tenant failed to remedy
the condition that is the subject of the notice before the termination
date.
The second additional ground for eviction is that the tenant has
"breached an obligation . . . imposed by a written rental agree-
ment.' 22 Unlike the ground based on the breach of statutory obli-
gations, this ground has a direct counterpart in the common law. At
common law there was no right in the lessor to declare an eviction
for breach of a rental agreement unless the lease conferred such a
right, 123 but practically every residential lease contained such a pro-
vision. 124 Even when the right was expressly reserved, however,
evictions were difficult to obtain because they were considered to be
117. Prior to the amendments made by the Act, OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §
1923.02 (Page 1968) provided in part that relief in forcible entry and detainer
would be granted:
(A) Against tenants holding over their terms;
(B) Against tenants in possession under an oral tenancy, who are
in default in the payment of rent as provided in this section;
(E) When the defendant is an occupier of lands or tenements, with-
out color of title, and to which the complainant has the right
of possession.
(F) In any other case of their unlawful detention.
118. OHso REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.02(H) (Page Supp. 1974).
119. Id.
120. Id. § 5321.11 sets forth the notice requirements.
121. Id.
122. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.02(I) (Page Supp. 1974).
123. Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N.E. 502 (1897).
124. 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.94.
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in the nature of a forfeiture, and the judicial attitude toward for-
feitures was not a favorable one.125 Courts developed the practice
of strictly construing a clause providing for a forfeiture against the
party seeking to enforce it.126 In ,addition, the courts would grant
a forfeiture only if no alternative form of relief would be suffi-
cient.127 When the tenant was willing to cure the breach by money
payment or substantial performance, the forfeiture could be en-
joined.' 28  The landlord could also be required to show that he de-
manded performance and that the performance was not forthcom-
ing.129
The Act appears to expand the right to eviction by giving the
landlord a statutory right to declare a forfeiture for breach of a writ-
ten rental agreement that is not dependent on a reservation of that
right in the written instrument. Merely changing the source of the
right from contractual to statutory, however, does not change the
limitations on forfeiture that have developed under the common law.
Since the legislature only codified a common law remedy, the courts
may continue to rely upon the limitations developed at common
law.' 30
The philosophy of the common law limitations pervades the right
to evict for breach of a statutory obligation. The antiforfeiture bias
is inherent in the demanding notice requirements; -the idea that
only a material breach triggers the right to evict closely parallels the
common law notion that eviction was a remedy of last resort.' 3 ' In-
deed the preservation of the common law limitations plays a critical
role in the process by which a -tenant may be evicted for breach of
125. Smith v. Whitbeck, 13 Ohio St. 471 (1862); Bates & Springer, Inc. v.
Nay, 91 Ohio L. Abs. 425, 187 N.E.2d 415 (Ct. App. 1963). Dietrich v. Ezra
Smith Corp., 12 Ohio App. 243, 31 Ohio C.C.R.(n.s.) 204 (1920).
126. Gould v. Hyatt, 40 Ohio L. Abs. 468, 154 N.E. 173 (Ct. App. 1926).
127. Peppe v. Knoepp, 103 Ohio App. 223, 140 N.E.2d 26 (1956); Reck
v. Daley, 72 Ohio App. 307, 48 N.E.2d 879 (1943).
128. Reck v. Daley, 72 Ohio App. 307, 48 N.E.2d 879 (1943); Eichenlaub
v. Neal, 10 Ohio C.C.R. 427, 3 Ohio N.P. 365, aff'd, 56 Ohio St. 782, 49 N.E.
1113 (1897).
129. Smith v. Whitbeck, 13 Ohio St. 471 (1862).
130. Thompson v. Ford, 164 Ohio St. 74, 128 N.E.2d 111 (1955); 2A
SuTERA_ -AND § 50.05.
131. Compare the requirement in New York that the tenant's breach of his
rental agreement must be of a substantial obligation of the tenancy in order
to declare a forfeiture. A trivial or inconsequential breach will not suffice.
Moss v. I-irshtritt, 60 Misc. 2d 402, 303 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.
1969); Madison 52nd Corp. v. Ogust, 49 Misc. 2d 663, 268 N.Y.S.2d 126
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1966), aff'd, 52 Misc. 2d 935 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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a statutory obligation. But for the presence of these limitations, it
would probably become a popular tactic of landlords to avoid the de-
manding preconditions of eviction for breach of statutory duty by
simply including the tenant's statutory duties in the written rental
agreement.1832 This would impose the statutory-duties obligations by
contract as well as by law. Then, in the event of a breach of a
statutory duty, the landlord could seek eviction on contractual
grounds. This would deprive the tenant of his opportunity to rem-
edy the breach and thereby retain possession. The likelihood that
such a maneuver would succeed in the courts in view of the tradi-
tional common law limitations, however, is slight. In all probabil-
ity, eviction based on breach of contractual terms will be carefully
scrutinized by the courts to prevent abuse by landlords.
An important aspect of both of the new grounds for eviction is
that they form part of a statutory scheme designed to restrict rather
than to enlarge the landlord's right to evict. It is true that eviction
may be based on breach of the new statutory obligations, but these
obligations are much less severe than those imposed upon the tenant
at common law.138 Moreover, the availability of eviction for breach
of lease terms is severely limited by the preservation of the prejudices
of the common law against forfeitures. Yet even these limitations
do not present the complete spectrum of protections against eviction.
The retaliatory eviction provision closely monitors the landlord's mo-
132. See, e.g., Form Apartment Lease 1 10, adopted by the Apartment and
Home Owners Association of Cleveland in 1975:
The Tenant shall keep that part of the premises that he occupies
and uses safe and sanitary; dispose of all rubbish, garbage, and other
waste in a clean, safe, and sanitary manner; keep all plumbing fix-
tures in the dwelling unit, or used by Tenant, as clean as their condi-
tion permits; use and operate all electrical and plumbing fixtures
properly; comply with the requirements imposed on tenants by all ap-
plicable state and local housing, health, and safety codes; personally
refrain, and forbid any other person who is on the premises with his
permission from intentionally or negligently destroying, defacing,
damaging, or removing any fixture, appliance, or other part of the
premises; conduct himself and require other persons on the premises
with his consent to conduct themselves in a manner that will not dis-
turb his neighbors' peaceful enjoyment of the premises; not unreason-
ably withhold consent for the Landlord to enter into the dwelling unit
in order to inspect the premises, make ordinary, necessary, or agreed
repairs, decorations, alterations, or improvements, deliver parcels
which are too large for the Tenant's mail facilities, supply necessary
or agreed services, or exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or ac-
tual purchasers, mortgagees, tenants, workmen, or contractors; and
maintain in good working order and condition the following appli-
ances supplied by the Landlord: . . ..
133. See notes 89-106 supra and accompanying text.
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tives for eviction.' 3 4 Even when that section is inapplicable, pro-
visions for setoff in lieu of eviction and expanded opportunities for
tenants to defend against proceedings in forcible entry and detainer
make the tenant much less vulnerable to eviction.13 5
2. Self-Help Eviction and Distraint
Prior to the enactment of the new law, a landlord could remove
a tenant who had forfeited his right of possession without the use of
legal process provided he did not breach the peace in the course of
removal. 136 Typically, this was accomplished by changing the
locks' 37 or by removing the tenant's personal possessions from the
premises.' 33 The new law has reacted to such activities by pro-
hibiting "any act, including termination of utilities or services, exclu-
sion from the premises, or threat of any unlawful act against the ten-
ant . . . for the purpose of recovering possession . . . . 39 The
provision also forbids a landlord to "seize the furnishing or posses-
sions of a tenant. . . for the purpose of recovering rent payments,
other than in accordance with an order issued by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction."' 40  The law attaches potentially severe penalties
to any violation of this provision by making the landlord liable for
the tenant's attorneys' fees as well as any damages to the tenant re-
sulting from the removal.' 41
There may be several reasons for the legislature's rejection of
self-help evictions. There is the general belief that legal remedies
134. E.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.02 (Page Supp. 1974), prohibiting
the landlord from using eviction to retaliate against a tenant. See notes 236-
304 infra and accompanying text.
135. Id. § 1923.061(B). See notes 390-404 infra and accompanying text
discussing the right of the tenant to set off his damages against rent due, the
expanded notice requirements, and the broadened scope of the forcible entry
and detainer proceeding giving a tenant greater opportunity to defend against
a landlord.
136. Smith v. Hawkes, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 733 (C.P. Pickaway County
1862). Even prior to the enactment of the new law there was some doubt
cast on the validity of this rule by a well-reasoned holding to the contrary.
See Edwards v. C.N. Investment Co., 27 Ohio Misc. 57, 272 N.E.2d 652
(Shaker Heights Mun. Ct. 1971).
137. See Comment, Landlord-Tenant Reform in Cincinnati, 43 U. CIN. L.
Pnv. 175, 182 (1974).
138. Smith v. Hawkes, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprints 733 (C.P. Pickaway County
1862).
139. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.15(A) (Page Supp. 1974).
140. Id. § 5321.15(B).
141. Id. § 5321.15(C).
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are created to be used. When the landlord's right is infringed, he
should rely on his legal remedy and comply with all the conditions
thereunder. 1 42 In this way, not only is the landlord's right enforced,
but the tenant's right to a hearing is recognized and a volatile situa-
tion is avoided. 14 3 Furthermore, forbidding the landlord to resort
to self-help maintains a balance with the tenant who is denied access
to self-help remedies, and confirms the overall statutory policy
against self-help measures.14 4
Although the provision forbidding distraint may be harsh, it is
arguably not broad enough in scope to effect a thorough abolition
of self-help remedies. For example, in the Uniform Act, the land-
lord's right to acquire liens on the tenant's -personal property through
lease provision is abolished entirely.' 45 The oppressive feature pre-
sented by such liens is that the landlord could execute on the per-
sonalty either on his own initiative or through special summary pro-
ceedings for distress.' 4 6 This is not a real problem in Ohio, however,
since the state has no distress provisions. 147 Furthermore, it seems
doubtful that any property attachment without some provision for
notice and hearing could withstand a constitutional challenge based
on a due process argument.' 48 Finally, a landlord cannot secure
142. Cowards v. Fleming, 89 Ohio App. 485, 493, 102 N.E.2d 850, 854
(1951).
143. Edwards v. C.N. Investment Co., 27 Ohio Misc. 57, 61, 272 N.E.2d
652, 655 (Shaker Heights Mun. Ct. 1971). Even if such a situation occurs,
the tenant's remedy is available through the legal process, rather than through
self-help. See generally, Note, Forcibly Ejected Tenant-Damages, Possession
Both or Nothing, 28 U. CN. L. REv. 369, 373 (1959).
144. The remedies given the tenant by the Act, with the exception of termi-
nation, require some form of judicial supervision. See text accompanying notes
158-200, 208-35 infra for discussion of new remedies. The law does
not even create a repair-and-deduct remedy which is a common self-help provi-
sion in landlord-tenant legislation. See notes 223-35 infra and accompanying
text. It should also be noted that the retaliatory conduct provision reflects the
overall policy against self-help. See text accompanying notes 261-64 infra.
145. URLTA § 4.205(a). This provision also abolishes distraint for failure
to pay rent, but this would be unnecessary in Ohio since there is no statutory
distraint or distress and apparently no analogous common law remedy. See
Sutliff v. Atwood, 15 Ohio St. 186, 193-94 (1864).
146. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 80, §§ 16-35 (Smith-Hurd 1966); Ky.
RaV. STAT. ANN. §§ 383.030-.068 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 250.302-
.313 (1965).
147. See note 145 supra.
148. In the wake of Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969),
summary proceedings were held to be unconstitutional by several courts. See,
e.g., Cross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Holt v. Brown, 366
F. Supp. 2 (W.D. Ky. 1971); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D.
Pa. 1970); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Blacker v.
[Vol. 25:876
LANDLORD AND TENANT
a waiver of hearing through a warrant of attorney under the new
law since such a waiver is expressly prohibited. 149 Thus, the tenant
would invariably be provided with a hearing prior to the attachment
of his property.150
3. Damages
Although evictions may be more difficult to obtain under the new
law, the landlord may recover damages, as at common law, for the
tenant's torts and breaches of contract.1 51 Where there is a breach
of the tenant's statutory duties, the landlord is restricted to actual
damages and reasonable attorneys' fees.' 52 Damages can only com-
pensate an injured party or deter certain activities. Neither of these
purposes can be served unless a tenant has sufficient resources to
satisfy a judgment. Where the landlord is renting to welfare recipi-
ents and the poor, he has little chance of actually collecting
a judgment. Damages are also made available to the landlord for
attempts by tenants to frustrate the statutory scheme by unjustified
use of statutory remedies. In the event that a tenant initiates a
statutory rent withholding,'5 alleging a violation of the landlord's
duty where the condition precipitating the action has in fact been
caused by the tenant's own "act or omission," the landlord may re-
cover damages and costs.' 54 If it can be shown that the tenant has
used his new remedies in bad faith, the landlord may recover not only
damages caused but attorneys' fees and costs as well.' 55'
Blackburn, 228 Ga. 2&5, 185 S.E.2d 56 (1971). See also for a discussion of
the issues involved Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and
Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L.
Rv. 1, 47-52 (1973).
149. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.13(B) (Page Supp. 1974); see text ac-
companying notes 350-59 infra.
150. It is also possible that a lien on personal property, if contained in a
form lease, could be attacked under the unconscionability provision of the new
law. OrHO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.14 (Page Supp. 1974). See text accom-
panying notes 360-67 infra.
151. "In any action under Chapter 5321 of the Revised Code, any party
may recover damages for the breach of contract or the breach of any duty that
is imposed by law." Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 5321.12 (Page Supp. 1974).
152. Id. § 5321.05(C).
153. See notes 170-89 infra and accompanying text.
154. Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 5321.09(D) (Page Supp. 1974).
155. Id. This provision states that "the tenant shall be liable for damages
caused to the landlord, and for costs, together with reasonable attorneys' fees
if the tenant intentionally acted in bad faith." Each of the clauses is a sep-
arate element of the liability, as the commas indicate. The requirement of bad
faith is in the clause imposing liability for attorneys' fees, which is set off from
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The damage remedy indicates that the new law is not strictly a
pro-tenant vehicle. Nevertheless, the usefulness of the remedy from
the point of view of the landlord may be marginal at best. Of
course, one can attempt to justify the -potential hardship upon the
residential landlord by reasoning that under a legal system that com-
pensates for injury with money, everyone faces the possibility that
an injury might go unanswered because the wrongdoer is judgment-
proof. It might also be argued that, like the common merchant, the
landlord has accepted the insolvency of a customer as a normal
business risk. However, unlike the judgment debtor or the mer-
chant, the landlord is compelled either by long-term commitments
or stringent antieviction legislation' 56 to continue to deal with the
wrongdoer. Thus, without compensation for damage or an effective
means to deter future damage, the landlord is uniquely vulnerable
to his tenants. 157
B. Remedies Available to the Tenant
1. Section 5321.07 Remedies
The .new law provides several remedies for the tenant faced with
the landlord's breach of a contractual or statutory duty.' 58 The
remedies are designed to offer the tenant a number of options in
approaching the landlord. The remedies, enumerated in section
5321.07 of the Act are:
the damages and costs not only by a comma but by the word "together." It
therefore seems that only the liability for attorneys' fees is dependent on bad
faith. Tenants are discouraged in this way from initiating rent withholding
motivated primarily by a desire to harass the landlord. Where the remedy is
used for trivial breaches or with greater frequency than may be reasonably
necessary to obtain compliance, the element of bad faith might well be present.
156. See text accompanying notes 117-50 supra.
157. The balance may not be so unequal as it appears. Arguably, the land-
lord could obtain insurance, much like an automobile owner's uninsured motor-
ists coverage, to cover such damages. In this manner, the risks could be spread
much more effectively.
158. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07 (Page Supp. 1974). However, some
landlords may avoid these sanctions. Where a landlord "is a party to any
rental agreements which cover three or fewer dwelling units," he may make
the sanctions inapplicable to him by giving the tenant written notice of the
number of units that he has in a written rental agreement or, "in the case of
an oral tenancy, delivers written notice of such fact to the tenant at the time
of initial occupancy." Id. § 5321.07(C). This provision protects the small
landlord from the stringent sanctions of the new bill, but does not relieve him
of his statutory responsibilities since the tenant still has a right to sue for dam-
ages for breach of a legal duty. Id.; see text accompanying notes 212-35 infra.
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1. rent withholding,
2. limited receivership
3. rent abatement,
4. termination,
5. injunctive relief.
The right to invoke these remedies may be triggered in two ways,
First, a government agency may certify that there has been a viola-
tion of a provision of a building, housing, health, or safety code
which applies "to any condition of the residential premises that could
materially affect the health and safety of an occupant."'159 This
method of verification by an outside observer has been the most com-
mon means of establishing a landlord's breach of duty under the
common law warranty of habitability doctrine. 60 The problem with
certification, however, is that it can only accommodate patent Viola-
tions of codified duties. Ohio has developed through the second and
third tiers certain duties whose breach cannot be readily ascertained
by resort to any fixed standard.' 61 It is hardly possible, for example,
for a housing inspector to identify with any degree of certainty
whether a given condition was within the expectation of the tenant.
Thus, were certification the only means of triggering the remedies
under the Act, it would severely restrict their availability for
breaches of more subtle obligations.
So that the full measure of the landlord's duties may be enforce-
able by resort to private remedies, the Act provides an alternative
basis for triggering the right to use the remedies: the tenant's rea-
159. Omo Rv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(A) (Page Supp. 1974) provides in
part:
If a landlord fails to fulfill any obligation imposed upon him by sec-
tion 5321.04 of the Revised Code or by the rental agreement, or the
conditions of the premises are such that the tenant reasonably be-
lieves that a landlord has failed to fulfill any such obligations, or a
governmental agency has found that the premises are not in compli-
ance with building, housing, health, or safety codes which apply to any
condition of the residential premises that could materially affect the
health and safety of an occupant ....
160. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25,
289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972). Inspection and official findings
are not the exclusive method of determining whether the landlord has breached
his duty. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1082 (citing Diamond Housing Corp. v. Rob-
inson, 257 A.2d 492, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1969)); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii
426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); note 70 supra. In some jurisdictions, however, they
have been made the sole methods by which a breach can be established. See,
e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 11-23 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
161. See text accompanying notes 65-81 supra.
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sonable belief that the landlord has not fulfilled his obligations.162
This provision gives the tenant discretion to decide whether sufficient
grounds exist to use one of the new remedies. This method, while
somewhat innovative in a statutory framework, has been previously
suggested at common law.'6 3 The exercise of the tenants' discretion
must be closely monitored in the first years of the statute's life.
There are, however, certain minimal protections against frivolous,
vindictive suits.' 4
A tenant may avail himself of the new remedies only if he has
satisfied certain procedural conditions. ,First, he must be current in
his rent payments.' 6 5 Secondly, he must send written notice to the
landlord specifying the acts, omissions, or conditions that constitute
the landlord's noncompliance. -6 6 The landlord or his agent must ac-
tually receive this notice.167 Finally, the tenant must wait either a
reasonable time or 30 days, whichever is shorter, before using any
of the remedies.' 68 This period is designed to enable the landlord
to avoid further action by correcting the complaints listed in the
notice.
-In addition to these formalized prerequisites, there are internal
practical guides to be followed in using the remedies. First, in many
cases a single remedy may not be wholly responsive to the particu-
lar problems confronting the tenant. Inherent in the statutory design
162. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(A) (Page Supp. 1974).
163. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.62 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
164. Otuo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.09(D) (Page Supp. 1974); see text ac-
companying note 181 infra.
165. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B) (Page Supp. 1974). Although
a default in rent payments precludes use of the new remedies, the tenant may
still obtain redress by waiting until the landlord tries to evict him, at which
time he may counterclaim for damages and set them off against the rent due
under § 1923.061(B). This could be risky, however, since the tenant would
not know if the court would consider the damages to be as great as the amount
by which the tenant was in default. See generally notes 212-35 infra and ac-
companying text.
166. Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(A) (Page Supp. 1974). By failing
to give the tenant his name and address, the landlord may be found to have
waived his right to notice. Id. § 5321.18(C). See note 388 infra and accom-
panying text.
167. Id. § 5321.07(B) provides in part: "If a landlord receives the notice
described in division (A) of this section and after receipt of such notice fails
to remedy the condition within a reasonable time considering the severity and
the time necessary to remedy such condition, or within thirty days, whichever
is sooner ... [the tenant may, if the other preconditions are met, pursue his
statutory remedies]."
168. Id.
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that provides the tenant with several possible responses is the idea
that the attorney representing a tenant may shape the specific rem-
edy to the tenant's peculiar situation, combining a number of the
provisions. The only limitiation on this would seem to be that of
conceptual consistency. For example, a tenant cannot invoke
termination and initiate rent withhholding at the same time. An-
other, and perhaps countervailing, factor to consider in using these
remedies is that they do reflect a constant tension between the needs
of the individual tenant and the needs of the community to secure
a sufficient supply of housing. In many cases, these policies will
not conflict. When they do, however, it is not inconceivable that
a court would exert its equitable powers in certain isolated situations
to curtail creative shaping of remedies or even restrict the choices
of remedies available to the tenant from the statutory list.169 A
liberal reading of the legislation could certainly support such an ap-
proach.
a. Rent Withholding. According to the statute, a tenant may
withhold the amount of rent due under the terms of his lease, if his
landlord fails to remedy the defects listed by the tenant in his no-
tice.170 To prevent the possibility of the dissipation of rent monies
by the tenant, the rent must be deposited with the clerk of court
in the county or municipality in which the premises are locatedY1
So that finances will not prove to be an obstacle to the vindication
of his statutory rights, there is no need for the tenant to file a suit
or pay a filing fee. The role of the clerk is carefully defined. He
is directed to keep a record of the names and addresses of the land-
lord and tenant involved, to maintain a running balance of the
monies deposited with him, to provide the landlord with notice of
deposits, and to maintain an escrow account for the deposited
funds, ' 72 the clerk may not refuse to accept rent deposited for rent-
withholding purposes; his duties are wholly administerial rather than
discretionary.' 73
169. See id. § 1923.15.
170. Id. § 5321.07(B)(1).
171. Id.
172. Id. § 5321.08(A)-(C). Failure to give the tenant the landlord's name
and address will operate as a waiver of notice from the clerk. Id. § 5321.18
(C). See text accompanying note 378 infra. The clerk may assess his costs
against the escrow fund at a rate not in excess of 1 percent of the amount
deposited. Id. § 5321.03(D).
173. Gittes & Marshall, A Guide to Ohio's New Tenant-Landlord Law, 3
LAw & HousiNo NEWSLEtrER 2, 23 (Jan. 1975).
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Once the rental funds have been deposited with the court, the
landlord has the burden of recovering them. He may obtain the
money either by having the tenant give notice to the clerk of courts
that the defect has been corrected 174 or by bringing an action in court
against the tenant to obtain release of the rent.' 7 5 The landlord may
base his action either on procedural grounds, that the tenant has
failed to give proper notice or to be current in rent,176 or on allega-
tions that go to the substance of the complaint-that the landlord had
never violated his duties or that he had remedied the defect.177 If
the landlord's allegations are upheld at trial, then the -rents, less court
costs, are returned to the landlord.17 8 If the court finds that the
defect was the result of the tenant's act or omission, the tenant is
liable for both damages and costs' 79 and may face eviction.180  Fur-
thermore, if the court finds that the tenant "intentionally acted in
bad faith," he may be liable for the landlord's attorneys' fees as
well.' 81
Of the sanctions available to the tenant, rent withholding is the
least onerous for the landlord. ,It merely serves to delay the land-
lord's receipt of his rental payment until the repairs have been made.
At that time the withheld rent, less costs if litigation is necessary,
is delivered to the landlord without any setoff for the claim of the
tenant that he was deprived of a portion of his bargain for the dura-
tion of the breach. In locales where the sanction has been used,
it has met with some success in obtaining landlord compliance with-
out litigation.' 82 The primary shortcoming of the remedy stems from
the fact that the correction of a defect in the dwelling often requires
capital. If all landlords had other sources of income, rent with-
holding would work satisfactorily. 'In realty, however, most land-
lords, particularly in low income areas, do not enjoy this advan-
174. Omo R.v. CODE ANN. § 5321.09(A) (1) (Page Supp. 1974).
175. Id. § 5321.09(B).
176. Id. § 5321.09(A)(2).
177. Id. § 5321.09(A) (3).
178. Id. § 5321.09(C).
179. Id. § 5321.09(D).
180. Id. § 5321.03 (A) (2).
181. Id. § 5321.09(D).
182. Gittes & Marshall, supra note 173, at 23 (citing success of remedy
under a Columbus, Ohio city ordinance and testimony before the Ohio Senate
Judiciary Committee regarding the success of the Pennsylvania procedure insti-
tuted in 1967); Simmons, Passion and Prudence: Rent Withholding Under
New York's Spiegel Law, 15 BuFF. L. REv. 572, 593 (1966).
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tage.' 83 The effect of rent withholding in many situations, therefore,
is to derpive the landlord of money when he most needs it, when
repairs must be made and paid for.
Moreover, the new law could conceivably discourage financial
institutions from lending capital to residential landlords in need.
One provison of the statute mandates that a party who receives pay-
ments of rent must assume the responsibility for fulfilling the land-
lord's statutory obligations.' s4 Thus, were a bank to grant a mort-
gage secured by rental obligations, the default of the mortgagor could
force the bank either to repair the defective premises or become sub-
ject to rent withholding itself. Even if the bank were to grant a
mortgage secured by the premises themselves, default by the landlord
would leave the mortgagee bank in an unfavorable position. Since
any purchaser of the land would be forced to repair the leased prop-
erty to avoid rent withholding by the tenants, any foreclosure sale
would necessarily draw a price below that obtainable for similarly
located property in full repair. In sum, then, the sanction of rent
withholding may place the unprosperous landlord in a difficult posi-
tion and, perhaps, isolate him from financial assistance.
The Act attempts, however, to mitigate the harshness of rent
withholding for -the marginal, or nonentrepreneurial, landlord in two
ways. First, a landlord with three or fewer units may avoid the
remedies entirely by informing his tenants in writing of the size of
his operation.' 8 5 Secondly, a court may, in certain circumstances,
release part of the withheld rents. The court may release funds to
help cover various items, including mortgage payments and mainten-
ance costs attributable to the premises.18 6 In deciding whether to
release such funds, the court may take into consideration the cost
183. Comment, Rent Withholding Won't Work: The Need for a Realistic
Rehabilitation Policy, 7 LOYOLA L. REv. (L.A.) 66, 80 (1974).
184. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.13 (E) (Page Supp. 1974) provides: "A
rental agreement, or the assignment, conveyance, trust deed, or security instru-
ment of the landlord's interest in the rental agreement may not permit the re-
ceipt of rent free of the obligation to comply with section 5321.04 of the Re.
vised Code." The possible effects of this provision on the acquisition of fi-
nancing are discussed in text accompanying notes 368-70 infra.
185. Id. § 5321.07(C). See note 158 supra.
186. Id. § 5321.10(A) provides:
If a landlord bring an action for release of rent deposited with the
clerk of court, the court may, during the pendency of the action, upon
application of the landlord, release part of the rent on deposit for
payment of the periodic interest on a mortgage on the premises, the
periodic principal payments on a mortgage on the premises, the in-
surance premiums for the premises, real estate taxes on the premises,
utility services, repairs, and other customary and usual costs of op-
erating the premises as a rental unit.
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of repairing the condition that was the basis of the tenant's com-
plaint.'8T
Although the idea of obtaining a release may be attractive to the
landlord, the law attaches some conditions to the option of freeing
the withheld rent. The landlord must make known his accounts to
the court.'88 He must show the court his income from the structure
or structures of which the dwelling unit is a part, the amounts of
the mortgage and interest payments, the operating expenses, and the
anticipated cost of repair. Practically speaking, this forces the land-
lord to choose between giving up his business privacy and financing
repairs and other expenses without rental income. Presumably, the
landlords who would seek a release under this option would most often
be the small-scale landlords to whom the privacy of business dealings
is not a significant consideration.
Although the release provision is designed to balance tenant re-
lief against the danger of contracting the housing supply, the bal-
ance established is imperfect. The Act's definition of expenses for
which release may be obtained is susceptible to abuse. There is
always the danger that a landlord would realize his profits from the
structure in advance by over-financing, with the result that all of the
rental income would be channeled into repaying indebtedness, an ex-
pense for which a release may be obtained.189
The disclosure that is a condition precedent to seeking the release
of withheld rental monies may, of course, discourage such practices.
Rarely, if ever, will a landlord willingly disclose that his building is
mortgaged to an unusually high degree. Furthermore, even if dis-
closure of unusually high debt were made by the landlord, the court
could examine the circumstances and act in a manner consistent
with achieving the overall goals of the statute.' 90
187. Id. § 5321.10(B) provides:
In determining whether to release rent for the payments described in
division (A) of this section, the Court shall consider the amount of
rent the landlord recieves from other rental units in the buildings of
which the residential premises are a part, the cost of operating those
units, and the costs which may be required to remedy the condition
contained in the notice given pursuant to division (A) of section
5321.07 of the Revised Code.
188. Id.
189. Gittes & Marshall, supra note 173, at 25.
190. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.10 (Page Supp. 1974). Strictly speak-
ing, however, there is no statutory basis for denying a release based on the
improper motives of a landlord. Inquiry into enterprises unrelated to the
structure in question is not authorized, so that the court may be prevented from
denying a release because of the landlord's general speculative approach to
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b. Receivership. Under the new statute, the court itself is al-
lowed to use funds on deposit under a rent withholding to have the
defect in the premises repaired.' 91 This method of obtaining compli-
ance bears a resemblance to a court-administered receivership, 192 but
from the standpoint of the landlord, it is only slightly more harsh
than the court's mere retention of the funds. The landlord benefits
from the improved condition of the building and gets back whatever
is left of the rent after deduction of costs.
Nevertheless, this procedure may have some serious conse-
quences for the landlord. Once the court has undertaken repairs
with the rental money, the landlord has, in effect, lost all control
over the repairs. The choice of repairman and, hence, the cost of
repairs is critical to both the small and large-scale landlord. The
landlord with few holdings is typically a handyman, who can afford
to own properties only because of his ability to cut costs by making
his own repairs. The entrepreneurial landlord, on the other hand,
often avoids the expenses of repairs by employing a salaried main-
tenance man, avoiding the high hourly rates demanded by special-
ized repair personnel.
Further problems have arisen in the administration of the more
expansive receivership remedies adopted elsewhere. 193 In some
business. Nevertheless, the language of the provision indicates that judicial re-
lease of rental funds is entirely discretionary with the court.
191. Id. § 5321.07(B)(2) permits the tenant to:
Apply to the court for an order directing the landlord to remedy the
condition. As part thereof, the tenant may deposit rent pursuant to
division (B) (1) of this section, and may apply for an order reducing
the periodic rent due the landlord until such time as the landlord does
remedy the condition, and may apply for an order to use the rent
deposited to remedy the condition. In any order issued pursuant to
this division, the court may require the tenant to deposit rent with
the clerk of court as provided in division (B)(1) of this section.
[Emphasis added.]
192. Most receivership statutes empower a municipality to take over all
management functions of an apartment building. See Comment, Rent With-
holding, supra note 183, at 86. S.B. 103, § 1909.02(I) provided for the court
to appoint a receiver to manage the residential premises and to fulfill the land-
lord's obligations if all other remedies proved inadequate. It is this type of
receivership that has proven -to be the most troublesome. See notes 193-94
infra and accompanying text. The rather limited authority given the courts
under the new Ohio law, i.e., to use deposited rent to pay for needed repairs,
does not seem to contemplate such extensive management. It is possible, how-
ever, that, given the need for extensive repairs and the participation of a large
number of tenants, even the rather circumscribed power granted by the Act
could lead to many of the problems found with the more extensive receiver-
ships.
193. See Comment, Rent Withholding, supra note 183, at 86. See also Mc-
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states receiverships have proved exceedingly complex and costly.
Where the needed repairs have been expensive, courts have been
forced to obtain commercial financing and to repay the loans from
withheld rents. The repayment period has proved to be long, requir-
ing the courts to engage actively in the management of the apart-
ment dwellings. These difficulties have not ended once the repairs
were made and the debt was fully paid. Many landlords, after being
out of control for a long period, have refused to resume the manage-
ment of the premises. 1 9
4
Although these experiences are products of receivership programs
of a much more ambitious nature than the Ohio plan appears to be,
they offer valuable guidelines for implementation of Ohio's receiver-
ship device. The other programs indicate that court administration
of repair is most effective when the repairs are relatively minor and
can be paid for by 2 or 3 months' rent. The necessity of avoiding
entanglement of the courts in financing arrangements further de-
mands that the remedy be avoided where the repairs would be expen-
sive or require a substantial commitment. Thus, instead of using this
procedure as a form of receivership, the judiciary should use the
remedy as a form of court-administered repair-and-deduct statute,
through which the costs of repair would be deducted from the
amount of the escrow account.19 5 A court should therefore be quite
certain of the cost and extent of the necessary repairs before ordering
the repair.
c. Rent Abatement. The Act also provides -that a tenant may
apply to the court for a prospective decrease in rent in response to
a breach of duties by his landlord.196 This order would remain in
effect until the landlord corrected the defect that precipitated the
tenant's complaint. 1 97 The provision sets no limit on the amount of
rent reduction, and does not establish any means by which the land-
lord can gain access to rent that has been "abated." Moreover,
abatement may be granted in conjunction with rent withholding,
thereby reducing the court-held fund and, consequently, the amount
available for release to cover expenses and repairs. 198
Elhaney, Retaliatory Evictions: Landlords, Tenants, and Law Reform, 29 MD.
L. REv. 193, 199-202 (1969); Comment, The Pennsylvania Project-A Practi-
cal Analysis of the Pennsylvania Rent iWithholding Act, 17 VILL. L. REv. 821,
845-52 (1972).
194. See Comment, Rent Withholding, supra note 183, at 86.
195. See note 192 supra. See also text accompanying notes 223-35 infra.
196. OHIo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1974).
197. Id.
198. If it appears that the court might have to direct the repairs, rent abate-
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From the point of view of the tenant, rent abatement is a second
line of defense against the offending landlord. He may remain un-
responsive to -rent withholding or receivership because, regardless of
how much time it takes him to complete repairs, he receives a dollar-
for-dollar refund for expenditures made by him. Even where repairs
are administered by the judiciary, the landlord receives the benefit
of the completed repairs in the increased value of the premises.
With rent abatement, however, the landlord is permanently deprived
of the abated portion of the rent. When he finally does make the
necessary repairs, he effectively pays twice for them. Equity favors
such a result. Since the tenant is deprived of his bargain until re-
pairs are completed, it seems entirely fair that his landlord should
suffer some corresponding detriment.
A crucial shortcoming of the rent abatement remedy is that its
terms may frustrate the entire policy of compelling landlords to main-
tain habitable dwellings. On the one hand, by permanently depriv-
ing the landlord of income, the sanction may severely reduce his
ability to make repairs. On the other hand, landlords might defeat
the policy by using the remedy to effect a judicial reformation of
the rental agreement. Because the court can adjust the rent to re-
flect the decrease in value of the premises, the landlord might then
feel he has the choice of either making the repairs in order to get
full rent or permitting the tenant to continue in possession at the re-
duced rent without making the repairs. If the tenant's complaint
rests upon the argument that he has paid for something that he is
not getting, that the landlord has breached a third-tier duty,199 then
relieving him of the duty to pay may well be acceptable to the land-
lord and tenant and also in keeping with the public policy underlying
the new law. But where the complaint is of a condition or defect
materially affecting health and safety, such a reformation would en-
counter serious policy obstacles.
Although a tenant might be willing to live in unsafe or otherwise
unfit premises in exchange for low rent payments, the legislature has
made the decision that certain minimum standards are to be avail-
able for all.200 They have further provided that the obligations and
ment would be unwise since it would reduce the amount of funds available with
which to pay for the repairs.
199. Id. § 5321.04(A) (2); see notes 65-81 supra and accompanying text.
200. Defects of this degree of seriousness would probably constitute
breaches of first- or second-tier duties. See notes 30-64 supra and accompany-
ing text; cf. note 80 supra and accompanying text.
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benefits of the new law cannot be waived. 20 1 It is therefore doubtful
that a court should allow the landlord and tenant to bargain with
regard to such basic standards.
A second consideration that argues against allowing abatement
to effect a contractual reformation without repair is the problem
posed by subsequent deterioration. Eventually, the deterioration
will reach such a level that a future tenant would have no alternative
but to compel repair. 20 2 It seems patently unfair to allow a present
tenant to foist the responsibility to compel repair onto some future
tenant solely for the purpose of obtaining a rent reduction. In addi-
tion, such a deferral of repairs would ultimately result in increased
cost of repairs to the landlord, thus increasing the possibility that he
would abandon the building. -All things considered, the result of
deferral would be to place the present tenant in jeopardy, to require
a future tenant to purchase a potential lawsuit with the premises,
and to increase the ultimate cost to the landlord.
-It seems advisable, therefore, for a court to join an order com-
pelling the landlord to make repairs with a prospective rent abate-
ment,20 3 at least in situations where the condition or defect is a seri-
ous one. In this way, although the landlord might be able to avoid
the repair duty merely by obtaining the tenant's agreement not to
seek enforcement of the injunction, the landlord would place himself
in great risk and at the tenant's mercy. He would be more likely
to make the repairs than try to bargain with the tenant to the frustra-
tion of the new law and to the detriment of all.
d. Termination. 'Under the common law, a tenant could ter-
minate his rental agreement before the end of his term only for ac-
tual or constructive eviction.2 0 4 Under the new law, a tenant has
the option of terminating for any breach of duty by the landlord,
whether the duty be statutory or contractual.2 05 'From one perspec-
tive, this is the most severe of all the sanctions available to the tenant
under the Act. The other remedies only defer or reduce the benefits
flowing to the landlord, whereas termination ends the landlord's right
to any future benefits flowing from the contractual relationship. The
tenant need not go to court to use this remedy. The landlord has
none of the benefits of a judicial contest; he is faced with a fait
201. OHIo RaV. CODE ANN. § 532.13(A) (Page Supp. 1974).
202. Id. § 5321.07(B)(2); see notes 208-11 infra and accompanying text.
203. See note 288 infra.
204. WetzeU v. Ritchcreek, 53 Ohio St. 62, 40 N.E. 1004 (1895).
205. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(A) & (B)(3) (Page Supp. 1974).
[Vol. 25:876
LANDLORD AND TENANT
accompli. His only means of responding to a termination is a suit
for damages for breach of the rental agreement.
In a statute that seeks to force landlords to maintain certain
standards through the threat of tenant action, termination is a
uniquely self-centered remedy. Unlike the other tenant remedies,
termination is not directed at securing the landlord's immediate com-
pliance with his statutory obligations. Instead, the sanction primar-
ily serves to protect the tenant's interests by freeing him to find a
more suitable dwelling.
The problems that arise from the termination remedy are the re-
sult of the intense focus on the individual tenant. By making ter-
mination so easy the legislature has given the tenant a means of
avoiding the direct avenues of tenant enforcement. Moreover, be-
cause the termination process is practically unsupervised, the sanc-
tion could become simply a means of voiding a lease when new space
becomes available, rather than an instrument for the vindication of
legitimate tenant grievances. The potential that termination holds
to become an easy escape route suggests that its use should be care-
fully scrutinized by the courts in order to advance, rather than frus-
trate the scheme of the statute. The courts should limit use of the
remedy to -those situations in which it is the only means by which
the tenant's interests can be advanced. 20 6 Thus, termination would
properly be utilized where alternative tenant remedies have been ef-
fectively exhausted or are of no value whatsoever. The nature of
repairs required to rectify a serious situation would be a relevant con-
sideration in analyzing the preferability of termination to other reme-
dies. For example, where a threat to the health and safety could
not be quickly removed, or where the repairs necessary to bring the
premises into compliance would be so extensive as to impair substan-
tially the use of the premises, termination would be a permissible
practical response. Of equal significance in determining whether
206. Since the law does not require that a tenant obtain court approval for
termination, the courts can only become involved if the landlord brings an ac-
tion for improper termination. The landlord is only likely to bring such a suit
if (1) he feels confident that he will obtain a judgment and (2) the tenant
is able to satisfy such a judgment. By restricting the use of the termination
remedy to extreme situations, the major effect would be felt by middle and
upper income tenants, who would be able to satisfy a judgment. Since the geo-
graphic and economic mobility of these tenants is greater than that of the poor,
one could hypothesize that they would be those most likely to abuse the termi-
nation remedy. Clearly defined limitations on the use of termination would
increase the certainty with which a landlord could bring suit to enforce his
contracts, thereby minimizing the chances of abuse.
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termination is the proper remedy in a particular situation is the land-
lord's history of compliance with other statutory duties. Where the
landlord has shown disregard for his obligations, either by repeated
failures to correct conditions despite the application of other sanc-
tions or by the frequency with which his tenants have had to resort
to legal remedies, termination is preferable to the continued attempts
to resolve problems by litigation.
The issue whether termination will become widespread, however,
is probably moot for the present. The effectiveness of termination
as a tenant remedy is contingent on the market environment. Where
the housing supply surpasses demand, the tenant may use termina-
tion with impunity in his quest of the most favorable bargain. How-
ever, when the supply lags far behind demand, as it does now, land-
lords may charge exorbitant prices. In such times, tenants do not
wish to enter the market if they can avoid it; they attempt to negoti-
ate long-term leases as a hedge against rising prices. In this type
of environment the tenant's remedy of termination may be il-
lusory. o7
e. Injunction. Although the focus of the new law is on private
enforcement, the civil sanction of injunction is available as a final
resort. Under the statute, the tenant may obtain a court order com-
pelling the landlord to make the necessary repairs 208 or to cease
abusing his right of entry. 209 These orders are probably most effec-
tive when joined with rent withholding or rent abatement. 21 0
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.4, Reporter's Notes 9
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1974) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY].
208. OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1974); see note
191 supra and accompanying text.
209. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(B) (Page Supp. 1974); see id. §
1923.15 for the grant of power to issue injunctive orders in forcible entry and
detainer provisions.
210. It should be noted that the tenant's right to seek rent abatement or
receivership is "as a part" of the right to obtain an order compelling the land-
lord to make repairs. Ox-o REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B)(2) (Page Supp.
1974). It might therefore be argued that the court may only grant abatement
or receivership in conjunction with an injunction. This argument is countered
by the consideration that this provision creates only the tenant's right to seek
the remedy, not the court's power to award the remedy. Cf. id. § 1923.15;
notes 393-94 infra and accompanying text. In addition, if the argument were
accepted, the court would be placed in the rather curious situation of ordering
a landlord to make repairs while directing the clerk to have them made out
of deposited rent. Therefore, this provision is more sensibly read as not impos-
ing restrictions on the court's power to grant relief. This leaves the courts
free to use their remedial powers as the facts of the case require.
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Unlike many of the other remedies, a court order does not pre-
sent the landlord with a series of options. After the issuance of the
order, a landlord's continued refusal or failure to correot his non-
compliance could result in civil or criminal contempt penalties.
These penalties could prove more severe than the -fines imposed for
building, housing, health, or safety codes, since they may include
total forfeiture of rent from the tenant. Thus, the use of the order
and the threat of possible penalties is probably the most effective
deterrent against a landlord's casual treatment of his obligations to
the tenant.-"
2. Damages and Statutory Setoff
The tenant's right to recovery of damages for breach of contract
or breach of "any other duty that is imposed by law"212 is one of
dual importance. Since the landlord's obligations regarding the con-
dition of the premises are obligations imposed by law, the tenant may
seek damages for a breach of -those obligations. More signifi-
cantly, an award of damages can enable a tenant to retain possession
of leased premises even if he himself has breached an obligation
owed to the landlord. Under the new law, if the landlord brings
an action in forcible entry and detainer to recover possession for non-
payment of rent, a tenant may use the amount of damages owed
him by the landlord as a setoff against rent due, and if that amount
equals or exceeds the rent due, the tenant can retain possession. 213
As a result of the setoff provisions, the method used to calculate the
damages can be crucial; unfortunately, the new law is silent about
the approriate method.
The case law dealing with the common law doctrine of warranty
of habitability reveals that there are basically two methods of compu-
tation that have found acceptance. There are, however, substantial
differences between the two as regards their utility under the Act.
The first method is taken from contract and commercial law.214
It sets the tenant's damages at the difference between the fair rental
211. See text accompanying notes 291-96 infra for discussion of the manner
in which a court might order a landlord to "go out of business" through its
power to enjoin a reletting of the premises under Omo REv. CODE ANN. §
1923.15 (Page Supp. 1974), and the policies to be considered in making such
a decision.
212. OHIo R-v. CODE ANN. § 5321.12 (Page Supp. 1974).
213. Id. § 1923.061(B).
214. See 11 S. WILLIsToN, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CoNTRAcrs §§
1391, 1404 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1968); cf. UCC § 2-714(2).
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value of the premises in a repaired condition and the fair rental
value, if any, of the premises in their defective condition.215  The
agreed-upon rental price is normally only evidence and not a conclu-
sive statement of the fair rental value.216  This measure of damages,
however, has two significant disadvantages when used under the new
law.
An obvious disadvantage of this fair rental approach is that it
may require tenants to produce costly expert appraisals of at least
the fair rental value of the premises in repaired condition. The ex-
pense of these appraisals will, in effect, make damages available only
to tenants who can afford to pay the fees of the experts.21 7 Not quite
so obvious is the hardship of the remedy on a tenant who, either
because of market peculiarities or poor bargaining ability,21 8 is pay-
ing a rent in excess of the fair rental value of the premises in a re-
paired condition. Under these circumstances, the maximum avail-
able damages would be less than the amount of rent owed. If the
defects were so substantial as to make the premises worthless, -this
ceiling on damages would, in effect, force the tenant to share in the
penalty for the landlord's breach for no other reason than that he
paid an inflated price for his dwelling.
Some courts, particularly those presented directly with a question
of damages, have not adopted the fair rental value approach.2 1 9
215. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 638, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183,
111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 719 (1974); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa
1972); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 845
(Mass. 1973).
This is also the measure of damages accepted by Ohio common law for
a landlord's breach of a covenant to make repairs. Cochran v. Widra, 35 Ohio
L. Abs. 608, 41 N.E.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1931).
216. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 845 (Mass.
1973); Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine
Raising New Issues, 62 CALIF. L. RaV. 1444, 1466 (1974); cf. Cochran v.
Widra, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 608, 41 N.E.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1931); 11 S. WILLISTON,
supra note 214, § 1391, at 436. But cf. 5 A. CoRBIN, CoNTRAcTs § 1004, at
41 (1964): "When goods have been sold and delivered at an agreed price in
money, the court does not have to find the value of the goods. The parties
have themselves 'valued' them; and the plaintiff is given judgment for the
amount of that agreed value-the price."
217. See Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 487, 268 A.2d
556, 562 (Dist. Ct. 1970); Moskovitz, supra note 216, at 1468.
218. Moskovitz, supra note 216, at 1466 n.103; cf. Berzito v. Gambino, 63
N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973) (rent of $35 per week for apartment valued by
the court at $75 per month). As an example of market peculiarities, consider
a multi-unit building in which tenants who have been renting for several years
pay less than new tenants.
219. See King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973);
[Vol. 25:876
LANDLORD AND TENANT
These courts have, instead, used a formula that sets damages at the
difference between the agreed-upon rental price of the premises and
the value of the premises in a defective condition. 220 By using this
method of computing damages, the disadvantages inherent in the fair
rental value measure are eliminated. First, while it is arguable that
expert evidence should be required to ascertain the fair rental value
of the defective premises, as a practical matter the courts have not
required this. It has been recognized that even sophisticated expert
testimony upon the fair rental value of premises operated in violation
of the law is of questionable worth.221 The courts have therefore
estimated that value on their own, basing their decision upon the
evidence of the nature and extent of the defects.2 22  Secondly, where
the landlord has been able to exact an inflated price, the agreed-
upon price method will provide a more realistic measure of the ten-
ant's injury since no portion of the rent would be insulated from the
damages measurement and setoff.
The significance of the method used to compute damages appli-
cable under the new law may be best illustrated in the form of a hypo-
thetical situation. Two landlords, A and B, own identical apart-
ments in the same neighborhood; the fair market value of both apart-
ments in maintained condition is $75 per month. Landlord A rents
Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 34, 289 N.E.2d 919, 926 (Sylvania Mun.
Ct. 1972); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 93-94, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971);
cf. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 639 n.29, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183-
84, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 719-20 (1974); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 469,
308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973); see also Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 NJ.
Super. 477, 485, 268 A.2d 556, 561 (Dist. Ct. 1970).
220. There is an alternative formulation of this measure that sets the dam-
ages as a percentage reduction in rent equal to the percentage reduction in the
tenant's use of the premises attributable to the defective condition. See Acad-
emy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 NJ. Super. 477, 485-87, 268 A.2d 556, 561-
62 (Dist. Ct. 1970). This does not, however, seem to be a different measure
of damages. Essentially, it only provides a method of calculating the amount
of money owed by the tenant to the landlord for the defective premises, i.e.,
the value of the premises in defective condition. The difference between this
figure and the agreed-upon rental price is the damage incurred by the tenant.
Cf. Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 34, 289 N.E.2d 919, 926 (Sylvania
Mun. Ct. 1972). But cf. Moskovitz, supra note 216, at 1468-70.
221. See Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 486, 268 A.2d
556, 562 (Dist. Ct. 1970); Steinberg v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 38, 344
N.Y.S.2d 136, 144 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1973); Moskovitz, supra note 216, at
1467-68.
222. See Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 487-88, 268
A.2d 556, 562 (Dist. CL .1970); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 34-35,
289 N.E.2d 919, 926 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972); cf. Green v. Superior Court,
10 Cal. 3d 616, 639, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 719 (1974).
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his apartment for $75 per month; landlord B has been able to obtain
$100 per month for his apartment. Both A and B then neglect their
legal duties under the Act to such an extent that the fair market
value of the premises is reduced to $0.
In this situation if A's tenant stops paying rent, A would be
unable to evict him for his default under either the fair market value
or rental price measure of damages. Under the fair market value
approach, the tenant's damages would be the fair market value of
the premises as repaired ($75) minus the fair market value of the
premises unrepaired ($0), or $75. Since the rent price equals the
fair market value of the premises as repaired, the damages would
also be $75 under the rental price method (rental price minus fair
market value of the unrepaired premises). A judgment for A's tenant
in the amount of $75 would completely offset the rent owed to A.
Thus, A's tenant would remain in possession.
On the other hand, if B's tenant discontinued his rent payments,
whether B could evict would depend on the measure of damages ap-
plied by the court in determining the value of the tenant's counter-
claim for B's breach. If the fair market value method is used,
the tenant's damages would again be $75 (fair market value of
premises as repaired minus the fair market value of the defective
premises). Since the tenant's rent obligation is $100, he would still
owe the landlord $25 in rent after the court offset his damage against
the landlord. Thus B could evict since the damages did not com-
pletely negate the rental obligation. Under the fair market value
formula, then, the landlord who was able to bargain for rent higher
than the fair market value would be able to regain possession, while
the landlord who has charged no more than the fair market value
would not be able to evict under the same circumstances. Signifi-
cant too, is the fact that the tenant paying an inflated rent is doubly
harmed.
If the rental price method of computing damages were applied
in B's case, however, he would be unable to use the higher rental
price to secure immunity from the setoff procedure and obtain an
eviction order. Since his tenant's damages would equal the $100
rental price ($100 rental price minus $0 fair market value of the
premises in defective condition), the use of the setoff would leave no
rent owing to B. Like A, he would be unable to evict. The result
is definitely the more equitable one.
The application of the rule of statutory setoff to prevent eviction
is a significant development of the Ohio law. It might be argued,
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however, that the legislature did not develop the full potential of the
setoff provisions. One of the easiest routes for development might
be using the cost of tenant-made repairs as a measure of damages.228
If this measure were used under the Act, a tenant could have repairs
made, deduct the cost from his rent, and if eviction were sought for
the deficiency, use the cost of repairs to set off the rent due, and
thus possibly retain possession. This would convert the setoff pro-
cedure into a self-help repair-and-deduct device.
Repair-and-deduct is an attractive option for the tenant. It
eliminates the need to go through time-consuming court proce-
dures to correct small problems or emergency conditions that re-
quire immediate attention.224  It offers the opportunity to a group
of tenants to pool their rents to make major repairs. It provides
greater leverage when requesting repairs since the landlord is faced
with the possibility that the repairs will be made without his consent,
but at his expense should he refuse to undertake them himself.
The judicial impositon of a repair-and-deduct remedy, which
could be achieved through interpretation of the new Ohio setoff pro-
vision, must overcome three substantial obstacles. First, the remedy
itself has several inherent problems. In the absence of some limit
upon the amount of rent that may be used for repairs, there is a
risk that the cost of repairs could so reduce the landlord's income
that he could not meet his other expenses. 225 Furthermore, without
a requirement of notice and a waiting period before having the re-
pairs made, the landlord might be deprived of the opportunity to
make the repairs himself or be caught in a race to repair with the
tenant.226 Lastly, because of the average tenant's inexperience in
making repairs and contracting with building tradesmen, repairs
might be poorly done or inordinantly expensive. 227
223. Marini v. Ireland, 56 NJ. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); see Cochran v.
Widra, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 608, 41 N.E.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1931).
224. See Jackson v. Rivera, 65 Misc. 2d 468, 318 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Civ. Ct.
1971); Comment, Landlord-Tenant Law Reform in Cincinnati, 43 U. CIN. L.
R.v. 175, 178-79 (1974); cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF PROPERTY § 10.2,
Comment a.
225. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 10.2, Comments a, b
and Reporter's Notes 9; Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-Tenant Act
of the Committee on Leases, Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Ten-
ant Act, 8 REAL PRop. PROBATE & TRusT J. 104, 116-17 (1973).
226. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 10.2, Reporter's Notes 1 3;
Dooley & Goldberg, A Model Tenants' Remedies Act, 7 Iv. J. LEGIs. 357,
379 (1970).
227. This was a major concern of the Ohio Board of Realtors and other
landlord groups who appeared before the Governor's Committee on Housing
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In recognition of these problems, the overwhelming majority of
states that have developed a repair-and-deduct remedy have done
so through the legislative rather than the judicial process. 228  In
order to minimize the risks presented by the remedy, the legisla-
tures have carefully limited its application. 22  These laws generally
prescribe a maximum dollar amount that may be used to make re-
pairs, the number of times per year the remedy may be used,
the length of time after giving the landlord notice that the tenant
must wait before commencing repairs, and whether the cost is to be
the actual cost or the reasonable value of the work.23 0  Moreover
some of the courts have taken a strict posture toward the laws to
further purge them of risks. 231 The end result is that the remedy
has been weakened. The question whether the risks of repair-and-
deduct can be minimized without impairing the utility of the remedy
has apparently been answered in the negative. 232
In addition to the intrinsic deficiencies of the remedy, a judicial
reading of the legislative intent of the Ohio law would probably pre-
clude the development of repair-and-deduct in the courts. In one
of the bills considered by the Ohio legislature there was an express
repair-and-deduct provision. 233  The bill was rejected. Further-
hearings prior to legislative consideration of the proposed reforms. Because
of the tenant's inability to make sound repairs, the repair duty was imposed
exclusively on the landlord and no repair-and-deduct provision was put into the
law. Interview with Peter Simmons, Professor of Law at the Ohio State Uni-
versity Law School and Member of the Governor's Committee on Housing, in
Cleveland, Ohio, Oct. 21, 1974.
228. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1942 (West Supp. 1974); MASs. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 111, § 127L (Supp. 1975); URLTA § 4.103.
229. New Jersey and New York are the only two states permitting the rem-
edy in absence of statutory authority. See Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265
A.2d 526 (1970); Jackson v. Rivera, 65 Misc. 2d 468, 318 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Civ.
Ct. 1971). See also Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1368 (1971).
230. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942 (West Supp. 1974) (requiring reason-
able notice, 30 days being deemed reasonable; setting maximum amount at 1
month's rent; limiting use to once each year); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111,
§ 127L (Supp. 1974) (landlord has 10 days after notice to begin repairs and
21 days from notice to finish; limit of 2 months' rent in any 12-month period).
See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 10.2, Statutory Notes at 268-
70.
231. See Olinger v. Reahard, 117 Ind. App. 172, 70 N.E.2d 436 (1947);
cf. Sherrod v. Lidyoff, 108 Cal. App. 2d 325, 236 P.2d 28 (1928). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 10.2, Comment e and Reporter's
Notes ff 9; Note, Landlord v. Tenant: An Appraisal of the Habitability and
Repair Problem, 22 CASE W. Rus. L. REv. 739, 748-51 (1971).
232. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 631, 517 P.2d 1168,
1178, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 714 (1974).
233. See Substitute H.B. 169, § 1923.19(A)(1). See also URLTA § 4.103.
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more, the overall scheme of the statute does not favor a reading of
a repair-and-deduct provision. Since the remedies set forth are
comprehensive, it is difficult to argue that the legislature intended
them to be other than the exclusive set of available remedies. Also,
the statute is clearly prejudiced against self-help remedies. 284
Finally, there is one overriding reason which would probably bar
the development of an implied repair-and-deduct remedy even if the
other obstacles were overcome. Under the Ohio common law, it is
firmly established that the measure of damages for a landlord's
breach of a covenant to repair cannot include the cost of tenant-
made repairs. 235 Since the new law is no more than a covenant im-
posed by law, this rule seems directly on point.
IV. RETALIATORY CONDUCT
A. Origins of the Provision
Unlike local building and housing codes, which seek to obtain
compliance through criminal penalties and governmental enforce-
ment, 236 the new landlord-tenant Act relies upon civil sanctions ap-
plied by private parties to enforce its goals. 237 Thus, if the new law
is to be successful in providing minimally adequate rental housing
through the alteration of the traditional balance of rights and obliga-
tons between the landlord and tenant, those who bear the responsi-
bility for enforcement must be free to apply the Act's sanctions to
secure its benefits. The more restricted this freedom becomes, the
less significance the sanctions will have, and ultimately the less effec-
tive the law will be.
The shortage of rental housing, the expense of moving, and the
inequality of bargaining power between the tenant and landlord
place the tenant in a highly vulnerable position.238 The opportuni-
ties for reprisal are great, particularly in the case of the short-term
or periodic tenant, over whom the landlord holds a virtually unre-
234. OHIo RaV. CoDE ANN. § 5321.15 (Page Supp. 1974), bars self-help
eviction or diminution of services. See text accompanying notes 136-42 supra.
235. Holder v. Farmakis, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 279, 117 N.E.2d 491 (Ct. App.
1950); see Cochran v. Widra, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 608, 41 N.E.2d 875 (Ct. App.
1931).
236. See note 46 supra.
237. See notes 117-235 supra and accompanying text.
238. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Schoshin-
ski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519,
541-42 (1966).
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stricted power of termination.23 9  If the price of asserting his legal
rights may be eviction or an exorbitant rent increase, a tenant will
be deterred from pursuing the remedies available to him.
A number of states have provided some measure of protection
by allowing the tenant to use a landlord's retaliatory motive as a
defense in an action for possession. 240 In states where the defense
has been created by the courts, it has been supported by two ra-
tionales. The first is that where a tenant is given a right to take
legal action to enforce public laws (as in filing complaints with hous-
ing authorities), allowing a landlord to terminate the tenancy in reply
would thwart the purposes of the statute. 241 The second justification
is that eviction would infringe upon the tenant's constitutional right
to organize or to petition the government and his guarantee to free
speech. 242 As the case law developed, however, it became apparent
that the original conception of the defense did not fully anticipate
its full parameters. In the slow, uneven fashion of common law de-
velopment, the courts gradually dealt with issues such as the validity
of rent increases motivated by retaliation243 and the degree of protec-
tion from retaliation to be afforded to tenant union activities. 244
By statutorily creating the defense in Ohio,245 the legislature has
articulated the scope of impermissible retaliatory conduct. Section
5321.02 defines the specific acts on the part of the landlord that may
be considered retaliatory in the presence of an improper motive.246
Furthermore, the provisions enumerates the remedies available to the
239. All that is necessary to terminate the tenancy is the giving of appro-
priate notice by the landlord that the tenancy is terminated. See 1 AmucAN
LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 3.23, 3.90. The notice requirements under the new Ohio
law are found in Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.17 (Page Supp. 1974); see
text accompanying notes 380-81 infra. Normally, the landlord's motives are
not to be considered since he is under no duty to renew the tenancy for another
period. See Ferguson v. Buddenberg, 87 Ohio App. 326, 94 N.E.2d 568
(1950).
240. See, e.g., statutes and cases cited in notes 179-82 inIra.
241. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699-703 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1970).
242. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 696-98 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501, 505-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); E.
& E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 116 NJ. Super. 220, 225, 281 A.2d 544, 546
(App. Div. 1971). But see Fallis v. Dunbar, 386 F. Supp. 1117 (N.D. Ohio
1974).
243. Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr.
729 (1970).
244. Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
245. Omno Ruv. CODE ANN. § 5321.02 (Page Supp. 1974).
246. Id. § 5321.02(A).
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tenant victimized by a retaliatory act. He may use the landlord's
activity as a defense against an eviction proceeding. He may use
it to recover possession lost in a previous eviction. And he may
terminate his tenancy as a result of the retaliation and avoid any
further contractual duties to the landlord.247 In addition, the tenant
may recover actual damages and attorneys' fees. 248
The Act also establishes the scope of tenant activities that are
protected by the retaliation defense. The common law retaliation
defense extended protection to any lawful act taken by the tenant
to secure rights granted him by law, and some states have simply
incorporated this formulation into statutory forms of the defense.249
Other states have used a more restrictive approach by listing the spe-
cific types of activity that are protected from retaliation. 250 The re-
taliation provision in the new Ohio law, which is modeled after the
retaliatory conduct provision of the Uniform Act,251 appears to take
the latter approach. The protected areas are those in which
1. the tenant has complained to an appropriate govern-
mental agency of a violation of a building, housing,
health, or safety code that is applicable to the premises,
and the violation materially affects health and safety;
2. the tenant has complained to the landlord of any viola-
tion of section 5321.04 of the Revised Code;
3. the tenant has joined with other tenants for the pur-
pose of negotiating or dealing collectively with the
landlord on any of the terms or conditions of a rental
agreement. 252
An important issue that must be considered is the allocation of
the burden of proof. Antiretaliation measures typically speak to "re-
247. Id. §§ 5321.02(B)(1)-(B)(3).
248. Id. § 5321.02(B).
249. Some statutes prohibit retaliation for an attempt to secure or enforce
rights under the lease or agreement or under the laws of the state, of its gov-
ernmental subdivisions, or of the United States without any limitation on the
acts that fall within the protection. MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.5720
(Supp. 1974-75); MI-N. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (Supp. 1974); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:42-10.10 to .12 (Supp. 1974-75); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 34-20-10 to
11 (1969).
250. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1942.5 (West Supp. 1974); CoNN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 19-375a (Supp. 1974-75); HAwAIu REv. STAT. § 521-74(a) (Supp.
1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1966); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 6001 (Supp. 1974-75); MASS. GEN. Lws ANN. ch. 186, § 18 (Supp.
1975); N.H. Rlv. STAT. ANN. §§ 5410:13-a, 13-b (Supp. 1973). See also
ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1381 (1974); URLTA § 5.101.
251. See URLTA § 5.401.
252. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.02(A) (Page Supp. 1974).
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taliatory motive." Because the element of subjectivity thus intro-
duced is undesirable, the Uniform Act and most of the state stat-
utes253 give the tenant the benefit of a presumption of retaliation
if the landlord's reprisal occurs within a given period of time after
the tenant has engaged in a protected activity. The new Ohio stat-
ute, however, does not contain such a provision. 254
Ohio takes a further step to mitigate the effect of the retaliation
provision on the landlord. The new law provides that a landlord
may, under certain specified circumstances, seek an eviction or a rent
increase notwithstanding the presence of a retaliatory motive.2 55
B. The Extent of Protection
The statutory list of specific protected activities 256 offers litigants
a degree of certainty. The list creates a major problem, however, in
that the activities listed are not coextensive with the full spectrum
of statutory activities in which the tenant may engage in order to
secure the landlord's compliance with his statutory obligations.
Given the specific enumeration in the provision, it is arguable that
the doctrine of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio
alterius257 would demand that the protection afforded by the retalia-
tory conduct defense not extend to tenant activities not expressly in-
cluded by the statute. This argument, however, would ignore an
equally important rule of construction that calls for the exercise of
caution to avoid frustration of legislative intent through too rigid an
application of the expressio unius rule:258 "Where an expanded in-
terpretation will accomplish beneficial results, serve the purpose for
which the statute was enacted, [or] is a necessary incidental to a
power or right. . . the maxim will be disregarded and an expanded
253. URLTA § 5.101 and the statutes cited in notes 249-50 supra, with the
exception of those in effect in Hawaii, Illinois, and Rhode Island, create pre-
sumptions of retaliation. The presumption created is that any eviction or
termination attempted during a specified time after a tenant has acted in a pro-
tected manner is presumed to be retaliatory. The period during which the pre-
sumption operates ranges from 60 days to 6 months.
254. See notes 265-74 infra and accompanying text for discussion of prob-
lems created by the absence of such presumption.
255. Orno Rav. CODE ANN. § 5321.03 (Page Supp. 1974).
256. Id. § 5321.02(A).
257. "[Where a form of conduct, the manner of its performance and oper-
ation, and the persons and things to which it refers are designated, there is
an inference that all omissions should be understood as exclusions." 2A
SUTHERLAND § 47.23 (emphasis added).
258. See State ex rel. Jackman v. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio St. 2d
159, 164, 224 N.E.2d 906 (1967).
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meaning given.12 59 If the enumerated items are interpreted as being
the only activities for which the defense of retaliatory conduct is
available, a tenant's resort to the formidable remedies created by the
new law would fully expose him to reprisal. Such an interpretation
would effectively emasculate the force of the private enforcement
program and, consequently, the thorough reform of the landlord-ten-
ant relationship established by the new law.260 There is little reason
to believe that a tenant faced with the possibility of termination or
substantial rent increases would dare to employ his new remedies
against a landlord who refused to respond to complaints, nor is there
reason to expect that landlords would voluntarily assume the sub-
stantial obligations imposed by the new law. Thus, if the new law
is to retain any vitality in the area of private enforcement of landlord
duties, the retaliatory conduct defense provision must be interpreted
in a liberal rather than restrictive manner.
Assuming that the list of protected tenant activities is not exclu-
sive, the exact scope of the defense must still be delineated. For-
tunately, other references to retaliatory conduct made in the Act pro-
vide criteria to be used in defining the breadth of tenant protection.
The clearest indication of legislative policy toward retaliatory
conduct outside the retaliation provision itself is found in the portion
of the Act dealing with forcible entry and detainer. 261  The law re-
quires 'that the summons issued to initiate eviction proceedings state
that "no person shall be evicted in retaliation for the exercise of his
259. 2A SuTnR.AND § 47.25. The expressio unius maxim should be used
with caution as a tool to ascertain legislative intent, not to frustrate legislative
policy. See State ex rel. Jackman v. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio St. 2d
159, 164, 224 N.E.2d 906 (1967).
260. The importance of this protection to the success of the statutory
scheme is emphasized in a discussion of a comparable provision of URLTA
§ 5.101(a).
If any of these prohibitions or protections were removed, the entire
structure of the Act would be jeopardized, for each represents a step
which a tenant might reasonably take when displeased with his land-
lord's attitude or actions regarding maintenance or repair. [The re-
taliatory conduct provision] thus stands as a delicately integrated
scheme which definitely should remain undisturbed by the enacting
body.
Davis, URLTA, Kansas, and the Common Law, 21 U. KAN. L. Rnv. 337, 420
(1973).
The Ohio statute is similar to the URLTA section except that it does not
include a presumption. See notes 265-74 infra and accompanying text. Had
the presumption been incorporated in the law, much of this discussion would
not be necessary.
261. Oino R.v. CODE ANN. § 1923.06(B) (Page Supp. 1974).
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lawful rights. ' 2 6 2  It is manifest that resort to remedies created by
the same statute is an "exercise of lawful rights." Thus, the defense
of retaliation must be available when eviction or other prescribed
measures are used by the landlord in response to the tenant's use
of statutory remedies.
The reason that the legislature did not include the use of the
statutory remedies in the retaliatory conduct provision is not clear
from a cursory reading of the provision. However, a closer examina-
tion of the enumerations in that section reveals a critical element
common to each of the items listed: each is initially a nonjudicially
supervised activity. It is this coloration of self-help that is the critical
element. Since the new law does not extend to the tenant any self-
help remedies263 and prohibits the landlord from using self-help, 264
it may be implied that the use of self-help does not fit into the gen-
eral category of a "lawful right." Therefore, the only positive way
of protecting a measure with self-help overtones from retaliation is
to include it specifically within the scope of the retaliation defense.
In this light, the retaliatory conduct provision can be seen not
as a complete enumeration of all activity that is within the scope
of the protection but rather as a list of those unsupervised activities
that are -to be afforded the same protection as measures that have
acquired their status as "lawful rights" by mere inclusion in the terms
of the statute. Only this construction affords protection in the use
of the new remedies, thereby insuring the tenant's freedom to seek
judicial aid in enforcing the new law.
C. Proof of Retaliatory Conduct
Ohio is one of five jurisdictions in the nation that has enacted
a retaliatory conduct provision by statute without concomitantly cre-
ating a presumption that requires the landlord to prove the absence
of retaliatory intent.265  Where the presumption does exist, it is
262. Id.
263. The law does not provide a repair-and-deduct remedy, see notes 223-
35 supra and accompanying text, nor does it expressly authorize self-help rent
withholding. See generally Note, Rent Withholding-A Proposal for Legisla-
tion in Ohio, 18 CASE W. Rns. L. REv. 1705, 1715 (1967).
264. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.15 (Page Supp. 1974) prohibits the use
of exclusion from the premises, termination of services and utilities, threats,
or seizing of a tenant's personal property to facilitate eviction or rent collec-
tion.
265. See note 253 supra; Daniels, Judicial and Legislative Remedies for Sub-
standard Housing: Landlord-Tenant Law Reform in the District of Columbia,
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typically keyed to the length of time between the occurrence of the
tenant's protected activity and the prohibited activity of the landlord.
The value of the presumption should not be underestimated. When
it is operative the -tenant need prove only that he engaged in a pro-
tected activity and that the landlord subsequently engaged in a
proscribed activity.260 No showing of causation or motive is neces-
sary.
Although a presumption provides the tenant with what is perhaps
the maximum protection by relieving him of the burden of proof re-
garding motivation, the absence of presumptive liability does not to-
tally vitiate the protection of the retaliation defense. 267 Both the
general evidentiary rules in Ohio2M8 and the retaliation cases in other
jurisdictions strongly indicate that retaliation may be proved by a
bare preponderance of the evidence.2 69 Even this relatively light
59 GEo. L.J. 909, 960 (1971) (reprinting DisT. OF CoLUmrA HOUSING REG.
§ 2910(C) (1970)).
266. If there is no presumption operating in favor of the tenant, he may
be required to prove a number of facts, for many of -which no evidence is read-
ily available. For example, in at least one jurisdiction, a tenant must prove
that his landlord was aware of a tenant's actions before a court will find retali-
atory motivation on the part of the landlord. Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d
389, 399, 173 N.W.2d 297, 302 (.1970). While this may raise no evidentiary
difficulties where the tenant's action is that of lodging complaints with the
landlord or initiating legal action, a proof problem may arise if the activity
is participation in a tenant union or submission of a complaint to a govern-
mental agency. In addition, where the act of the tenant is the filing of a com-
plaint with an agency, the common law appears to require a substantial viola-
tion of a building, housing, health, or safety code for protection from retalia-
tion to attach. By so limiting the tenant's protected right to complain, a deter-
rent to using such complaints to harnass the landlord is created. Proof of a
code violation might be required under OHIo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 5321.02(A)
(1) (Page Supp. 1974). See Wilkins v. Tebbetts, 216 So. 2d 477 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1968).
267. Cf. McElhaney, Retaliatory Evictions: Landlords, Tenants and Law
Reform, 29 MD. L REv. 193, 220-23 (1969).
268. 'There is no doctrine of the law settled more firmly than the rule
which authorizes issues of fact in civil cases to be determined in accordance
with the preponderance or weight of the evidence." Johnson v. Stackhouse
Oldsmobile, Inc., 27 Ohio St. 2d 140, 142, 271 N.E.2d 782, 784 (1971); quot-
ing Jones, Stranathan & Co. v. Greaves, 26 Ohio St. 2, 4 (1874).
269. In jurisdictions where no presumption of retaliation is available to the
tenant the preponderance standard is generally required. See, e.g., Robinson
v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Dickhut v.
Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 399, 173 N.W.2d 297, 302 (1970), however, the court
required that the retaliatory motive be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
This court was not applying a statutory defense of retaliatory conduct, but was
recognizing the defense at common law. It is probable that judicial concerns
regarding the impact of widespread availability of such a defense were the pri-
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burden of proof, however, may cause the tenant serious difficulties.
The evidentiary problems that may arise stem primarily from the dif-
ficulty of proving the subjective state of mind known as retaliatory
intent. In the absence of a landlord's testimony that his conduct was
retributive,270 a tenant must use indirect evidence to infer improper
motivation. Obviously, such evidence is difficult both to discover
and evaluate. Of the various types of indirect evidence available
to the tenant, the factor given most weight in many of the cases is
the length of time between the tenant's protected activity and the
alleged retaliatory conduct of the landlord. 27 1
The shorter the period between the act and the alleged reprisal,
the stronger the inference of retaliation. The sudden initiation of
threats of eviction or rent hikes would likewise support an inference
of retaliatory motive.2 72  It could also be shown that (1) the tenant
had always been well-behaved and that no reason other than reprisal
could thus exist; (2) .the landlord has been evasive or unduly reti-
cent when asked to justify the eviction; (3) the reasons given for
the eviction, such as violations of legal or contractual duties, had not
been the subject of previous complaints; or (4) the acts or omissions
given as reasons had not resulted in the eviction of other tenants
mary motive behind the imposition of the relatively rigid burden of proof.
Such a standard of proof is only required in Ohio in an action for fraud where
a party is trying to set aside a written instrument. Household Finance Corp.
v. Altenberg, 5 Ohio St. 2d 190, 193, 214 N.E.2d 667, 669 (1966). See also
Merrick v. Ditzler, 91 Ohio St. 256, 260-67, 110 N.E. 493, 494-96 (1915).
Since the applicability of the clear-and-convincing standard is strictly limited
and since this higher standard is not expressly called for by the Act, there is
no reason to impede the retaliation defense with a high burden of proof.
270. A landlord may of course unwittingly testify against himself. In Rob-
inson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1969), for example,
in a previous action a tenant had had her lease invalidated because of housing
code violations existing at the time she entered into the agreement. Under
the illegal contract theory of Brown v. Southhall Realty Corp., 237 A.2d 834
(D.C. Ct. App. 1968), this relieved the tenant of the duty to pay rent. The
landlord then came into court seeking an eviction because the tenant was not
paying rent. The court held that if the eviction were allowed on such grounds
it would constitute a penalty upon the exercise of the right to be relieved of
paying rent under an illegal contract. In other words, it would be retaliatory.
The landlord had inadvertently testified to the retaliatory motive merely by
stating his grounds for eviction. Id. at 858-59.
271. Cf. Fallis v. Dunbar, 386 F. Supp. 1117, 1118-19 (N.D. Ohio 1974);
Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Schweiger
v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 511, 476 P.2d 97, 98, 90 Cal. Rptr.
729, 730 (1970).
272. Cf. Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501, 502-03 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
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who had engaged in similar activities. 273 Although this type of proof
may be difficult to discover, the experiences under other statutes that
require proof of intent or motive indicates that the burden will not
be overly demanding.2 74
D. Reasons Sufficient to Overcome the Defense of Retaliation
A landlord may have legitimate motives for raising rent or evict-
ing a tenant that coexist with retaliatory intent. When such legiti-
mate motives are present, the availability of the retaliation defense
is dependent upon whether these motives can justify the landlord's
conduct notwithstanding his vindictiveness. Jurisdictions are split on
this issue. Some hold that in order for the defense to prevail eviction
must be solely motivated by the intent to retaliate. 27 5  Others hold
that a presumption of retaliation may be overcome only by a showing
that retaliation was not even considered by the landlord.27 6 A less
extreme approach has been adopted by courts that require only that
retaliation must be the dominant or overriding motive.2 77
Ohio approaches the problem by statutorily specifying the rea-
sons or circumstances in which a landlord is permitted to raise rents
or seek eviction notwithstanding retaliatory intent.2 78 The finite list
of permissible circumstances set forth in the provision indicates that
the enumerated reasons are meant to be exclusive. While in the
273. Moskowitz, Retaliatory Eviction-A New Doctrine in California, 46
CAL. SrATE BJ. 23, 33 (1971); 1971 Wis. L. REv. 938, 946-49.
274. See Moskovitz, supra note 273, at 31-33; 1971 Wis. L REa. 938, 948-
49; Daniels, supra note 265, at 947. These articles draw interesting analogies
to cases involving retaliatory discharge under the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970).
275. In Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 399, 173 N.W.2d 297, 302
(1970), the court, in a jurisdiction without a statutory authorization of a retali-
ation defense, held that, in order for the defense to prevail, retaliation had to
be the sole motive for the landlord's proscribed activity. See note 269 supra.
This requirement, however, is so onerous that it may make the protection af-
forded by the defense almost illusory. Comment, Landlord-Tenant Reform:
Arizona's Version of the Uniform Act, 16 ARuz. L. Rav. 79, 133 (1974);
1971 Wis. L. REv. 938, 951.
276. E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 116 N.J. Super. 220, 224, 281 A.2d
544 (App. Div. 1971); Silberg v. Lipscomb, 117 NJ. Super. 491, 496, 285 A.2d
86, 88 (Dist. Ct. 1971).
277. See, e.g., Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 864-65
(D.C. Cir. 1972); see also McH. CossP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5720(2) (a) (Supp.
1974-75) ("That the alleged termination was intended primarily as a penalty
.... "); Moskovitz, supra note 273, at 31-32 (discussing the possible analogy
with the "motivating" or "substantial" reason test for retaliatory discharge
under the National Labor Relations Act).
278. See Omo Rav. CoDF ANN. §§ 5321.03(A)(1)-(4) (Page Supp. 1974).
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case of statutorily protected tenant activities the interpretative doc-
trine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius should be ignored in fa-
vor of a more liberal interpretation, 279 the doctrine should be applied
rigidly with respect to motivations statutorily more powerful than the
retaliatory conduct defense. A nonexclusive reading of these cir-
cumstances would result in decreased protection of the tenant and
cause the tenant to be hesitant to assert his rights in any manner
but one expressly permitted by the new law.280 A broad interpre-
tation could lead to an open-ended exemption from the retaliation
defense and should be avoided to protect the overall goals of the
Act.281 Therefore, only the specific reasons stated in the new law
should justify a landlord's actions in the face of proof of retaliatory
intent.
Since the exceptions to the retaliation provisions are for the bene-
fit of the landlord, he bears the evidentiary burden of proving that
one or more of them is applicable to his situation. 282 In other words,
if the tenant can prove the simple existence of a retaliatory intent,
the landlord must counter with proof that at least one of the statutory
exemptions applies. If either the tenant's proof fails or the land-
lord's proof succeeds, the court will uphold the landlord's action.
The exact delineation of exemptions from the retaliaton defense in
the statute has two distinct advantages of particular merit. First,
it provides both parties with a firm basis to assess the possibility of
success in litigation. Secondly, this approach strikes a balance in
the allocation of evidentiary burdens between the landlord and
tenant.
While the mechanics of this provision are relatively complex, the
rationale behind sustaining retaliatory actions in particular situa-
tions is basic: response in kind. Thus, while some tenant activities
may justify one type of retaliatory response from the landlord, that
same activity may not suffice as justification for retaliation in another
form. For example, an increase in rent, if effected solely with retri-
butory motives, may be overturned by a tenant. 288 The landlord
can, however, justify the increased rent if he can prove increased
279. See notes 257-60 supra and accompanying text.
280. Cf. id.
281. Pioneer Linen Supply Co. v. Evatt, 146 Ohio St. 248, 251, 65 N.E.2d
71.1, 712 (1946); Kroff v. Amrhein, 94 Ohio St. 282, 286, 114 N.E. 267, 268
(1916) (remedial statutes); 2A SU'mUAND § 47.11.
282. 2A SurTHERLAND § 47.11.
283. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.02(A) (Page Supp. 1974). See also
notes 256-64 supra and accompanying text.
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operating costs or the need for capital to cover costs of improve-
ments.284 Increased costs or expenses cannot justify the harsher
sanction of eviction, because eviction is not a response in kind to
the increased need for money.285
Eviction, the other type of retaliatory conduct contemplated by
the statute, necessarily presents a different case. It may be a legiti-
mate response to more varied forms of conduct and circumstances.
That is, more activities and events go to the essence of the retention
of the possessory interest than to the amount of the rent. Ohio
recognizes this fact and justifies eviction even when accompanied by
retaliatory motives in four different circumstances. 286
The first situation occurs when the tenant is in default of rent.287
The reasoning behind this justification is plain: the rental obligation
is perhaps the most essential covenant the tenant makes with his
landlord and should outweigh any other considerations. Moreover,
the recent trends of the courts to view the lease as a contract288 only
confirms the essential nature of the covenant to pay rent.
The second set of circumstances that justifies retaliatory eviction
appears when the violation of an applicable building, housing, health,
or safety code, which was the subject of a tenant's complaint to either
the landlord or a government agency, was "primarily caused by any
act or lack of reasonable care by the tenant" or by a member of
his household including someone on the premises with his consent.289
Again, this justification has a firm common law background. It
speaks to the inability of the tenant to shift the onus to the landlord
for situations caused by the tenant.2 90
284. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.02(C) (Page Supp. 1974).
285. See notes 291-96 infra and accompanying text; cf. Robinson v. Dia-
mond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
286. See OHno REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.03 (Page Supp. 1974).
287. Id. § 5321.03 (A) (1). From a different perspective, being current in
rent payments could be viewed as a condition precedent to using the retaliatory
conduct defense. Once a tenant acts against the landlord in a protected fash-
ion, the price of keeping the defense available is timely rent payment.
288. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 624, 517 P.2d 1168,
1172-73, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 708-09 (1974); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d
65, 75-76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
289. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.03(A) (2) (Page Supp. 1974). The
landlord can recover damages and attorneys' fees if the acts or negligence vio-
late the tenant's statutory duties. Id. § 5321.05(C). The same relief is avail-
able if the tenant has initiated a proceeding under § 5321.07 in bad faith or
on grounds caused by his own negligent acts or omissions. Id. § 5321.09(D).
290. See notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text.
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The third situation that can justify an eviction notwithstanding
retaliatory intent occurs when the repairs necessary to comply with
the applicable building, housing, health, or safety code would be so
extensive as "to effectively deprive the tenant of the use of the dwell-
ing unit. '2 91 This justification has no extensive common law back-
ground; its focus is unique. It speaks to the effects of contemplated
repairs rather than to the impact of present unrepaired conditions.
Judicial precedent to support this justification is minimal. The
theoretical basis for exoneration of retaliatory motive in this situation
might be termed the "sound business purpose" rationale. This ra-
tionale was accepted by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Robinson v. Diamond Housing
Corp.292 In that case, the court refused to proscribe as retaliatory
the closing of a dwelling where another motive for the closing was
the landlord's inability to realize a return on his investment. 293 This
rationale shifts the burden of deterioration of housing from the land-
lord to the tenant. The landlord is relieved of the necessity to make
extensive repairs; the tenant must seek a new home.
Although the Act enables the landlord to evict rather than repair,
the new law does take steps to prevent abuse of this theory as enun-
ciated in Robinson. By expressly limiting its use to situations in
which repairs are necessary to comply with local codes, the Act pre-
cludes a landlord from using the eviction process merely because
overfinancing of the dwelling prevents a normal return on his in-
vestment. 294 Moreover, where an eviction is upheld on the basis of
necessary repairs, the court can enjoin reletting of the dwelling until
repairs are completed.2 95 Thus, should a landlord employ this justi-
fication to meet an allegation of retaliatory conduct, he may be
placed in the situation of having to make necessary repairs or lose
rental value of his property entirely. 296
The final situation that can justify an otherwise retaliatory evic-
291. OHIo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 5321.03(A)(3) (Page Supp. 1974).
292. 463 F.2d 853, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
293. Id. at 865.
294. See text accompanying note 189 supra and notes 368-69 infra discus-
sing aspects of financial pyramiding in relation to the Act.
295. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.15 (Page Supp. 1974).
296. So limiting the choices of the landlord may decrease the housing sup-
ply through what might be called a "court approved dissolution." Neverthe-
less, such a result may be in the public interest in cases where the premises
in question are in a severe state of deterioration. Furthermore, should the
court fear an adverse effect on the housing supply, it is authorized to order
repairs if the public interest so demands. Id. § 1923.15.
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tion is where "a tenant is holding over his term. '29 7  This justifica-
tion is not innovative. Where the tenant no longer has possessory
rights to protect, he should not be protected from eviction. The
problem that arises from this exception is that it could be employed
to vitiate the protection afforded by the defense of retaliation as re-
gards any periodic tenant, since it could be reasoned that a periodic
tenant becomes a holdover after the landlord declares the tenancy
terminated or declines to renew. 298  Such an interpretation is circu-
lar; it makes a nullity of the retaliation defense because the label
of holdover summarily disposes of the entire issue whether the land-
lord had a right to evict in the first instance.299 The actual issue
that arises when the retaliation defense is asserted by a periodic ten-
ant is not whether a landlord may evict a holdover tenant, but
whether the law will label the tenant a holdover. 'It is that status
which must be confronted first in the litigation process.
Although the holdover exception may appear to be especially
harsh for the periodic tenant, not every application of the holdover
exception will produce such inequitable results. For example, where
a notice of termination precedes the tenant's engaging in activities,
not even the periodic tenant could complain of the eviction or ter-
mination. Indeed, absent the application of the holdover exception
in this situation, there might be some question whether a landlord
could ever rightfully secure an eviction. At the very least, then, the
holder exception should remove the need to litigate the tenant's in-
tent to frustrate a nonretaliatory termination by engaging in pro-
tected activities subsequent to receipt of the notice of eviction or
termination.
There are a number of situations that ore not so easily resolved.
For example, should the holdover exception apply where a tenant
with a rental agreement for a fixed term engages in activity for which
the retaliation defense is available, and the landlord subsequently re-
fuses to renew the lease? Arguably, this tenant's situation is distin-
guishable from that of a periodic tenant. The periodic tenant does
not contemplate a fixed end to his tenancy, but a tenant who has
specified a -termination date well in advance without a binding re-
297. Id. § 5321.03(A)(4).
298. Id. § 5321.17(A) and (B). See text accompanying notes 380-81
infra for notice requirements.
299. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Mosko-
vitz, supra note 273, at 23-24; Schoshinski, supra note 238, at 542-45; Com-
ment, Landlord-Tenant Reform: Arizona's Version of the Uniform Act, 16
Amz. L. REv. 79, 130-33 (1974); 1971 Wis. L. Rlv. 938, 940-44.
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newal option may be deemed to have considered the possibility of
not being permitted to relet and accepted the risk of termination or
even desired the option to leave. In this context, it appears justified
that the tenant would become a holdover after the expiration of his
agreement. The holdover exception would probably allow the land-
lord to evict him.
Finally, it is not difficult to envision a situation in which a land-
lord has threatened not to renew a lease although the tenant believed
at the time of negotiation of the lease that the decision concerning
renewal was virtually his alone. This pressure may well restrict a
tenant's freedom to use the new law almost as much as would threats
of a more immediate eviction. The unavailability of the retaliatory
defense on the occasion of nonrenewal would deprive the tenant of
the defense at the only time when it would be of any importance
to him, since the agreement upon the fixed term of occupancy would
preclude most arbitrary attempts at eviction. °00 The landlord's con-
duct appears to be exactly the type at which the retaliation defense
is aimed. Conceptually, the tenant's expectations should bring him
outside the holdover exception. The question, however, remains un-
resolved.
The unavailability of the retaliation defense in a failure-to-renew
situation illustrates the limits of both the defense and the pro-tenant
policies of the entire statute. The new law does not convert the pri-
vate residential landlord into a public utility; nor does the retaliatory
conduct defense give the tenant a life estate. The real effect of the
defense is to provide a period during which the landlord can recon-
sider his decision or the tenant can find another dwelling. Although
the Act does not establish a fixed period during which a presumption
of retaliation operates in favor of the tenant,301 at some point in
time, the tenant's activity is so far attenuated from the alleged retali-
atory act that the defense cannot be successfully maintained. A
landlord cannot be forced to enter into a new rental agreement, but
he can be required to take time to "cool off" before refusing to enter
voluntarily into a new agreement for a fixed term.302 The protection
300. See notes 121-35 supra and accompanying text for discussion of re-
quirements for eviction for breach of a written rental agreement.
301. Statutory presumptions in other states have a life of from 60 days to
6 months. See note 253 supra. After a longer period they may be completely
unavailable. Moskovitz, supra note 273, at 28; Comment, Retaliatory Eviction
in California: The Legislature Slams the Door and Boards up the Windows,
46 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 118, 126 (1972); cf. McElhaney, Retaliatory Evictions:
Landlords, Tenants and Law Reform, 29 MD. L. REV. 193, 220-23 (1969).
302. Section 1923.15 may prevent the landlord from attempting to forego
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is only from a landlord's immediate vindictiveness, not from a long
term dissatisfaction with the tenant. Thus, to allow the retaliation
defense where the landlord has refused to renew would, in effect,
only permit the tenant to retain possession as a periodic tenant.
The statutory justifications play an important role in this process.
They represent a recognition of the fact that, despite being colored
by vindictiveness, certain evictions are authorized to effectuate the
larger policies of the statute. On the other hand, justifications
are so narrowly drawn that they maximize the vulnerability of the
vindictive landlord.303 Moreover, they do not exculpate the landlord
from his wrongful actions; he remains liable in damages for any vio-
lation of his legal duties.304
V. CONTRACTUAL CONTROLS
In ithe eyes of the law, landlord and tenant have traditionally
been free to bargain as they saw fit, adding to or subtracting from
-their responsibilities with impunity.30 5 In reality, the superior bar-
gaining power of the landlord results in little, if any, bargaining and
permits him to impose very harsh terms on the tenant.30 6 Although
the new Ohio law allows the use of rental agreements to set the terms
and conditions of the tenancy, the Act limits the freedom of contract
to prevent the parties from thwarting the purpose of the law.307 The
the cooling-off period and renting to a more compliant tenant Under that
section, the court may enjoin the reletting of premises if they are found to
be in a defective condition by a homing inspection agent Omro REV. CODE
ANN. § 1923.15 (Page Supp. 1974). Thus, if a landlord comes into court seek-
ing an eviction, he runs the risk of a general inspection and a potential injunc-
tion. The statute, therefore, prevents use of eviction as a vehicle for avoiding
the repair responsibility. Of course, if the inspection were to disclose no de-
fective conditions, no injunction would issue and the tenant's only recourse
would be the retaliation defense provision. See also notes 295-96 supra and
accompanying text.
303. Cf. Pioneer Linen Supply Co. v. Evatt, 146 Ohio St. 248, 65 N.E.2d
711 (1946).
304. Omo Rv. CODE ANN. § 5321.03 (B) (Page Supp. 1974).
305. See, e.g., George H. Dingledy Lumber Co. v. Erie RIR. Co., 102 Ohio
St. 236, 131 N.E. 723 (1921).
306. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); see Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their
Leases: An Empirical Study, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 247 (1970); Comment, A
Flexible Approach to the Problem of Exculpatory Clauses in Standard Form
Lease, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 520.
307. Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 5321.06 (Page Supp. 1974) provides:
A landlord and a tenant may include in a rental agreement any terms
and conditions, including any term relating to rent, the duration of
an agreement, and any other provisions governing the rights and ob-
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devices used by the statute take three forms. First, the law requires
that certain procedures be followed in handling security deposits. 308
Secondly, it renders unenforceable four types of provisions tradition-
ally used to modify rights, responsibilities, and liabilities.30 9 Finally,
the statute demands various notices by parties who elect to undertake
certain statutorily approved activities.310
A. Security Deposits
The provision dealing with security deposits is one of the most
deliberate reforms of the new law. In their consideration of various
bills, the legislators became sensitive to the flagrant abuses resulting
from the unjustifiable retention of deposits by landlords at the end
of the lease term.31' The legislature responded to this problem by
making it clear that such unwarranted confiscation will not be
tolerated.
A security deposit is defined under the statute as "any deposit
of money or property to secure performance by the tenant under a
rental agreement." 31-2  This definition immediately sets the tone of
ligations of the parties that are not inconsistent with or prohibited
by Chapter 5321 of the Revised Code or any other rule of law.
308. Id. § 5321.16.
309. Id. §§ 5321.13(A)-(D).
310. Id. § 5321.17.
311. Comments of State Representative Harry Lehman, one of the principal
drafters of the Act, at a conference sponsored by the Cleveland Heights Com-
munity Congress on Nov. 16, 1974.
To some extent the law also protects tenants who subsequently occupy the
premises. Since the landlord will have to make an inspection when a tenant
leaves in order to compile the required list, damages done by a previous -tenant
would be noted, thereby minimizing the possibility that a subsequent tenant
would be charged with that damage.
312. Omo Rav. CoDa ANN. § 5321.01(E) (Page Supp. 1974). The distin-
guishing characteristics of a security deposit are that the tenant is entitled to
its return at the end of the term of occupancy if he has fulfilled his obligations
and that he remains liable for damages in excess of the amount of the security
deposit. Cain v. Brown, 105 Ohio St. 264, 136 N.E. 916 (1922). There are
other forms of security that may be taken by the landlord that do not fall under
the restrictions of this statute since they do not fit the definition of security
deposit. Such security may take the form of advance rent, liquidated damages,
or additional consideration. 1 AM1UCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.73; ABA Com-
mittee on Leases, Security Deposits and Guarantees Under Leases, 1 REAL
PROP. PROBATE & ThusT 1. 405, 418-20 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as
ABA, Security Deposits]. Each of these forms of security has certain disad-
vantages that may make it unattractive to the residential landlord.
Advance Rents: A tenant has the right to the return of the advance if ei-
ther he or the landlord terminates the agreement prior to the period for which
the rent was paid in advance. The tenant also remains liable -for any damages
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the legislative approach. It makes clear that when the tenant has
performed his duties the purpose of the security deposit has been
achieved and the amount remaining in the fund is to be returned
to the tenant On the other hand, the law avoids setting limitations
on the amount a landlord may require as a security deposit.313 Pre-
sumably, the latitude is given the landlord to allow for the varied
circumstances under which a rental agreement may be negotiated
and to provide the landlord with the cushion he may believe neces-
sary to avoid large losses. However, should the landlord demand
a relatively large deposit, the law does not allow any windfall to the
landlord. If the amount of the deposit exceeds the greater of $50
or 1 month's rent, the landlord must pay 5 percent interest annually
on that excess, 314 roughly the equivalent of what the tenant would
realize if he had deposited the amount in a personal savings account.
done to the premises. Therefore this type of security is generally held to be
a security deposit. Cain v. Brown, supra; 1 AmmRIcAN LAW OF PRoPERTY §
3.73; Harris, A Reveille to Lessees, 15 S. CAL. L. REv. 412, 424-25 (1942).
It is therefore not a viable device for avoiding the new laws governing security
deposits.
Liquidated Damages: If there is doubt whether a security provision repre-
sents liquidated damages or a penalty, it will be treated as a penalty, particu-
larly if the actual damages are disproportionate to the amount of the security.
Friedlander v. Yakoobian, 10 Ohio L. Abs. 107 (CL App. 1931). Conse-
quently, the security may have to be returned despite actual damages. Midwest
Properties Co. v. Renkel, 38 Ohio App. 503, 176 N.E. 665 (1930).
Additional Consideration: If the tenant is entitled to the return of any of
the security under any circumstances this will be sufficient to convert the con-
sideration into a security deposit. See Cain v. Brown, supra; ABA, Security
Deposits, at 419-20.
Each of these forms of security is a device for avoiding the laws relating
to security deposits, and the use of any of them might be found to be uncon-
scionable under Omo Rv. CODE ANN. § 5321.14 (Page Supp. 1974). See
notes 360-67 infra and accompanying text.
313. See Omo Rav. CoDE ANN. § 5321.16 (Page Supp. 1974). A statutory
maximum security deposit is suggested in the URLTA § 2.101(a). The Com-
ment to that section suggests that this position was adopted rather than one
prohibiting security deposits altogether.
The virtue of not limiting the amount of the deposit is that the landlord
is free to take the security necessary under any given circumstance. Should
he abuse this flexibility, the unconscionability provision of the new law may
afford the tenant a remedy. See notes 360-67 infra and accompanying text.
314. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.16(A) (Page Supp. 1974). The land-
lord is relieved of the duty to pay interest if a tenant remains in possession
less than 6 months. This limitation on a tenant's right to receive interest could
be attributed to the small amount of money that would normally be involved
as well as to a recognition of the administrative and bookkeeping problems
connected with such short tenancies. It may also be indicative of a legislative
policy favoring relatively stable and continuing rental relationships.
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After the rental agreement has terminated and the tenant has
surrendered possession, the statute gives the landlord 30 days to (1)
deliver a written notice to the tenant itemizing and identifying each
deduction made from the deposit, and (2) return to the tenant what-
ever might be left of the deposit.815 If the landlord fails to comply
with these rules, he is subject to the statutory penalty: "the tenant
may recover the property and the money due him, together -with
damages in an amount equal to the amount wrongfully withheld, and
reasonable attorneys' fees."'316
On its face, the penalty provision is a powerful deterrent; how-
ever, the provision leaves unresolved the crucial question whether
providing the written notice and returning the unclaimed portion of
the deposit within the 30 days is a condition precedent to the land-
lord's right to deduct damages from the deposit.31 If the right is
not conditioned on adherence -to the procedural steps, the measure
of damages, "the amount wrongfully withheld," would only be the
part of the security deposit that is in excess of the damage to the
premises. Practically, then, as the dollar amount of tenant-caused
damages approaches the value of the security deposit, the sole sanc-
tion that is imposed on the landlord who fails to comply with the
notice requirements is payment of the tenant's attorneys' fees. Fur-
thermore, without an itemized list of charges, the tenant would be
left to speculate on the charges actually applied by the landlord
against his deposit. His only means of discovering both the nature
and the amount of the charges would be to file suit. Since court
costs are not made part of the tenant's recovery and since the award
of attorneys' fees is only discretionary,318 the tenant would have to
URLTA § 2.010(a) rejects interest payments in favor of providing a maxi-
mum amount for security deposits. This solution does not appear to be as sat-
isfactory as Ohio's. By imposing an interest rate instead of limiting the
amount or abolishing the security deposit, the Ohio law seems to balance the
very real need of landlords to have some means of protecting themselves
against the need of tenants to be protected from overreaching landlords.
315. Id. § 5321.16(B).
316. Id. § 5321.16(C).
317. See Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-Tenant Act of Committee
on Leases, Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 8 REAL
PROP. PROBATE AND TRusT J. 104, 110 (1973); Comment, Landlord-Tenant Re-
form: Arizondes Version of the Uniform Act, 16 ARIz. L REV. 79, 102 n.179
(1974). Setoff of actual damages before assessing the penalty was specifically
allowed in only one of the bills before the Ohio legislature. H.B. 277, §
5315.16.
318. OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.16(C) (Page Supp. 1974). In cases
where no actual or potential injuries will result from a failure to adhere to
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take a fairly substantial risk-conceivably only to discover hat the
charges are not unreasonable and do in fact equal the amount of
the deposit.
On the other hand, if the landlord's right to deduct damages is
construed as being conditional on his compliance with the law, he
would have no right to any portion of the deposit when he fails to
provide timely notice and remittance of the unclaimed portion.319
His failure to act would result in the entire amount of the deposit
being wrongfully withheld and therefore due to the tenant. The pos-
sible sanction under this construction would be liability for twice the
amount of the security deposit plus attorneys' fees.3 20 The landlord
could then set up his actual damages as a counterclaim and, if he
could prove them, use them as a setoff against the damages awarded
the tenant.32 1
This harsher penalty is much more consistent with the objectives
of the legislation. By imposing heavy sanctions on the landlord, the
Act performs two critical functions. First, it permits the tenant who
has not received the required notice to bring an action secure in the
knowledge that it will produce something more than a list of deduc-
tions, which he was entitled to at the outset. Secondly, it protects
against the landlord's disregard for procedural requirements by pre-
senting him with a substantial incentive to comply.322  At the same
time the legislation includes a mechanism to avoid the inequitable
a provision, the word "may" will generally be given a discretionary rather than
an imperative or mandatory construction. See State v. Board of Education,
127 Ohio St. 336, 188 N.E. 566 (1933); 2A Su'nmAxN § 57.03.
319. Conditioning rights on the giving of proper notice is a common pat-
tern in the statute. The tenant's right to damages and attorneys' fees for a
landlord's violation of security deposit provisions is conditional upon providing
the landlord with a forwarding address. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.16(B)
(Page Supp. 1974). The tenant's right to use the new remedies, id. § 5321.07,
and the landlord's right to evict, id. § 1923.02(H), and to receive notice of
rent withholding, id. § 5321.08, are all dependent on giving some form of no-
tice. See notes 375488 infra and accompanying text.
320. OHIo RaV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.12, .16(C) (Page Supp. 1974). Al-
though this "double damage" approach may appear harsh, this provision is less
harsh than other proposals before the legislature. Two of the bills would have
set minimum damages at three times the security deposit. S.B. 103, § 1923.24
(B); H.B. 796, § 5315.16(C). Even the bill sponsored by the Ohio Board
of Realtors provided minimum triple damages to be determined after a setoff
from the withheld security deposit of actual damages sustained by the landlord.
ILB. 277, § 5315.16(B).
321. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.12 (Page Supp. 1974).
322. See Note, Landlord-Tenant Reform: Arizona's Version of the Uni-
form Act, 16 AnIz. L. REv. 79, 102 n.179 (1974).
1975]
948 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
application of this severe penalty. The award of damages is wholly
subject to the discretion of the court.323  Thus, the court may take
into account the landlord's substantial good faith attempts to comply
with the notice requirements and withhold the award of damages ac-
cordingly.3 24
Another critical issue in the area of security deposits is the effect
of the landlord's sale of the leased property upon his statutory obliga-
tion to return a deposit at the termination of the tenancy.3 25 Ohio
common law has traditionally viewed the relationship of the landlord
and the tenant with regard to the deposit as that of a pledgee to
pledgor, since the title to the deposit does not pass to -the landlord.326
This makes the obligation a personal one between the parties. The
tenant, therefore, has no right against the purchaser of the landlord's
interest unless the purchaser receives a credit on the purchase price
to reflect the liability for the deposit. 32 7
Unlike some other landlord-tenant laws,328 the Ohio statute does
not specifically identify who has the obligaton to repay the tenant
as between the landlord and the purchaser. Although the statute
is apparently deficient in -this regard, there is a strong argument that
in reality no void exists. According to the statute, the person who
must comply with all the provisions of the law, including those regu-
lating the security deposit, is the landlord. "Landlord" is defined
323. See note 318 supra.
324. In discussing a security deposit statute similar to Ohio's, a New Jersey
court said: "The intent of the security deposit law is to alleviate certain prac-
tices engaged in by unscrupulous landlords and not to punish landlords who
act in good faith." Burnstein v. Liberty Bell Village, Inc., 120 NJ. Super. 54,
59, 293 A.2d 238, 240 (Dist. Ct. 1972).
325. 1 AM mcAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.73; ABA, Security Deposits, supra
note 312, at 420-21.
326. Cain v. Brown, 105 Ohio St. 264, 136 N.E. 916 (1922); Reveille to
Lessees, supra note 312, at 420. A lack of title change affects the landlord's
responsibilities for the deposit in that he is not subject to any rules against
the commingling of assets. This view was also accepted by New Jersey courts
at one time. See Kaufman v. Williams, 92 N.J.L. 182, 104 A. 202 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1918). In 1968, however, New Jersey by statute changed its view of
the relationship to that of a trust relationship. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-
19 (Supp. 1974-75).
327. Kaufman v. Williams, 92 N.J.L. 182, 104 A. 202 (Ct. Err. & App.
1918).
328. See, e.g., CAL. CM CODE § 1950.5(a)(1) (West 1954) (requiring no-
tice to the tenant of the sale in order to avoid liability); UR.LTA §§ 2.101
(e), .105(a) (imposing liability on both the old and the new owners). But
see Strum, The Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: A
Departure From Traditional Concepts, 8 REAL PROP. PROBATE & TRUsT J. 495,
496-97 (1973) (criticizing the URLTA treatment of the problem).
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by the statute as the owner or anyone authorized by the owner to
receive rents.3 29  Since the purchaser would be both the owner and
the one authorized by the original landlord to receive rents at the
time the issue of refund arises, he could be considered the landlord
for the purposes of fulfilling all refund obligations imposed by the
new law. The force of this argument may be considerably dimin-
ished, however, by the provison that imposes on a purchaser or other
transferee of the property the duty to fulfill only those obligations
of the landlord set forth in the provisions governing the condition
of the premises. 330
A primary consideration in reconciling the obligations of the
"landlord" with those of a purchaser on the question of security de-
posits should be the respective abilities of the parties to protect them-
selves in the sale transaction. Both immediately before and im-
mediately after the sale, the tenant is extremely vulnerable. If the
new purchaser is not responsible for the return of the deposit, the
tenant may be left in the unpleasant position of having to locate his
former landlord in order to reclaim his deposit. It is also quite pos-
sible that the tenant will not even be informed of the change in
ownership since the law does not explicitly require that tenants be
so informed. Moreover, the purchaser, upon assuming the owner-
ship of the structure, might demand a deposit to secure the tenant's
obligations to him, doubling the amount of the tenant's capital that
is tied up. The purchaser, on the other hand, can alleviate -these
problems by requiring the liability for the security deposits to be de-
ducted from the purchase price as part of the sale transaction. At
this point he is in a better position to receive the amount of the
security deposits from the landlord than the tenant would be after
the sale. The concession in price having been obtained, there would
be no hardship in imposing the liability for return of the deposit on
the purchaser. Since the purchaser is in the position to remove the
problem by simple drafting of the agreement, the law should require
him to do so.
B. Unenforceable Terms in Landlord-Tenant Agreements
It is well-established that a lease or rental agreement is a contract
329. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(B) (Page Supp. 1974). "'Landlord'
means the owner, lessor or sublessor of residential premises, his agent, or any
person authorized by him to manage the premises or to receive rent from a
tenant under a rental agreement." Cf. id. § 5321.13(E), discussed in text ac-
companying notes 368-70 infra.
330. Id. § 5321.13(E).
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as well as a conveyance of an interest in land. 83 1 The contractual
aspect of the lease has often been a weapon in the hands of the land-
lord that enables him to defeat legislative and judicial mandates in
the name of free negotiation. 3 2  In order that the allocation of
rights, remedies, and responsibilities established by the Act may re-
main effective, limitations have been placed on the power of the par-
ties to contract as they wish.
1. The General Limitation
The threshold limitation on lease terms states that no provision
of Chapter 5321 "may be modified or waived by any oral agree-
ment. '333 One broad exception to this general limitation is -that the
landlord may agree to assume any or all of the obligations of the
tenant with respect to the condition of the premises.3 3 4 The reason
for this exception is clear. Since the tenant begins negotiations at
a disadvantage, whatever concessions he may be able to obtain from
the landlord in the broad area of maintenance responsibilities will
be upheld. Conversely, since the landlord possesses a pronounced
advantage in the transaction, the further advantages he may gain
will, in all likelihood, be achieved by his artificial advantage, rather
than his bargaining abilities. Thus, the law will not recognize further
concessions.
One major problem arises from the wording of the general pro-
scription of waivers.3 3 5 By its literal terms, the provision does not
apply to waivers of Chapter 1923 rights. Thus, it could be argued
that a landlord could legally compel his tenant to agree to waiver
of the notice 33 6 or counterclaim3 37 rights granted by that chapter.
There are indications, however, that other features of the statute pre-
clude such a reading. The prohibition of warrants of attorney to
confess judgments strongly suggests that the tenant cannot be denied
the opportunity to present his side of the case in forcible entry and
detainer proceedings. 338 Furfhermore, -the nature of the interests in-
volved would dictate a prohibition of such waivers. By allowing an
overreaching landlord to secure waivers of counterclaim and notice,
331. See note 290 supra.
332. See note 306 supra.
333. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.13(A) (Page Supp. 1974).
334. Id. § 5321.,3(F).
335. Id. § 5321.13(A).
3,36. Id. § 1923.04.
337. Id. § 1923.061(B).
338. Id. § 5321.13(B); see notes 340-43 infra and accompanying text; cf.
Jenkins v. Myers, 63 Ohio St. 101, 102, 57 N.E. 1089 (1900).
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the law would be denying the tenant the chance to protect his right
to possession, perhaps the paramount concern of the legislature.
2. Attorneys' Fees
At common law, there was limited authority to the effect that
provisions for payment of legal fees were not enforceable. 339 The
Act codifies this rule by declaring unenforceable any lease provision
whereby either the landlord or tenant agrees to pay the other's at-
torneys' fees. 340 The reason for this prohibition lies in the general
role of fees in the statutory framework. The new law uses the award
of attorneys' fees basically for two purposes. 341  First, the award
serves as an additional sanction against one who violates the more
339. Midwest Properties Co. v. Renkel, 38 Ohio App. 503, 176 N.E. 665
(1930).
340. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.13(C) (Page Supp. 1974).
341. The legality of awarding attorneys' fees by statute is somewhat unset-
tled in Ohio. OHno CONsTtTMON art. I, § 16 (1851) provides in part
that: "All courts shall be open and every person, for an injury done him in
his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law;
and shall have justice administered without denial or delay." In Hocking Val-
ley Coal Co. v. Rosser, 53 Ohio St. 12, 41 N.E. 263 (1895), the Ohio Supreme
Court held that a statute awarding attorneys' fees to an employee who was
suing to collect back wages was violative of the spirit of the above provision
of the Ohio Constitution since it unduly restricted the employer's access to
the courts. The court, in obiter dictum, stated that the award also violated
the equal protection clause of ORIo CONsnTitUoN, art. I, § 2.
Although Hocking Valley Coal has not been overruled, it is doubtful that
it remains good law. In Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642 (1914),
the United States Supreme Court upheld a similar statute, which had been chal-
lenged on fourteenth amendment grounds. The Court pointed out that:
Even were the statute to be considered as imposing a penalty upon
unsuccessful defendants in cases within its sweep, such penalty is ob-
viously imposed as an incentive to prompt settlement of small but
well-founded claims, and as a deterrent of groundless defenses, which
are the more oppressive where the amount involved is small ....
[The award of attorneys' fees] imposes only compensatory damages
upon a defendant who, in the judgment of the legislature, unreason-
ably delays and resists payment of a just demand.
233 U.S. at 651. This case is cited in Flory v. Cripps, 132 Ohio St. 487, 493,
9 N.E.2d 500, 502 (1937), which may be read as impiedly overruling Hocking
Valley Coal as regards the unconstitutionality of a statutory award of attor-
neys' fees.
Two other factors cast doubt on the vitality of Hocking Valley Coal. The
first is that it has not been cited since State ex rel. McCartney v. Hummell,
52 Ohio L. Abs. 55, 57, 81 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ct. App. 1948), where it was
not cited for its holding regarding attorneys' fees. A further shadow is cast
on its vitality by a case under the Ohio Fair Trade Act (OHIo REv. CoDE ANN.
§ 1333.32 (Page 1962)), Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 117 Ohio
App. 207, 176 N.E.2d 236 (1961), affd, 174 Ohio St. 487, 190 N.E.2d 460
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important provisions of the new law, whether landlord or tenant.3 42
Secondly, it provides incentive for the private bar to extend more
active and extensive representation to the low and middle income
tenants who normally cannot afford to pay the fees.3 43  This feature
is critical in providing the tenant with access to the courts. If the
tenant cannot afford his own legal fees, much less anyone else's, he
has to think carefully about attepting to vindicate his rights in litiga-
tion. Hence, what rights he may have had to a trial would be fore-
closed in the absence of the award of attorneys' fees.
3. Exculpatory and Indemnification Clauses
At common law the landlord and tenant were free to contract
away any or all liability by imposing the risk on the other.344  The
practical result was that, since the landlord had greater bargaining
power, leases generally relieved the landlord of all liability by impos-
ing the risk on the tenant.3 45 Typically, exculpatory clauses were
directed at tort liability. Since the tenant shouldered most of the re-
pair responsibilities, there was not a great deal for which to hold the
landlord harmless. However, such clauses take on new significance
under the Act. With the landlord's assumption of new statutory obli-
gations of repair, his potential tort liability may be substantially in-
creased. 346  Indeed, the courts have held that the creation of tort
liability based on statutory standards is a necessary sanction to ensure
compliance with statutory duties and that removing the sanctions by
contract is against public policy.3 4 7 The legislature has clearly rati-
(1963), which held that attorneys' fees awarded under the Fair Trade Act were
constitutional. See also Fisher, Ohio Fair Trade-Fair or Foul, 28 OIO ST.
LJ. 565, 592 (1967).
342. Attorneys' fees are awarded to the tenant in the following provisions
of the Ohio Revised Code: § 5321.02 (retaliatory conduct); § 5321.04 (abuse
of access); § 5321.15 (self-help evictions); § 5321.16 (security deposits). The
landlord may receive attorneys' fees under § 53,21.05 (tenant's breach of statu-
tory duty) and § 5321.09 (abuse of rent withholding). See also AimcAN
BAR FOUNDATION, MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 3-402, Com-
mentary (Tent. Draft 1969).
343. Gittes & Marshall, A Guide to Ohio's New Tenant-Landlord Law, 3
LAw & HOUSING NEWSLETTER, 2, 28 (Jan. 1975). Affluent landlords, how-
ever, have been well represented. Id.
344. Mansfield Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, C.L. & St. L.R. Co., 74 Ohio
St. 30, 77 N.E. 269 (1906); George H. Dingledy Lumber Co. v. Erie R. CO.,
102 Ohio St. 236, 131 N.E. 723 (1921); 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1472
(1962).
345. Mueller, supra note 306; Comment, id.
346. Compare Rose v. King, 49 Ohio St. 213, 30 N.E. 267 (1892), with
Branham v. Fordyce, 103 Ohio App. 379, 145 N.E.2d 471 (1957). See also
Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment COrp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
347. American States Ins. Co. v. Hannan Constr. Co., 283 F. Supp. 988
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fled the development of parallel tort liability by making unenforceable
any clause by which the landlord's liability or related costs are trans-
fered to the tenant.48 s
4. Warrants of Attorney to Confess Judgment
The prohibition against warrants of attorney in leases is a curious
one. At common law a warrant of attorney in a lease was effective
to obtain possession in an eviction proceeding. 349 The Act appar-
ently leaves that rule intact, since there is no direct reference to war-
rants to gain possession. Under the statute, however, courts may
no longer enforce warrants of attorney to confess judgment that are
contained in "any rental agreement or in any other agreement be-
tween the landlord and tenant for recovery of rent or damages to
the residential premises." 350
The coexistence of the common law and statutory rules gives rise
to a provocative interpretation of the statute. If the phrase "for re-
covery of rent or damages" is read as a description of the recoveries
for purposes of which the warrant is unenforceable regardless of
where it appears, then warrants for use in obtaining possession may
be enforceable. Such warrants would be for possession, not for rent
or damages. 351
The problem with such a construction, however, is that it may
confliot with other provisions of the statute. The law provides that
in any action under the law any party may recover any amount of
damages due him.352 By using a warrant to obtain possession, the
landlord could deprive the tenant of the opportunity to assert by way
(N.D. Ohio 1966), affd, 392 F.2d 171 (6th Cir. 1968); Boyd v. Smith, 372
Pa. 306, 94 A.2d 44 (1953).
348. Omo RFv. CoDE ANN. § 5321.13(D) (Page Supp. 1974). A prohibi-
tion of exculpatory clauses in all leases except those "in which any municipal
corporation, governmental unit, or corporations regulated by a State or Federal
Commission or agency" was a party has been struck down as violative of the
equal protection doctrine of the state and federal constitutions since the classi-
fication of the exceptions was unreasonable, Sweney Gas & Oil Co. v. Toledo
P. & W.R. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 265, 247 N.E.2d 603 (1969). It has been suggested
that a law distinguishing between residential and commercial rentals would also
be vulnerable to such an attack. Comment, supra note 306, at 528-29.
349. Milthoff v. Columbus Lodge, 8 Ohio Dec. 700, 7 Ohio N.P. 630, 34
Weekly L. Bull. 277 (C.P. Franklin County 1895); Hunter, The Warrant of
Attorney to Confess Judgment, 8 Omo ST. L.J. 1, 4 n.ll (1941).
350. Omo Rzv. CoDE ANN. § 5321.13,(B) (Page Supp. 1974).
351. See Klein, Highlights of Recent Changes in Landlord-Tenant Law, 46
L w & FAcT 5 (Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n, Nov. 1974).
352. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.12 (Page Supp. 1974).
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of counterclaim any damages that he might recover. The tenant
would not, therefore, be permitted to recover in "any action." The
tenant would be deprived of the right to use the landlord's retaliatory
motive as a defense353 and to avoid eviction 'by resorting to the setoff
provision.354 In these situations the warrant would act as a waiver
or modification of the rights granted in two provisions of the new
law. And yet the Act provides in absolute terms that no provision
can be waived or modified, 55 with none of the available exceptions
covering waivers effectuated by warrants of attorney.
Internal consistency can be preserved by a different construction
of the provision. The phrase "for rent or damages" may be read
as limiting -the type of "other agreement" in which warrants for any
purpose are unenforceable. Thus construed, the provision first pro-
hibits all warrants in any rental agreement, and further prevents
them in any other agreement, that has any effect upon the landlord's
right to recover rent or damages.3 56
Not only does such a construction avoid conflict with other pro-
visions of the landlord-tenant law, but it is also consistent with ex-
pressions of legislative policy in other areas. In the area of con-
sumer transactions, for example, warrants of attorney are unenforce-
able for any purpose.3 57 The broader prohibition would also further
the policy of consolidation of litigtion, which is intimately related to
elimination of delay and unnecessary judicial expense:n58 Indeed,
it is this policy of avoiding a multiplicity of lawsuits that pervades
the statutory reform in the closely related area of forcible entry
and detainer. 359 The effect of voiding a warrant of attorney for all
353. Id. § 5321.03(B)(1).
354. Id. § 1923.061(B); see notes 213-22 supra and accompanying text.
3,55. Id. § 5321.13 (A); see note 323 supra and accompanying text.
356. This construction is consistent with the rule that referential or qualify-
ing words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, should refer solely
to the last antecedent. See Carter v. Division of Water, 146 Ohio St. 203,
65 N.E.2d 63 (1946); 2A SuTHERLAND § 47.33.
A possible explanation for not prohibiting warrants of attorney in "other
agreements" as absolutely as in rental agreements is that the landlord and ten-
ant may be engaged in a sale of chattels or in an employment contract where
other laws might control or where the use of the warrant might be appropriate.
In such agreements the warrant would only be unenforcible where it concerned
rent or damages to the rental premises.
357. Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2323.13(E) (Page Sapp. 1974). This provi-
sion defines a consumer transaction as a sale or lease of goods, services, or
intangibles "for purposes that are primarily personal, family, educational, or
household." Id. § 2323.13(E) (2).
358. Omo R. CIrv. P. 1 (B).
359. The new law allows the landlord to join all of his claims, whether for
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purposes is to guarantee that the landlord's claim to possession and
the tenant's defenses and claims will be considered in one proceed-
ing.
5. Unconscionability
The landlord-tenant law includes an unconscionability provi-
sion similar to that found in the commercial transactions chapter
of the Ohio Revised Code.360 This provision permits the court to
examine the full commercial environment surrounding the making
of any rental agreement to determine if either party was under any
disability that would preclude meaningful bargaining.3 61 There are
obviously many variables that are relevant to such an inquiry. The
respective bargaining positions and abilities of the landlord and the
tenant are critical.362  A court would probably examine the agree-
ment itself to see if its terms were grossly unbalanced in favor
of one of the parties.3 63 The court could also narrow its in-
quiry and examine any one clause to see if its presence would un-
fairly surprise the other party.3 64 As in the commercial transaction
chapter, the unconscionability provision of the landlord-tenant stat-
ute provides for a flexible judicial response if the court finds the
agreement or some part of it to have been "unconscionable at the
time it was made." 3 5 The court may refuse to enforce the entire
lease, refuse to enforce separate provisions, or enforce the lease in
a manner that avoids an unconscionable result.
On its face the unconscionability provision is an important pro-
possession or damage, in a forcible entry and detainer action. Omo REv. CODE
ANN. § 1923.081 (Page Supp. 1974). The tenant may also assert all defenses
and counterclaims. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.061(A) (Page Supp. 1974).
URLTA § 4.105(a) is identical to Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 1923.061 (Page
Supp. 1974). The Comment to that provision states that the provision is
meant to be "consistent with modem procedure reform ... to the end that
all issues between the parties may be disposed of in one proceeding."
360. OHio Rnv. CODE ANN. § 1302.15 (Page 1962). See Leff, Unconscion-
ability and the Code: The Emperor's New Clause, 111 U. PENN. L. REv. 485
(1967), for an analysis and critique of the provision. It is obvious upon a
comparison of the two provisions that in the one contained in the Act revisions
have been made only to the extent necessary to make the provision specifically
applicable to residential rental agreements. See id. § 5321.14.
361. Leff, supra note 360.
362. See note 306 supra.
363. UCC § 2-302, Comment 1; Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d
80 (3d Cir. 1948); Leff, supra note 360, at 537-40.
364. UCC § 2-302.
365. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 53Z1.14(B) (Page Supp. 1974).
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teotion. Praotically, however, the comprehensiveness of the rest of
the statutory protections precludes the widespread use of an uncon-
scionability attack. Most of the rights and obligations in the residen-
tial rental relationship are set up by express statutory authority; 36
0
the arrangement cannot be disturbed by the agreement. 367  There
are, however, certain areas that the legislature chose not to enter.
The Act does not impose restrictions on the amount of rent or se-
curity deposit or in any way regulate the rules that the landlord may
impose on the tenant's use of the premises. It is only in these un-
regulated areas that -the unconscionability provision could serve as
an effective curb on contractual rights.
6. Right to Receive Rent
The Act provides that "[a] rental agreement, or the assignment,
conveyance, trust deed, or security instrument of the landlord's inter-
est in the rental agreement may not permit the receipt of rent free"
of the landlord's obligations regarding the condition of the prem-
ises. 36 8 The objective of this provision is to frustrate attempts to
avoid the new law by various technical changes in legal or equitable
ownership, specifically the separation of the obligations and responsi-
bilities of the landlord from his rights and assets. There could be
additional positive repercussions. The provision could discourage
over-financing or pyramiding second and third mortgages, since those
holding the subordinate security interests could only rely on assign-
ments of rents as additional security at substantial risk. By discour-
aging such financing, this provision reduces the opportunity for land-
lords to abuse the release-of-rents provision in a rent withholding ac-
tion. 369 On the other hand, this provision may have the unfortunate
side effect of limiting the availability of initial construction financing
or repair financing because of the risks that would accompany an
assignment. No institution would be eager to extend large amounts
of capital on a mortgage transaction where the mortgagor's default
might result in the mortgagee's being forced to assume the repair
responsibilities of the landlord when he receives the rental income.
At the very least, this additional risk may have some impact on the
interest rates charged for repairs of multiple dwellings.3 70
366. See id. §§ 5321.04, .05.
367. Id. § 5321.,13(A).
368. Id. § 5321.13(E).
369. See note 189 supra and accompanying text.
370. See Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-Tenant Act of the Commit-
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C. Notice Requirements
The giving of notice plays an important role in the new landlord-
tenant law. Wherever some form of notice is required, the giving
of that notice is a condition precedent to obtaining a benefit or exer-
cising a right 37 1 By -requiring notice, the Act may help to alleviate
some of the common problems of the residential tenancy: the anony-
mous landlord to whom the tenant cannot complain, 372 the lackadaisi-
cal tenant who would postpone complaining until problems are
virtually beyond correction,3 73 or the inconsiderate landlord who
would terminate a tenancy on short notice.3 74 The following notice
requirements have, for the most part, already been discussed in rela-
tion to the benefits or rights with which they are connected. They
are reiterated here for convenient reference.
1. Notice from the Landlord
At the beginning of the tenant's term of occupancy, the landlord
must give the tenant:
1) the name and address of the owner, and
2) the name and address of the owner's agent, if any.37 5
Where either of these is a corporation or other organization or busi-
ness entity, the address given must be either:
1) the principal place of business in the county in which
the premises are located, or,
2) if -there is none, then the principal place of business
within the state.376
In addition, the name of the person in charge of the principal place
of business must be supplied. This information must be contained
in every written rental agreement. Even if the agreement is oral
this information must be given to the tenant in writing.3 77 The con-
sequences to the landlord for failing to provide the information are
serious. If he fails to provide this notice, he is deemed to have
waived his own right to notice from the tenant as to defects in the
tee on Leases, Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 8 RE.AL
PROP. PROBATE & TRusr J. 104, 109 (1973), discussing a similar provision in the
URLTA, § 1.404.
371. See note 319 supra.
372. See notes 375-78 infra and accompanying text.
373. See notes 388-89 infra.
374. See notes 379-81 infra.
375. Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 5321.18(A) (Page Supp. 1974).
376. Id.
377. Id. § 5321.18(B).
1975]
958 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
premises and waived notice from the court as to the initiation of a
rent-withholding action.378
Notice is also necessary when the landlord intends to pursue
those statutory remedies available to him. The landlord must give
the tenant 30 days' notice of his intent to terminate the tenancy for
the tenant's violation of a statutory obligation.379 The landlord must
also give notice of termination of a month-to-month periodic tenancy
at least 30 days -prior -to -the date on which the next rent falls due.380
In the case of a week-to-week tenancy the notice must be given at
least 7 days prior to the date on which the termination is to occur.381
-Furthermore, unless there is an emergency or giving notice is im-
practical,38 2 the landlord must give at least 24 hours' notice before
exercising his right of entry.38 3  Finally, the landlord must give an
itemized list of deductions made from a security deposit within 30
days of the tenant's surrender of possession and termination of the
rental agreement. 88 4
2. Notice from the Tenant
At the time when he vacates the premises, the tenant must give
the landlord an address to which the list of damages and security
deposit may be sent.388 Failure to give the notice will bar the tenant
from obtaining damages or attorneys' fees for the landlord's failure
to supply the notice or return the deposit.386 The tenant does not,
however, forfeit his right to the unclaimed portion of the deposit.38 7
As a condition to using the new remedies provided by the Act
the tenant must give the landlord a written notice of any alleged
breach of obligations imposed on him by either the law or the rental
agreement. 38 8  This notice must be given within 30 days or a rea-
sonable time (considering the severity of the defect or condition),
whichever is shorter, of taking other action. 89
378. Id. § 5321.18(C).
379. Id. § 5321.11.
380. Id. § 5321.17(B).
381. Id. § 5321.17(A).
382. Id. § 5321.05(B).
383. Id. § 5321.04(A)(8).
384. Id. § 5321.16(B).
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. § 5321.07(A).
389. Id. § 5321.07(B).
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VI. ACTION FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
Prior to the enactment of the new law, the only issue considered
in an action for forcible entry and detainer was who held the right
to the present possession of the premises. 390 Under the new law391
the landlord may join his claim for possession with any other claim
he might have against the tenant arising out of the rental agreement,
including a claim for past due rent.3 92
The most significant benefits of the expanded form, however, ac-
crue to the tenant. Under the Act he may assert at trial any defense
he has to the landlord's claims. 393 Moreover, if the landlord's claim
for possession rests on nonpayment of rent, the tenant may counter-
claim for any damages that he might recover under either the law
or the agreement and use them as a setoff against the -rent due. If
after the setoff is completed there remains no rent due, the tenant
retains possession of the premises. 394 The effect of this modification
is to make the tenant's duty to pay rent dependent upon the land-
lord's performance of both his statutory and contractual obligations.
To the extent that the landlord has damaged the tenant by failing
to perform his obligations, the tenant is relieved of the duty to pay
rent. 395 If the tenant is willing to take the chance that the court's
evaluation of his damages will equal or exceed that of the landlord,
he may refuse to pay rent and counterclaim against the landlord
when the landlord proceeds in court to evict him.396 Although the
390. Carroll v. O'Conner, 25 Ohio St. 617 (1874); Sexton v. Sugar Creek
Packing Co., 38 Ohio App. 2d 32, 67 Ohio Op. 2d 187 (1974). The parties
to an action of forcible entry and detainer were entitled to a jury trial on re-
quest. The landlord was required to send a written demand that the tenant
vacate the premises at least 3 days before he could file a complaint. A sum-
mons had to be served at least 3 days prior to trial. OmIo Rnv. CODE ANN.
§ 1923.10 (Page 1968); Bonham v. Mills, 39 Ohio St. 534 (1883).
391. The modifications in the forcible entry and detainer provisions have
been given an excellent and knowledgeable discussion in Gittes and Marshall,
A Guide to Ohio's New Tenant-Landlord Law, 3 LAw & HOUSING NEwsLE'rra
2, 14-18 (Jan. 1975).
392. OmIo Rv. CoDE ANN. § 1923.081 (Page Supp. 1974).
393. Id. § 1923.061(A).
394. Id. § 1923.061(B). A court in equity had powers analogous to these.
For example, where there was a debt relating to the premises and owed by
the landlord to the tenant, the tenant could deduct the debt from the rent and
equity would enjoin the forfeiture. Milbourn v. Aska, 81 Ohio App. 79, 77
N.E.2d 619 (1946). Instead of giving the court new power to prevent a for-
feiture the Act may be interpreted merely to expand the ground on which the
old powers may be exercised.
395. See notes 212-35 supra and accompanying text.
396. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1923061 (Page Supp. 1974).
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tenant risks eviction if he withholds too great a portion of his rent,
his willingness to speculate on the damage award of the court creates
a type of self-help rent-withholding remedy. 97
The court itself has been granted new powers by the amended
law. A court may order the tenant to pay all or part of his rent
into the court.398 This is in addition to the power given the court
to order a full or partial rent abatement.3 99 The court may also for-
bid the landlord to rerent vacated premises until repairs have been
made to bring it up to the standards required by the law.40 0  The
court may order a government agency to inspect the residential
premises for violations of any of the landlord's statutory duties and
then act on the agency's findings. 40 1
As was the case at common law, the amended procedure requires
that a demand for vacation be given the tenant before an action can
be initiated. However, the law requires in addition that specific lan-
guage be used to inform the tenant of his legal rights and possible
need for legal advice. 40 2 The length of time between service of proc-
ess and trial has been extended to 5 days. 40 3 Furthermore, the sum-
mons must include specific language informing the tenant of his
rights. 40 4 This information is more extensive than that required in
the demand to vacate.
VII. CONCLUSION
The new Ohio landlord-tenant law makes three significant
changes in the residential rental relationship. The first is in the al-
location of responsibility for the condition of the premises. Instead
of basing duties on present possessory rights and protection of the
reversion, the Act assigns responsibilities commensurate with the
abilities and interests of the parties to a lease. The second significant
change is the grant of extensive new protections to the tenant.
These protections range from the negotiation of the lease to the final
judicial vindication of legal rights. Most impressive, though, is the
battery of remedies created by the new law. Whereas the common
law would allow only money damages and, under certain restricted
397. See notes 223-35 supra and accompanying text.
398. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1923.061(B) (Page Supp. 1974).
399. Id. § 5321.07(B)(2).
400. Id. § 1923.15.
401. Id.
402. Id. § 1923.04.
403. Id. § 1923.06(A).
404. Id. § 1923.06(B).
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circumstances, termination, the Act provides the tenant with the legal
tools to secure a safe and habitable dwelling from the most uncooper-
ative landlord.
The third major change effected by the law is perhaps the most
significant. It is not set forth as a provision of the new law, but it
pervades the entire statutory scheme. This change will be reflected
in the day-to-day relations of landlords and tenants throughout the
state. Burdened with new obligations and faced with tenants armed
with new and powerful remedies, landlords will be forced to become
more receptive to the needs of their tenants. Thus, the new law
will to a significant degree equalize the balance of legal power between
the landlord and tenant so that both will hopefully realize the futility
of maintaining adversary positions and work together to achieve ade-
quate housing.
JOHN E. CAMPION
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APPENDIX
Ohio Revised Code Chapter 1923.-1974 Revisions'°
Sec. 1923.02. Proceedings under Chapter 1923. of the Revised
Code, may be had:
(H) Against tenants of residential premises who have breached
an obligation imposed by section 5321.05 of the Revised Code which
materially affects health and safety. Prior to the commencement of
an action under -this division, notice must be given to the tenant and
compliance secured with section 5321.11 of the Revised Code.
(I) Against tenants of residential premises who have breached
an obligation imposed upon them by a written rental agreement.
As used in this Chapter, "landlord," "tenant," "residential prem-
ises," and "rental agreement" mean the same as defined in section
5321.01 of the Revised Code.
Sec. 1923.04.
Every notice given under this section by a landlord to recover
residential premises shall contain the following language printed or
written in a conspicuous manner: "You are being asked to leave the
premises. If you do not leave, an eviction action may be initiated
against you. If you are in doubt regarding your legal rights and obli-
gations as a tenant, it is recommended that you seek legal assistance."
See. 1923.06. (B) Every summons issued under this section to
recover residential premises shall contain the following language
printed in a conspicuous manner: "A complaint to evict you has been
filed with this court. No person shall be evicted unless his right to
possession has ended and no person shall be evicted in retaliation for
the exercise of his lawful rights. If you are depositing rent with -the
clerk of this court you shall continue to deposit such rent until the
time of the court hearing. The failure to continue -to deposit such
rent may result in your eviction. You may request a trial by jury.
You have the right to seek legal assistance. If you cannot afford a
lawyer, you may contact your local legal aid or legal service office.
If none is available, you may contact your local bar association."
See. 1923.061. (A) Any defense in an action under Chapter
1923. of the Revised Code may be asserted at trial.
(B) In an action for possession of residential premises based
upon nonpayment of the rent or in an action for rent when the tenant
is in possession, the tenant may counterclaim for any amount he may
recover under the rental agreement or under Chapter 5321. of the
Revised Code. In that event the court from time to time may order
the tenant to pay into court all or part of the past due rent and rent
becoming due during the pendency of the action. After trial and
judgment, the party to whom a net judgment is owed shall be paid
first form the money paid into court, and any balance shall be satis-
405. Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1923.02, .04, .061, .081, .15 (Page Supp.
1974).
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fled as any other judgment. If no rent remains due after application
of this division, judgment shall be entered for the tenant in the action
for possession. If the tenant has paid into court an amount greater
than that necessary to satisfy a judgment obtained by the landlord,
the balance shall be returned by the court to the tenant.
Sec. 1923.081. A trial on an action in forcible entry and de-
tainer for residential premises pursuant to Chapter 1923. of the
Revised Code may also include a trial on claims of the plaintiff for
past due rent and other damages under a rental agreement, unless
for good cause shown the court continues the same. For purposes
of this section, good cause includes the request of the defendant to
file an answer or counterclaim to the claims of the plaintiff or for
discovery, in which case the proceedings shall be the same in all re-
spects as in other civil cases. If, at the time of the trial, the
defendant has filed an answer or counterclaim, the trial may proceed
on the claims of the plaintiff and -the defendant.
Sec. 1923.15. During any proceeding involving residential
premises under this Chapter, the court may order an appropriate
governmental agency to inspect the residential premises. If the
agency determines and the court finds conditions which constitute a
violation of section 5321.04 of the Revised Code, and if the premises
have been vacated or are to be resiored to the landlord, the court may
issue an order forbidding the re-rental of the property until such con-
ditions are corrected. If the court finds that the tenant may remain
in possession, the court may order such conditions corrected. If the
conditions have been caused by the tenant, the court may award
damages to the landlord equal to the reasonable cost of correcting
such conditions.
Ohio Revised Code Chapter 5321.406
Sec. 5321.01. As used in Chapter 5321. of the Revised Code:
(A) "Tenant" means a person entitled under a rental agree-
ment to the use and occupancy of residential premises to the
exclusion of others.
(B) "Landlord" means the owner, lessor or sublessor of resi-
dential premises, his agent, or any person authorized by him to man-
age the premises or to receive rent from a tenant under a rental
agreement.
(C) "Residential premises" means a dwelling unit for residen-
tial use and occupancy and the structure of which it is a part, the
facilities and appurtenances therein, and the grounds, areas, and
facilities for -the use of tenants generally or the use of which is prom-
ised the tenant. "Residential premises" does not include:
(1) Prisons, jails, workhouses, and other places of incarceration
or correction, including halfway houses or residential arrangements
which are used or occupied as a requirement of probation or parole;
(2) Hospitals and similar institutions with the primary purpose
of providing medical services and "homes" licensed pursuant to
Chapter 3721. of the Revised Code;
406. Id. §§ 5321.01-.19.
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(3) Tourist homes, hotels, motels, and other similar facilities
where circumstances indicate a transient occupancy;
(4) Boarding schools, where the cost of room and board is in-
cluded as part of the cost of tuition, but not college and university
approved housing and private college and university dormitories;
(5) Orphanages and similar institutions;
(6) Farm residences furnished in connection with the rental of
land of a minimum of two acres for production of agricultural prod-
ucts by one or more of the occupants;
(7) Dwelling units subject to the provisions of sections 3733.41
to 3733.48 of the Revised Code;
(8) Occupancy by an owner of a condominium unit.
(D) "Rental agreement" means any agreement or lease, writ-
ten or oral, which establishes or modifies the terms, conditions, rules,
regulations, or any other provisions concerning the use and occu-
pancy of residential premises by one of the parties.
(E) "Security deposit" means any deposit of money or property
to secure performance by the tenant under a rental agreement.
(F) "Dwelling unit" means a structure or the part of a structure
that is used as a home, residence, or sleeping place by one person
who maintains a household or by two or more persons who maintain
a common household.
Sec. 5321.02. (A) Subject to section 5321.03 of the Revised
Code, a landlord may not retaliate against a tenant by increasing the
tenant's rent, decreasing services that are due to the tenant, or bring-
ing or threatening to bring an action for possession of the tenant's
premises because:
(1) The tenant has complained to an appropriate government
agency of a violation of a building, housing, health, or safety code
that is applicable to the premises, and the violation materially affects
health and safety;
(2) The tenant has complained to the landlord of any violation
of section 5321.04 of the Revised Code;
(3) The tenant joined with other tenants for the purpose of
negotiating or dealing collectively with the landlord on any of the
terms and conditions of a rental agreement.
(B) If a landlord acts in violation of division (A) of this sec-
tion the tenant may:
(1) Use the retaliatory action of the landlord as a defense to
an action by the landlord to recover possession of the premises;
(2) Recover possession of the premises; or
(3) Terminate the rental agreement.
In addition, the tenant may recover from the landlord any actual
damages together with reasonable attorneys' fees.
(C) Nothing in division (A) of this section shall prohibit a
landlord from increasing the rent to reflect the cost of improvements
installed by the landlord in or about the premises or to reflect an
increase in other costs of operation of the premises.
Sec. 5321.03. (A) Notwithstanding section 5321.02 of the
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Revised Code, a landlord may bring an action under Chapter 1923.
of the Revised Code for possession of the premises if:
(1) The tenant is in default in the payment of rent;
(2) The violation of the applicable building, housing, health,
or safety code that the tenant complained of was primarily caused
by any act or lack of reasonable care by the tenant, or by any other
person in the tenant's household, or by anyone on the premises with
the consent of the tenant;
(3) Compliance with the applicable building, housing, health,
or safety code would require alteration, remodeling, or demolition of
the premises which would effectively deprive the tenant of the use
of the dwelling unit;
(4) A tenant is holding over his term.
CB) The maintenance of an action by the landlord under this
section does not prevent the tenant from recovering damages for any
violation by the landlord of the rental agreement or of section
5321.04 of the Revised Code.
Sec. 5321.04. (A) A landlord who is a party to a rental
agreement shall:
(1) Comply with the requirements of all applicable building,
housing, health, and safety codes which materially affect health and
safety;
(2) Make all repairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary
to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition;
(3) Keep all common areas of the premises in a safe and sani-
tary condition;
(4) Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all
electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, and air condition-
ing fixtures and appliances, and elevators, supplied or required to
be supplied by him;
(5) When he is a party to any rental agreements that cover
four or more dwelling units in the same structure, provide and main-
tain appropriate receptables for the removal of ashes, garbage, rub-
bish, and other waste incidental to the occupancy of the dwelling
unit, and arrange for their removal;
(6) Supply running water, reasonable amounts of hot water
and reasonable heat at all times, except where the building that in-
cludes the dwelling unit is not required by law to be equipped for
that purpose, or the dwelling unit is so constructed that heat or hot
water is generated by an installation within the exclusive control of
the tenant and supplied by a direct public utility connection;
(7) Not abuse the right of access conferred by division 03) of
section 5321.05 of the Revised Code;
(8) Except in the case of emergency or if it is impracticable
to do so, give the tenant reasonable notice of his intent to enter and
enter only at reasonable times. Twenty-four hours is presumed to
be a reasonable notice in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(B) If the landlord makes an entry in violation of division
(A)(8) of this section, or makes a lawful entry in an unreasonable
manner, or makes repeated demands for entry otherwise lawful
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which have the effect of harassing the tenant, the tenant may recover
actual damages resulting therefrom and obtain injunctive relief to
prevent the recurrence of the conduct, and if he obtains a judgment
reasonable attorneys' fees, or terminate the rental agreement.
See. 5321.05. (A) A tenant who is a party to a rental agree-
ment shall:
(1) Keep that part of the premises that he occupies and uses
safe and sanitary;
(2) Dispose of all rubbish, garbage, and other waste in a clean,
safe, and sanitary manner;
(3) Keep all plumbing fixtures in the dwelling unit or used by
tenant as clean as their condition permits;
(4) Use and operate all electrical and plumbing fixtures prop-
erly;
(5) Comply with the requirements imposed on tenants by all
applicable state and local housing, health, and safety codes;
(6) Personally refrain, and forbid any other person who is on
the premises with his permission, from intentionally or negligently
destroying, defacing, damaging, or removing any fixture, appliance,
or other part of the premises;
(7) Maintain in good working order and condition any range,
refrigerator, washer, dryer, dishwasher, or other appliances supplied
by the landlord and required to be maintained by the tenant under
the terms and conditions of a written rental agreement;
(8) Conduct himself and require other persons on the premises
with his consent to conduct themselves in a manner that will not dis-
turb his neighbors' peaceful enjoyment of the premises.
(B) The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent for the
landlord to enter into the dwelling unit in order to inspect the prem-
ises, make ordinary, necessary, or agreed repairs, decorations,
alterations, or improvements, deliver parcels which are too large for
the tenant's mail facilities, supply necessary or agreed services, or ex-
hibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers, mort-
gagees, tenants, workmen, or contractors.
(C) If the tenant violates any provision of this section, the
landlord may recover any actual damages which result from the vio-
lation together with reasonable attorneys' fees. This remedy is in
addition to any right of the landlord to terminate the rental agree-
ment, to maintain an action for the possession of the premises, or
injunctive relief to compel access under divison (B) of this section.
Sec. 5321.06 A landlord and a tenant may include in a rental
agreement any terms and conditions, including any term relating to
rent, the duration of an agreement, and any other provisions govern-
ing the rights and obligations of the parties that are not inconsistent
with or prohibited by Chapter 5321. of the Revised Code or any
other rule of law.
Sec. 5321.07. (A) If a landlord fails to fulfill any obligation
imposed upon him by section 5321.04 of the Revised Code or by
the rental agreement, or the conditions of the premises are such that
the tenant reasonably believes that a landlord has failed to fulfill any
such obligations, or a governmental agency has found that the prem-
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ises are not in compliance with building, housing, health, or safety
codes which apply to any condition of the residential premises that
could materially affect the health and safety of an occupant, the ten-
ant may give notice in writing to the landlord, specifying the acts,
omissions, or code violations which constitute noncompliance with
such provisions. Such notice shall be sent to the person or place
where rent is normally paid.
(3) If a landlord receives the notice described in division (A)
of this section and after receipt of such notice fails to remedy -the con-
dition within a reasonable time considering the severity of the condi-
tion and the time necessary to remedy such condition, or within thirty
days, which ever is sooner, and if the tenant is current in rent pay-
ments due under the rental agreement, the tenant may do one of
the following:
(1) Deposit all rent that is due and thereafter becomes due the
landlord with the clerk of court of the -municipal or county court
having jurisdiction in the territory in which the residential premises
are located;
(2) Apply to the court for an order directing the landlord to
remedy the condition. As part thereof, the tenant may deposit rent
pursuant to division (B) (1) of this section, and may apply for an
order reducing the periodic rent due the landlord until such time as
the landlord does remedy the condition, and may apply for an order
to use the rent deposited to remedy the condition. In any order is-
sued pursuant to this division, the court may require the tenant to
deposit rent with the clerk of court as provided in division (B)(1)
of this section.
(3) Terminate the rental agreement.
(C) This section does not apply to any landlord who is a party
to any rental agreements which cover three or fewer dwelling units
and who provides notice of such fact in a written rental agreement
or, in the case of an oral tenancy, delivers written notice of such fact
to the tenant at -the time of initial occupancy by the tenant. This
section does not apply to any private college and university dormi-
tories.
Sec. 5321.08. (A) Whenever a tenant deposits rent with the
clerk of a court as provided in section 5321.07 of the 'Revised Code,
the clerk shall give written notice of this fact to the landlord and
to his agent, if any.
(B) The clerk shall place all rent deposited with him in a sep-
arate rent escrow account in the name of the clerk in a bank or build-
ing and loan association domiciled in this state.
(C) The clerk shall keep in a separate docket an account of
each deposit, with the name and address of the tenant, and the name
and address of the landlord and of his agent, if any.
(D) For his cost, the clerk may charge a fee of one per cent
of the amount of the rent deposited, which shall be assessed as court
costs.
Sec. 5321.09. (A) A landlord who receives notice that rent
due him has been deposited with a clerk of court pursuant to section
5321.07 of the Revised Code, may:
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(1) Apply to the clerk of court for release of the rent on the
ground that the condition contained in the notice given pursuant to
division (A) of section 5321.07 of the Revised Code has been reme-
died. The clerk shall forthwith release the rent, less costs, to the
landlord if the tenant gives written notice to the clerk that the condi-
tion has been remedied;
(2) Apply to the court for release of the rent on the grounds
that the tenant did not comply with the notice requirement of division(A) of section 5321.07 of the Revised Code, or that the tenant was
not current in rent payments due under the rental agreement at the
time the tenant initiated rent deposits with the clerk of courts under
division (B) (1) of section 5321.07 of the Revised Code;
(3) Apply to the court for release of the rent on the grounds
that there was no violation of any obligation imposed upon the land-
lord by section 5321.04 of the Revised Code or by the rental agree-
ment, or by any building, housing, health, or safety code, or that the
condition contained in the notice given pursuant to division (A) of
section 5321.07 of the Revised Code has been remedied.
(B) The tenant shall be named as a party to any action filed
by the landlord under this section, and shall have the right to file
an answer and counterclaim, as in other civil cases. A trial shall
be held within sixty days of the date of filing of the landlord's com-
plaint, unless for good cause shown the court may continue the same.
(C) If -the court finds that there was no violation of any obli-
gation imposed upon the landlord by section 5321.04 of the Revised
Code or by the rental agreement, or by any building, housing, health,
or safety code, or that the condition contained in the notice given
pursuant to division (A) of section 5321.07 of the Revised Code has
been remedied, or that the tenant did not comply with the notice
requirement of division (A) of section 5321.07 of the Revised Code,
or that the tenant was not current in rent payments at the time the
tenant initiated rent deposits with the clerk of court under division(3)(1) of section 5321.07 of the Revised Code, the court shall order
the release to the landlord of rent on deposit with the clerk, less costs.
(D) If the court finds that the condition contained in the notice
given pursuant to division (A) of section 5321.07 of the Revised
Code was the result of an act or omission of the tenant, or that the
tenant intentionally acted in bad faith in proceeding under section
5321.07 of the Revised Code, the tenant shall be liable for damages
caused to the landlord, and for costs, together with reasonable attor-
neys' fees if the tenant intentionally acted in 'bad faith.
Sec. 5321.10. (A) If a landlord brings an action for the re-
lease of rent deposited with a clerk of court, the court may, during
the pendancy of the action, upon application of the landlord, release
part of the rent on deposit for payment of -the periodic interest on
a mortgage on the premises, the periodic principal payments on a
mortgage on the premises, the insurance premiums for the premises,
real estate taxes on the premises, utility services, repairs, and other
customary and usual costs of operating the premises as a rental unit.
(B) In determining whether to release rent for .the payments
described in division (A) of this section, the court shall consider the
amount of rent the landlord receives from other rental units in the
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buildings of which the residential premises are a part, the cost of
operating those units, and the cost which may be required to remedy
the condition contained in the notice given pursuant to division (A)
of section 5321.07 of the Revised Code.
Sec. 5321.11. If the tenant fails to fulfill any obligation imposed
upon him by section 5321.05 of the Revised Code that materially
affects health and safety, the landlord may deliver a written notice
of this fact to the tenant specifying the act and omission that consti-
tutes noncompliance with such provision and that the rental agree-
ment will terminate upon a date specified therein not less than thirty
days after receipt of the notice. If the tenant fails to remedy the
condition contained in the notice, the rental agreement shall then ter-
minate as provided in the notice.
Sec. 5321.12. In any action under Chapter 5321. of the Revised
Code, any party may recover damages for the breach of contract or
the breach of any duty that is imposed by law.
Sec. 5321.13. (A) No provision of Chapter 5321. of the Re-
vised Code may be modified or waived by any oral or written agree-
ment except as provided in division (F) of this section.
(B) No warrant of attorney to confess judgment shall be recog-
nized in any rental agreement or in any other agreement between
a landlord and tenant for the recovery of rent or damages to the resi-
dential premises.
(C) No agreement to pay the landlord's or tenant's attorney
fees shall be recognized in any rental agreement for residential prem-
ises or in any other agreement between a landlord and tenant.
(D) No agreement by a tenant to the exculpation or limitation
of any liability of the landlord arising under law or to indemnify the
landlord for that liability or its related costs shall be recognized in
any rental agreement or in any other agreement between a landlord
and tenant.
(E) A rental agreement, or the assignment, conveyance, trust
deed, or security instrument of the landlord's interest in the rental
agreement may not permit the receipt of rent free of the obligation
to comply with section 5321.04 of the Revised Code.
(F) The landlord may agree to assume responsibility for ful-
filling any duty or obligation imposed on a tenant by section 5321.05
of the Revised Code.
Sec. 5321.14. (A) If the court as a matter of law finds a rent-
al agreement, or any clause thereof, to have been unconscionable
at the time it was made, it may refuse to enforce the rental agree-
ment or it may enforce the remainder of the rental agreement with-
out the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(B) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the rental
agreement, or any clause thereof, may be unconscionable, the parties
shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to
its setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making the deter-
mination.
Sec. 5321.15. (A) No landlord of residential premises shall
initiate any act, including termination of utilities or services, exclu-
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sion from the premises, or threat of any unlawful act, against a ten-
ant, or a tenant whose right to possession has terminated, for the pur-
pose of recovering possession of residential premises, other than as
provided in Chapters 1923., 5303., and 5321. of the Revised Code.
(B) No landlord of residential premises shall seize the furnish-
ings or possessions of a tenant, or of a tenant whose right to posses-
sion has terminated, for the purpose of recovering rent payments,
other than in accordance with an order issued by a court of compe-
tent jurisdictio9 .
(C) A landlord who violates this section is liable in a civil ac-
tion for all damages caused to a tenant, or to a tenant whose right
to possession has terminated, together with reasonable attorneys'
fees.
Sec. 5321.16. (A) Any security deposit in excess of fifty dol-
lars or one month's periodic rent, whichever is greater, shall bear in-
terest on the excess at the rate of five per cent per annum if the
tenant remains in possession of the premises for six months or more,
and shall be computed and paid annually by the landlord to the
tenant.
(B) Upon termination of the rental agreement any property or
money held by the landlord as a security deposit may be applied to
the payment of past due rent and to the payment of the amount of
damages that the landlord has suffered by reason of the tenant's non-
compliance with section 5321.05 of the Revised Code of the rental
agreement. Any deduction from -the security deposit shall be item-
ized and identified by the landlord in a written notice delivered -to
the tenant together with the amount due, within thirty days after ter-
mination of the rental agreement and delivery of possession. The
tenant shall provide the landlord in writing with a forwarding address
or new address to which the written notice and amount due from
the landlord may be sent. If the tenant fails to provide the landlord
with the forwarding or new address as required, the tenant shall not
be entitled to damages or attorneys' fees under division (C) of this
section.
(C) If the landlord fails to comply with division (B) of this
section, the tenant may recover the property and money due him,
together with damages in an amount equal to the amount wrongfully
withheld, and reasonable attorneys' fees.
Sec. 5321.17. (A) The landlord or the tenant may terminate
or fail to renew a week-to-week tenancy by notice given the other
at least seven days prior to the termination date specified in the
notice.
(B) The landlord or the tenant may terminate or fail to renew
a month-to-month tenancy by notice given the other at least thirty
days prior to the periodic rental date.
(C) This section does not apply to a termination based on the
breach of a condition of the rental agreement or the breach of a duty
and obligation imposed by law.
See. 5321.18. (A) Every written rental agreement for residen-
tial premises shall contain -the name and address of the owner and
the name and address of the owner's agent, if any. If the owner
or the owner's agent is a corporation, partnership, limited partner-
ship, association, trust, or other entity, the address shall be the princi-
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pal place of business in the county in which the residential property
is situated or if there is no place of business in such county then its
principal place of business in this state, and shall include the name
of the person in charge thereof.
(B) If the rental agreement is oral, the landlord, at the com-
mencement of the term of occupancy, shall deliver to tenant a written
notice containing the information required in division (A) of this sec-
tion.
(C) If the landlord fails to provide the notice of the name and
address of the owner and owner's agent, if any, required under divi-
sion (A) or (B) of this section, the notices to the landlord required
under division (A) of section 5321.07 and division (A) of section
5321.08 of the Revised Code shall be waived by the landlord and
his agent.
Sec. 5321.19. No municipal corporation may adopt or continue
in existence any ordinance that is in conflict with Chapter 5321. of
the Revised Code, or that regulates those rights and obligations of
parties to a rental agreement that are regulated by Chapter 5321.
of the Revised Code. The provisions of Chapter 5321. of -the
Revised Code do not preempt any housing, building, health, or
safety codes of any municipal corporation.
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